

POL 16

BIAFRA

1/1/67

Systematic declassification review of material in this folder
was completed by the Department of State on:

2-19-96 RTR

(Date and Reviewer's Initials)

The remaining material was declassified as of that date.

0422

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05



POL 17 NIGERIA-ETH
Department of State

TELEGRAM

TR POL 16 BIAFRA

UNCLASSIFIED 634 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 LAGOS 04911; 041943Z

88
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 20, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,

CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSA 02, RSR 01, AID 30, PC 15, ACDA 16,

/169 W

R 041917Z DEC 67
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8446
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 330
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1926


UNCLAS LAGOS 4911

1. NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA ADEDOKUN HAASTRUP DEPARTED LAGOS FOR ADDIS DEC. 3. AT AIRPORT HE TOLD NEWS REPORTERS THAT AMONG ENVOYS FROM REBELS IN EAST CENTRAL STATE WHO HAD VISITED ETHIOPIA

PAGE 2 RUDSLC 4911 UNCLAS
SEEKING APPOINTMENTS WITH EMPEROR IN ORDER REQUEST RECOGNITION FOR "BIAFRA" ARE K.O. MBADIWE, MATHEW MBU, KENNETH DIKE, CHIKE OBI, FRED NWANWUN AND PIUS OKIGBO. HAASTRUP SAID THAT NONE OF THESE SUCCEEDED IN SEEING THE EMPEROR OR ANY OF HIS MINISTERS. HAASTRUP ADDED THAT ETHIOPIAN GOV'T IS "SOLIDLY BEHIND" FMG IN TASK OF MAINTAINING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF NIGERIA.
MATHEWS

2
UNCLASSIFIED

0423



21
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE collect
[] CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

PRIORITY

PRIORITY

Origin: ACTION: Amembassy LISBON
Info: INFO: Amembassy BRUSSELS
Amembassy KINSHASA
Amembassy LAGOS
Amconsul LUANDA
USUN NEW YORK

STATE

Based on uncleared memcon and subject to revision on review. NOFORN FYI:

1. Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Portuguese Ambassador ~~XXXX~~ Garin October 31 to express USG's deep concern over growing reports of mercenary activities in Angola directed against the Congo (K) and of GOP's support for ~~XXXXXX~~ Biafra.
2. Under Secretary stated that USG had learned from a variety of sources including ~~XXXXXX~~ foreign governments that there is open talk by mercenaries in Angola about supporting their comrades in ~~XXXX~~ Bukavu or even attacking Kinshasa. This seriously jeopardizes good offices of the International Red Cross which now attempting remove mercenaries from Bukavu without further bloodshed. He added that he was extremely concerned about these reports and wanted the Ambassador to make it clear to Lisbon that we hoped that no rpt no mercenary movements from Angola would take place and that GOP would prevent any such attempts.

EUR: SFP: GWLandau: mhs 10/31/67

4065

Telegraphic transmission and class

EUR - John Ledy

U - Mr. Katzenbach
S/S - Mr. Walsh

SECRET

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

POL 23-9 The Cong
062809

Biafra
MMA

1 NOV 67 01 28Z

62 869

0424

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

ORIGIN ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	
ANA	EUR	EC
	5	
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	
L	FBO	AIC
		12
SPM		4P
		1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
33	10	3
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

PL 7 NIGERIA
PL FR. NIGERIA
PL 10 BIAFRA
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-604

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State-WASHINGTON
INFO : American Embassy: LAGOS

FROM : American Embassy-PARIS

DATE: October 10, 1967

SUBJECT : FMG Mission Visits Paris

REF : Paris' telegram 4632 of October 4, 1967

As reported in the referenced telegram, a Nigerian Federal Military Government mission passed through Paris the week of October 1-7. The members of the mission were Permanent Under-Secretaries M. P. C. ASIODA (Industry), Ahmed JODA (Information) and Oguan SULIRE (Foreign Affairs). They reportedly met with French businessmen and bankers and devoted special attention to the daily newspaper, Le Figaro, (whose coverage of Nigeria has been markedly pro-Biafra). For reasons which are as yet unexplained, the mission cancelled an appointment with M. LEBEL, the Quai's Director (Assistant Secretary) for Africa and the Middle East. Apparently there was no official contact by the mission with the French Government.

The mission held a press conference on October 4 before leaving for Brussels and Bonn. Asioda (an Ibo) denied that the war was causing serious economic problems and said the FMG has "given orders for the protection of Ibo lives and property." He described the OAU six-man committee on Nigeria as having a purely "consultative" role which could not treat Lagos and Enugu as "two separate powers". Asioda then repeated the standard FMG three points for a settlement of the conflict and said perhaps the OAU could send observers to the Constitutional Convention of the 12 states of Nigeria once peace has been restored. Questioned on Communist arms aid, he replied that the FMG has the means to pay for what it needs and purchased a small number of Soviet and Czech aircraft commercially. He noted India, another Commonwealth member, also uses MIG's.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:RBOakley/rm 10/9/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:RFunkhouser

Clearances:

0425

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VN12959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

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Page 2 of A-604 from
Embassy-PARIS

The Nigerian Embassy here has been moderately active in the propaganda field, most recently by circulating the text of General GOWON's September 2 speech under a covering note stressing the three points (conditions for peace) set forth by Gowon in that speech.

BOHLEN

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0426

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

AFS	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	
NEA	CU	INN
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
L	FBO	AID
		20
ARM	SIP	SIR
2		
AGR	COM	FRB
	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	3
OSD	USIA	NSA
33	10	3
	NSC	6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 23 - NIGERIA
X 2
Pol 16 BIPRA
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A-1203
NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : Amembassy LAGOS

OCT 13 8 25 AM '67

FROM : Amembassy LONDON

DATE: October 10, 1967

SUBJECT: "Inside Biafra": Connor Cruise O'Brien Describes
Visit for Observer

REF :

1. The Observer of October 8 carries an article by former Irish diplomat and UN official in the Congo, Connor Cruise O'Brien, describing a short visit he made to Enugu, Port Harcourt and Calabar in late September. O'Brien made the trip with two American professors, Stanley Diamond and Audrey Chapman. In his words, "we were known to be sympathetic to the Biafran cause, in the sense that we shared, and still share, a belief that the conquest of the Eastern Region by the North, in the name of federation, would be a great human disaster. We were received in Biafra, therefore, as friends and were guests of the Biafran Government during our stay."

2. In the course of the article O'Brien describes an interview with Colonel Ojukwu in which Ojukwu spoke in familiar terms of his willingness to accept "all possible forms of technical and economic cooperation," with the rest of Nigeria, although he knew "this was not enough and that his adversaries hoped to impose their own terms on a defeated Biafra." O'Brien is at pains to deny that there is any similarity between the secession of Katanga from the Congo ("inspired by the Union Miniere") and the secession of the Ibos. He does, however, see similarities between the adaptability and intelligence of the Ibos and that of the Kasai Baluba.

3. O'Brien summarizes his thesis near the end of the article: "It is possible that the State of Biafra may be crushed out of existence...what is certain, however, is that a nation has been born and will in some form endure."

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL/R-A:MS:earns:ajo

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL - William H. Brubeck

Cleanances:

0427

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/03

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2
A- 1203 London

4. The text of the O'Brien article is attached.

KAISER

Enclosure:

Newspaper Article

all bmb

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0428

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

PL FR NIGERIA
TELEGRAM
NR PL 16 BIAFRA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 PARIS 04632 042053Z

90
ACTION AF 21

INFO EUR 25, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, L 03, INR 07, P 04,
CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, SAM 03, NSA 02, AID 30, RSR 01, SR 01,
ORM 03, /171 W

R 041540Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6195
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA 86
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 210
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 268
AMEMBASSY LAGOS 201
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 62
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 104
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 135

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 4632

SUBJ: FRENCH VIEWS ON NIGERIA

REF: PARIS 391 *PL BIAFRA*

- ② 1. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS OCT. 4 WITH QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR
NON-FRENCH AFRICA (GUEURY) AND NIGERIAN DESK OFFICER (PIERRET),

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 4632 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IMBOFF OBTAINED IDEA PRESENT FRENCH THINKING ON NIGERIAN SITUATION.
QUAI LACKS SOLID INFORMATION ON MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY
SINCE IT HAS NO REPRESENTATION IN BIAFRA. HOWEVER, QUAI
INCLINED TO THINK THAT FEDERAL FORCES STIL HAVE LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE
GAINING MILITARY VICTORY, ALTHOUGH THEY VERY CLEARLY HAVE OBTAINED

CONFIDENTIAL

0429

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MW NARA Date 10/5/05

3



POL 17 UK-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
XR POL 16 BIAFRA

CONFIDENTIAL

LAGOS 2660
9-18-67

PAGE 01 LAGOS 02660 181952Z

89
ACTION AF 21

INFO RSR 01, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, SSO 00, DODE 00, USIE 00, NSAE 00, BUR 25,
SP 02, SS 35, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, SAH 03, L 03, H 02, P 04,
INR 07, O 02, OPR 02, //122 W

P R 181815Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7256
INFO AMCONSUL ENUGU 2084

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 2660

1. BRITISH HC HAS INQUIRED INFORMALLY ABOUT MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING BRITISH AFFAIRS IN ENUGU IF DHC AND STAFF HAVE TO DEPART IN NEXT FEW DAYS. SPECIFICALLY, WOULD IT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR BRITISH TO LEAVE ONE MAN IN ENUGU WHO WOULD WORK THROUGH OUR CONSULATE?
2. GUIDANCE FROM DEPT REQUESTED.
GP-4. MATHEWS.

2
MICROFILMED BY 6578

CONFIDENTIAL

0430

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 9509503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

37



UN 22-2 NIGERIA
Department of State
XR TELEGRAM
POL 16 BIAFRA

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 USUN N 00646 011530Z

TO
ACTION 10 01

INFO FOR PS-AP 21:00PM 02:50 01:50C 01:50A 12:00 02:50C 10:00SAE 00.
00:00R 27:00 04:00A 04:00D 01:50 02:50 35:00A 02:50R 01:50/156

4 011:00Z EFF 67
FM US 15610R USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6796
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS 203
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1191

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 646

SUBJECT: NIGERIA AND UNSEC

1. CLARK (NIGERIA) TOLD HISOFF U THANT HAD INFORMED CHIEF ()
JAG 01 THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED UNSEC OFFICIALS NOT TO RECEIVE
ANY BIAFRAN DEL AND TO BAR BIAFRANS FROM ENTERING SECRETARIAL
BUILDING.

2. COMMENT: CLARK OBVIOUSLY SATISFIED BOTH BY SYG ATTITUDE
AND OFFICER'S STATEMENT THAT IT WILL RECEIVE NO BIAFRAN DEL.

END

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USUN 646
9-1-67

2

CONFIDENTIAL

0431

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

37

POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
XR POL NIGERIA 4-835

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

POL 16 BIAFRA

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ACCRA PRIORITY
 " LONDON "
 Amconsul ENUGU "
 " IBADAN "
 " KADUNA "
 CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA PRIORITY

STATE _____

LIMDIS

1. Nigerian Ambassador Martins called on Assistant Secretary Palmer August 30 at own request. Martins began conversation by citing press report he had just seen to effect that should Zik become head of state of Biafra, USG would probably recognize Biafra. Palmer responded with categorical assurances there no basis for story and that USG had no intention of recognizing Biafra.
2. Martins welcomed Palmer's statement but said he and FMG had been increasingly disturbed recently at spate of stories concerning USG involvement with rebels, citing specifically "Private Eye" article published in UK. Palmer reiterated that USG continues recognize FMG as only sovereign, legal GON, that there had been no change in our policy, and no change anticipated.
3. Martins said FMG respects USG stand of "absolute neutrality" in Nigerian conflict. FMG troubled, however, by ease with which rebels have obtained US military equipment. As example, Martins cited info just received by FMG that (a) rebels have purchased six American F-104 Starfighters in West Germany for

Drafted by:

AFW:RPSmith:emb 8/30/67

Tel. Ext.
6402Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AFW - Roy M. Melbourne

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Palmer (draft)

SECRET

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

0432

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND959503
 By MMNARA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY
" MOSCOW "
Amconsul ENUGU "
IBADAN "
KADUNA "
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, PRIORITY

STATE

LIMDIS

1. Under Secretary received Ambassador Martins afternoon August 23 at latter's request for brief meeting to enable Ambassador to deliver Aide-Memoire containing FMG protest over US statement on Nigerian purchase of Soviet arms. Text of Aide-Memoire being sent separately. Ambassador read and interpolated briefly on text.
2. In response, Under Secretary expressed regret if there any misunderstanding by FMG of intent of US statement. While he understood reasons for FMG seeking arms, he had discussed arms with Martins before and recalled being told during meeting with Chief Enaharo that FMG had no intention of turning to Soviets. Martins said that FMG had hoped it might get some US arms up to time of Enaharo's visit and it was later that request of US had been made for export licenses and had been refused. However, Under Secretary recalled Enaharo's shock that question even asked when he had inquired if FMG mission then in Moscow was seeking arms. Martins expressed doubt whether Enaharo, before coming on his mission, had been seized with facts and asserted that he himself had no details

Drafted by:

AFW:RMMelbourne:emb 8/23/67.

Tel. Ext.
2619

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Palmer
Amb Trimble

S/S - Mr. Gribble

SECRET

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR

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JEF 19-6 USSR-NIGERIA

POL NIGERIA-US

POL 16

24 AUG 67 01 21Z

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0433

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

3



POL 17-2 US-NIGERIA
 Department of State **TELEGRAM**
 XR POL 16 BIAFRA

CONFIDENTIAL

ENUGU 384
8-23-67

PAGE 01 ENUGU 00384 231221Z

46

ACTION AF 21

INFO EUR 25, SP 02, SS 35, GPM 03, SC 01, NSC 10, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, INR 07

P 04, SAH 03, IO 21, O 02, PER 02, CPR 02, OPR 02, OC 09, SSO 00, CCO 3,

USIE 02, NSCE 02, NSAE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, /158 W

0 P 231155Z AUG 67
 FM AMCONSUL ENUGU
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 618
 INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 1116
 AMEMBASSY LONDON 368

C O N F I D E N T I A L ENUGU 384

1. CONSULATE PERSONNEL REQUIRE PASSES FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE CITY IN ORDER AVOID LENGTHY DELAYS AND SEARCHES AT ROADBLOCKS. FORMERLY PASSES WERE ISSUED BY MILGOV'S OFFICE BUT RECENTLY THIS FUNCTION WAS TRANSFERRED TO "MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS," WHICH ISSUED PASSES UPON ORAL REQUEST. "CHIEF OF PROTOCOL" NOW INFORMS US PASSES WILL BE ISSUED ONLY AFTER "MINISTRY" RECEIVES WRITTEN REQUEST FROM CONSULATE.

2. RELIEVE WE WILL HAVE TO SEND LETTER TO "MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS" IF WE ARE TO OBTAIN PASSES AND POSSIBLY OTHER FORMS COOPERATION WHICH ESSENTIAL PERMIT US CARRY OUT

PAGE 2 RUTANU 384 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 RESPONSIBILITIES. REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON HOW TO HANDLE THIS.

3. FYI: PASS REQUIRED FOR COURIER TRIP WHICH SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY AUGUST 25.

GP--3
 BARNARD

CONFIDENTIAL

0434

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND 959503
 By MNARA Date 10/5/03

3
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: [] COLLECT
[] CHARGE TO

POL 17-2 US-NIGERIA

025719

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

XR POL

6 BIAFRA

23 AUG 67 20

Origin

ACTION: Amconsul ENUGU IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO : Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY
" " LONDON "

STATE

Ref: Enugu 384

see

1. You should ~~make appropriate~~ most appropriate official and make following points.

a) USG position well known: continues recognize Federal Government; has not recognized Biafra.

b) USG has sought vigorously to avoid involvement in Nigeria's internal difficulties. It hopes Easterners appreciate that endeavor and respect it.

c) Requirement that Amconsul make formal application to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Biafra might be misinterpreted by some as implying recognition of Biafra by USG. ~~Such an understanding could indicate US recognition of Biafra and could create serious problems for US relations with Nigeria.~~

d) We believe it in interest of all parties that US Consulate continue function in Enugu.

e) Request most strongly therefore that authorities continue permit Consulate function without raising unnecessary difficulties which would make US position more difficult.

Drafted by:

L/AF:CGustafson:nmc:ba 8/23/67

Tel. No.

2887

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

William C. Trimble

AF - JUSMUN

Cleared by:

AFW-Mr. Smith

L/SCA-Mr. Smith (draft)

SCA-Miss Watson (sub)

L/AF-Mr. Runyon (draft)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

125719

0435

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/03

37



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
 Department of State
 XR TELEGRAM
 POL 16 BIAFRA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 ACCRA 00575 151833Z

89
ACTION AF 21

INFO P 04, CIA 04, RSC 01, NSA 02, INR 07, RSR 01, EUR 25, AID 30, PC 15.

GPM 03, NSC 10, DOD 01, 124 W

R 151700Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO USINFO WASHDC
SECSTATE WASHDC 2250

Accra 575-
8-15-67

UNCLAS ACCRA 575

UNCLAS

CURRENT REACTION, ATTN: IOP/R, IBS, IPS, IAA

1. ACCRA, AUGUST 15 -- THE INDEPENDENT KUMASI PIONEER THIS MORNING QUESTIONED BRITAIN'S ROLE IN THE NIGERIAN CRISIS, SAYING THAT WHILE THERE APPEARS TO BE NO DOUBT SHE IS BACKING THE GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL GOWON, "SHE SEEMS TO BE UNCERTAIN ABOUT BIAFRA; SHOULD SHE RECOGNIZE BIAFRA OR SHOULD SHE NOT?"

2. THE PIONEER ACCUSED BRITAIN OF "COLDLY CALCULATING" THE CHANCES OF BIAFRA BEFORE MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT

3. THE PIONEER SAID THAT THIS SELF-INTEREST BY BRITAIN WAS ALSO EVIDENCED IN "THE GOLD COAST WHEN BRITAIN BETRAYED THE TRUST REPOSED IN HER BY THE CHIEFS AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA WHEN, INSTEAD OF GIVING BACK POWER TO THIS GROUP, BRITAIN GAVE IT TO THE C.P.P."

UNCLASSIFIED

(2)

0436

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VNI 954503
 By MNARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
TR POL 16 BIAFRA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 LAGOS 01211 041841Z

50
ACTION AF 21

INFO EUR 25, IO 21, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, NSA 02, L 03,

INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, AID 30, ACDA 17, RSR 01,

/202 W

R 041710Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6500
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA 979
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 151
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 67
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 126
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 61
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1465
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 205
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 209
RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS 536
AMCONSUL ENUGU 1777
AMCONSUL IBADAN 1047
AMCONSUL KADUNA 1353

UNCLAS LAGOS 1211

REFERENCE LAGOS 1157 AND A-019

SUBJ UPPER VOLTA SUPPORT FOR FMG

1. FEDERAL INFORMATION MINISTRY YESTERDAY ISSUED PRESS RELEASE ON UPPER VOLTA SUPPORT FOR FMG POLICY WHICH FRONT-PAGED LAGOS PAPERS TODAY. THIS ADDS ANOTHER COUNTRY TO THOSE WHICH HAVE EXPRESSED VIEWS ON SUPPORTING FMG (LAGOS A-019).

EXCLUDED FROM
(2)

UNCLASSIFIED

0437

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MWA/ARA Date 10/5/05

31 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM

*Intelligence
Note* - 642

August 3, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

DAVID E JOOR

Subject: NIGERIA: Gowon Gaining Against Defiant Ojukwu

The recent military achievements of Nigeria's Federal Military Government have strengthened its position vis-a-vis breakaway Biafra, but prospects for a settlement have not yet emerged.

Military Successes. During the first four weeks of hostilities against Biafra, the Federal forces of General Yakubu Gowon have made moderate but significant inroads into Biafran territory. They now have three important footholds there. Nsukka, 10 miles from the border and 35 miles from Enugu, was the hardest to take and continues to involve the heaviest fighting. At Ogoja, near Biafra's northeast border, local minority tribes welcomed Federal troops and have since accepted an administrator appointed by Lagos. The Nigerian navy on July 25 landed strong forces at Bonny, at the mouth of the Niger River. From there they block all ocean traffic to Biafra's principal port 40 miles up-river, Port Harcourt. Lagos, hopeful of more support from Biafra's non-Ibo minorities, is now planning further landings in southern Biafra and a move on Port Harcourt.

Federal Image Brightens. The exaggerated and conflicting announcements made in Lagos about the course of operations, particularly at first, compared unfavorably with Enugu's more accurate accounts describing initial Biafran successes. This early credibility advantage tended to give weight

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CONTROLLED DISSEM

6
This report was prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

PCL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR PCL 15-1 NIGERIA
PCL 18 NIGERIA

PCL 16 BIAFRA

XR DEF 14-2 CLEH-NIGERIA

0438

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959543
By MNARA Date 10/5/02

37



UN 22-2 USSR
Department of State
TELEGRAM
xR POL 23-8 US

POL 16 BIAFRA
DET-19-6 USSR-NIGERIA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 USUN N 00376 020707Z

ACTION 10 21

INFO EUR 25, FBI 01, SY 03, CPR 02, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, N

NSC 02, NSA 02, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, SAH 0,

AF 21, RSR 01, 163 W

P 012232Z AUG 67
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USUN N
376
8-1-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 376

DEMONSTRATION AT SOV MISSION

SOV MISSION PICKETED THIS DATE BY FIFTEEN INDIVIDUALS CARRYING
SIGNS ADVOCATING RECOGNITION BIAFRA AND PROTESTING SOV UNION
FURNISHING ARMS TO NIGERIA. DEMONSTRATION PEACEFUL AND BROKE
UP AFTER ONE AND HALF HOURS. NOTIFICATION OF INTENTION TO
PICKET GIVEN TO POLICE BY DONATUS ANYANWU OF 435 WEST

119TH STREET, NYC, REPRESENTING BIAFRA STUDENTS ASSO.

DECON UPON RECEIPT.

FEDERSEN

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
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By MNA Date 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL 16 BIAFRA		
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L	FBO	AID				ANALYSIS BRANCH		
		20				DATE: July 20, 1967		
		30						
AGR	COM	FRB	FROM : Amembassy LAGOS					
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT : Non-Recognition of Biafra/Support of Federal Military Government					
IR	XMB	AIR	REF : Lagos A-019					
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
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<p>1967 JUL 21 PM 5 42</p> <p>COPYFLO-PBR</p>			<p>The Iraqi Ambassador to Nigeria has assured the Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs of the "unflinching support of his government and people to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria in the current Nigerian crisis." This was announced in a Federal Ministry of Information press release dated July 18, 1967. The text of the press release follows:</p> <p>"The Iraqi Ambassador in Nigeria, His Excellency, Mr. Nafdat Al-Shawaf, to-day paid a courtesy visit to the Inspector-General of Police and Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs, Mr. Kam Selem, at the offices of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ikoyi and reaffirmed the unflinching support of his government and people to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria in the current Nigerian crisis.</p> <p>"The Ambassador discussed the Nigerian situation with the Inspector-General and said that his country noted with sympathy and understanding the untiring efforts of the Federal Military Government to protect the independence and territorial integrity of Nigeria and expressed optimism that these efforts would soon restore normalcy to the whole country.</p> <p>"The Inspector-General thanked the Ambassador and said that the government and people of Nigeria will ever remain grateful to the governments and peoples of countries like Iraq for their expressions of sympathy and support during this crucial period of Nigeria's history. He added that the Federal Military Government was determined to ensure that Nigeria remained one united, indivisible and prosperous nation."</p>					
			FORM 4-62 DS-323					
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Clearances:								

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COMMENT: Knowing that the Federal Government is anxious that no country recognize the secessionist regime of Biafra, particularly while the outcome of military efforts to suppress the rebellion is uncertain, and knowing that there are millions of moslems in Nigeria, the Arab countries can be expected to give their support to the Federal Government. Moreover, this helps them to obtain Nigerian support in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council in their conflict with Israel.

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FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN

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INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

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BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 0080

NEA

1. UK AND NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSIONERS HAVE INFORMED ME THAT
THEY HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN
PUSHING CASE FOR RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA ON CHAIRMAN JUXON-SMITH.

IO

P

USIA

2. IF THIS IS TRUE, EFFORT HAS BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL TO DATE.
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN LEIGH HAS TOLD ME NO ACTION WOULD EVEN BE
CONTEMPLATED UNLESS OAU WERE TO TAKE POSITION IN FAVOR OF
RECOGNITION.

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3. IN GENERAL CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH ISRAELI AMBASSADOR,
I TOUCHED UPON NIGERIAN SITUATION, AND HIS REACTION WAS CLEARLY

RSC

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 080GF C O N F I D E N T I A L
FAVORABLE TO BIAFRA CAUSE. HOWEVER, HE WAS EVASIVE ON
"RECOGNITION". EMBASSY OFFICER MET SIMILAR EVASIVE REACTION
IN TALK WITH ISRAELI SECOND SECRETARY.

GP-3. BRADFORD

1967 JUL 18 AM 9 30 12

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By MVA Date 10/5/05

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* ^{POL 16 BIAFRA}
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Action
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DE RUEHCR 391 1911245
ZNY CCCCC

Info

SS FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
GFM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
SP INFO RUHDKJA/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
RITALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
ZNY/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
SC RUHDKLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON
SAH RUHDTOR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
L RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
H RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
EUR STATE BRNC
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DD C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 391

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USIA SUBJ: BIAFRA: FRENCH VIEW

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1. QUAI DIRECTOR NON-FRENCH AFRICAN AFFAIRS (GUEURY)
GAVE FM3GFF RUN DOWN OF QUAI THINKING ON BIAFRA JULY 7 BASED ON
PAPER HE RECENTLY PREPARED FOR MINISTEP. HE MADE TWO MAIN
POINTS: (A) GOF HAS NO PRESENT INTENTION RECOGNIZING BIAFRA OR

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 391 C O N F I D E N T I A L
PROVIDING IT ANY ASSISTANCE; (B) GOF BELIEVES BIAFRA IS STRONG
ENOUGH IN HUMAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES TO MAINTAIN ITS EXISTENCE
AND EVENTUALLY OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION.

2. SAFRAP DECISION TO PAY CRUDE ROYALTIES TO BIAFRA
DESCRIBED AS HAVING BEEN MOTIVATED BY FEELING THIS WAS BEST
MEANS ENSURE CONTINUATION ITS EXPORTS AND PROTECT ITS EMPLOYEES
FROM POSSIBLE REPRISALS. WHILE BP-SHELL DECIDED MAKE "TOKEN
PAYMENT" OF 250,000 POUNDS STERLING TO BIAFRA, WHILE CONTINUING
MAKE PAYMENTS IN LAGOS AS WELL, SAFRAP MADE CLEAR CHOICE FOR
BIAFRA. EFFECTIVENESS FMG BLOCKADE CAUSED SAFRAP RECONSIDER
POSITION AND IT HAS NOW DECIDED MAKE "TOKEN PAYMENT" TO BIAFRA
(MONEY TO BE DEPOSITED IN FRENCH BANK IN PARIS) AND CONTINUE
PAYMENTS TO LAGOS, FOLLOWING SHELL FORMULA. IN "FEW WEEKS" SAFRAP
WILL PROBABLY SEND TANKER TO BORRY TO SEE WHETHER BIAFRA AND FMG
WILL ALLOW CRUDE TO BE EXPORTED UNDER NEW FORMULA.

3. GUEURY OF OPINION THAT BLOCKAGE OF OIL EXPORTS IS
"DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD", IN THAT BIAFRA IS PROBABLY BETTER ABLE

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By MNA Date 10/5/03

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-2- Paris 391, July 10

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 391 C O N F I D E N T I A L
WITHSTAND LOSS OF REVENUES THAN FMG. BARRING VERY REAL DANGER
OF WAR BETWEEN FMG AND BIAFRA, QUAI INCLINED BELIEVE THAT
CONTINUATION OF PRESENT IMPASSE FOR ONE OR TWO YEARS WOULD FORCE
FMG TO COME TO TERMS WITH BIAFRA SO THAT OIL PRODUCTION COULD
RESUME WITH REVENUES SHARED. GUEURY LIKENED IBOS TO ISRAELIS
IN THEIR INDUSTRY AND COHESIVENESS AND SAID HE BELIEVES BIAFRA
HAS EXCELLENT CHANCE TO SURVIVE "SO LONG AS NOTHING HAPPENS TO
OJUKWU".

4. GUEURY KEENLY INTERESTED IN INFORMATION ON B-26S
AND SAID QUAI WOULD DO WHAT IT COULD IN PLUGGING POSSIBLE
LOOPHOLES THROUGH WHICH AIRCRAFT MIGHT ESCAPE FROM FRANCE.
FRENCH MISSIONS IN AFRICA ALERTED AND ABIDJAN HAS REPORTED
THAT B-26, US REGISTRATION N-12576, LANDED THERE JUNE 28 AND TOOK
OFF JUNE 29, ORIGIN AND DESTINATION UNKNOWN. PILOT GAVE NAME
OF L'ESTRADE BUT BELIEVED TO BE FORMER POLE NAMED ZUMBACH WHO
FLEW FOR RAF DURING WWII AND REPORTEDLY FLEW FOR TSHOMBE
AT ONE TIME IN CONGO. QUAI IN TOUCH WITH MINDEF ON THIS QUESTION
GUEURY SAID.

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 391 C O N F I D E N T I A L
5. COMMENT: BASED ON ITS MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC ASSESSEMENT
OF BIAFRA'S CHANCES OF SURVIVAL, WE CAN EXPECT FRANCE TO
TRY AND KEEP ON REASONABLE TERMS WITH OJUKWU. HOWEVER, WE DO
NOT THINK GOF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY "SUPPORTING EASTERN
SECESSION" AS LOGOS 5936 TO DEPT SPECULATES. GOF MOST UNLIKELY
RUN RISK OF INVOLVEMENT IN PRICKLY AFRICAN PROBLEM OF ONLY
PERIPHERAL INTEREST, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF DIFFICULT SITUATION
IT NOW FACES IN NORTH AFRICA WHERE ITS INTERESTS ARE OF CONSIDERABLE
IMPORTANCE. (THIS EVEN MORE CASE SINCE OUTBREAK MAJOR FIGHTING
BETWEEN FMG AND BIAFRA, OF WHICH GUEURY NOT AWARE JULY 7.)
BOHLEN

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Authority	VND 954503
By	MMNARA
Date	10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL 16 Biafra	
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TO : Department of State

INFO : ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, CHAD, COTONOU, GABERONES, KHARTOUM, KUALA LUMPUR, KUWAIT, LISBON, LOME, LONDON, LUSAKA, MADRID, NAIROBI, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, PARIS, SENEGAL, SIERRA LEONE, THE HAGUE, ENUGU, IBADAN, KADUNA

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: July 9, 1967

SUBJECT : Non-Recognition of "Biafra"; View of 20 Countries

REF : Lagos 10070, June 9, 1967

Shortly after ex-military governor Ojukwu issued a unilateral declaration of independence and led the former Eastern Region out of Nigeria, the Embassy reported in the reference telegram the names of fifteen countries which had denied recognition of the secessionist government or had disclaimed rumors that they had accorded recognition.

As of July 7, Biafra has not been recognized by any country. Information has been received from various sources on the attitudes toward recognition (ranging from positive denial to undecided) of eighteen additional countries. Two countries (Zambia and Togo) listed in the reference telegram have also stated more emphatically that they will not extend recognition to Biafra. All twenty are listed below along with a brief summary of their reported stand on the question of recognition. The source of the information for each country is given in parentheses.

ZAMBIA

The original denial of recognition by Zambia was reported in Lagos 10070. Foreign Minister Kapwepwe has "categorically assured" Nigerian High Commissioner Ejiwunmi that the GRZ would not recognize Ojukwu's regime (Lusaka 2081). However, Zambian sympathies probably lie at least in part with Biafra. Zambian High Commissioner Ngalande has told the American Ambassador that Zambia had hoped to initiate actions which would delay fighting in Nigeria and make it possible for the OAU to have the problem discussed by other African countries. According to Ngalande, Gowon's recent actions have made this undertaking very difficult, and he urged that only action by a big power such as the US to recognize and protect Biafra would prevent bloodshed. (Lagos 121)

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Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:AEWellons

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TOGO

The original denial of recognition by Togo was reported in Lagos telegram 10070. The Lagos newspaper Morning Post of July 3 said that President Eyadema had assured the Federal Military Government's (FMG's) representative (E. Enahoro) that Togo will not recognize any republic created by secession from Nigeria. A Lome domestic radio broadcast monitored by FBIS reports that at a July 3 Cabinet meeting which was chaired by President Eyadema, a message from General Gowon was discussed and a decision made to support all efforts of the FMG aimed at keeping the country unified. The radio broadcast said the Togolese government called on General Gowon to find a peaceful solution to the problem posed by the secession of the East.

SUDAN

The President of the Sudanese Supreme State Council, Sayed El Ashari, in a message to Gowon pledged his country's support for FMG efforts to restore national unity. (Lagos newspaper Daily Times, June 27)

DAHOMY

The official GRD stand on the Nigerian conflict is one of keeping hands off and hoping that differences can be resolved without bloodshed. The acting Foreign Minister of the GRD has informed the Nigerian Chargé that the GRD is disturbed by press reports of an imminent showdown between the forces of the FMG and the East, and is ready to do anything in its power to help restore the unity of Nigeria. According to the French Ambassador to the GRD the GRD statement was the result of unsuccessful FMG pressure through the Nigerian chargé to secure a GRD pronouncement against the eastern secession. Previously, the GRD Foreign Minister has said that the GRD believes Nigerian unity is in fact unrealizable at present. (Cotonou telegram 1405)

SIERRA LEONE

Col. A. T. Juxton-Smith, Chairman of the National Reformation Council, has said in a letter to General Gowon that "My Government will do nothing inconsistent with or likely to damage the very friendly and cordial relations existing between this Government and the Nigerian Federal Military Government." (Morning Post, July 7)

CHAD

The President of the Republic of Chad, Mr. Francois Tombalbaye, has expressed in a letter to General Gowon his personal and his Government's "sympathy and encouragements in your increasing efforts to preserve the unity of the great Federation of Nigeria." (Morning Post, July 7)

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SENEGAL President Leopold Senghor has told the Nigerian Ambassador that the GOS is opposed to Biafra's secession, but will not condone the use of force by the Federal government to end secession. Senghor is also reported to have counselled moderation in a personal letter he sent to Ojukwu. (Dakar telegram 058)

BOTSWANA The Secretary of the GOB Department of External Affairs has informed the American Charge that for the time being Botswana will continue with a wait and see attitude toward Biafra. This announcement was in response to a telegram which President Khama received from General Gowon containing a personal plea that Botswana not recognize Biafra and indicating that Nigeria would consider such recognition an unfriendly act. (Gaberones A-159)

KENYA Nigerian High Commissioner Harriman has informed the American Embassy that special FMG emissaries Arikpo and Adegoroye have received the GOK's assurances "on paper" that Kenya will not recognize Biafra. Kenyatta is reported to be determined to do everything possible to prevent the breakup of Nigeria, and to have ordered Foreign Minister Nyamweya, who was previously ambiguous on this point, to make a public statement on this. (Nairobi telegram 5531)

KUWAIT The ruler of Kuwait has assured the head of the FMG that Kuwait regards the present situation in Nigeria as a "purely internal matter to be tackled with the discernment and sagacity of Nigerian leaders and authorities," and has stated that the policy of Kuwait is based on non-intervention in others affairs. (Daily Times, June 29)


INDIA The new Indian High Commissioner, Mr. Ramachandran, said on his arrival in Lagos that India did not recognize Biafra. He said that as far as he was concerned he had nothing to do with the illegal government and pledged his support for the FMG. (Morning Post, July 3)

MALAYSIA In response to an FMG request that all countries should avoid giving support to Biafra, Malaysia has announced it is suspending all postal services to the three new eastern states. (Daily Times, June 27)

SPAIN A Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer in Madrid who deals with African Affairs confirmed to an Embassy officer that Spain has not recognized Biafra. The Spanish source said the GOS has refused all official contacts with Biafran representatives, and has suspended the movement of Ibo plantation labor to and from Fernando Poo. (Madrid telegram 3701)

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FRANCE The GOF received a request from General Gowon for cooperation in not recognizing Biafra and has sent a noncommittal reply. (Paris telegram 20440) President DeGaulle has told Cameroon's President Ahidjo that France does not intend to recognize Biafra or otherwise interfere in Nigeria's affairs, and that Paris continues to recognize the FMG. (Paris 21095)

GREECE Greece has as yet made no decision on the form of its reply to General Gowon's request for cooperation in not recognizing Biafra. (Paris telegram 20440)

BELGIUM The Belgian government is of the opinion that the form of General Gowon's request for cooperation--an unsigned circular--does not appear to warrant a reply. (Paris telegram 20440)

GERMANY The FRG has told General Gowon it will not recognize the eastern regime (Biafra). The FRG has refused a request made by Biafran representatives for a private call on the Foreign Minister. (Paris telegram 20440)

NETHERLANDS The Dutch Prime Minister has received General Gowon's request for cooperation. The Netherlands Embassy in Lagos has orally acknowledged receipt of the message and confirmed the dutch policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state. (Paris telegram 20921)

CANADA The Canadian government has received a communication from Ojukwu, head of Biafra, raising the question of recognition. The government will not reply. (Paris telegram 20921)

PORTUGAL Portugal has indicated that, although it has no diplomatic relations with Nigeria, it is interested in developments there and "had noted that the principle of self-determination was apparently not a relevant factor in national decisions on recognition of the eastern regime." (Paris telegram 20921)

Comment: It would be normal for most countries to have adopted a wait and see attitude toward recognizing Biafra no matter what the situation in Nigeria might be. However, it is becoming apparent that economic sanctions against Biafra are beginning to bite hard, and there seems to be some truth in the FMG assertion that the secessionist regime is not able to control its access to the outside world. The Nigerian Navy has fired on and hit a Norwegian tanker which failed to stop on orders near the entrance to Bonny and Port Harcourt. The FMG has extended

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its restriction on shipping to the Eastern states to include crude oil tankers. As a result, Shell-BP has announced that it is cutting back production of crude oil, and marine insurance rates are bound to increase. Given these signs that Biafra is running into difficulties, and considering the prevailing opinion that a military confrontation is imminent, it is likely that the normal reluctance of most countries to stick their necks out by recognizing Biafra will be reinforced. Even those countries which sympathize with Biafra will probably await the outcome of the expected military confrontation between the FMG army and Ojukwu's troops as well as the results of mediation negotiations being pursued by some East African countries.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research
Memorandum

RSB 95.31, July 6, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through : S/S
From : INR- Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject : Soviet Policy Toward Africa, May 1 - 31, 1967

This report continues the series of monthly memoranda recording and analyzing significant developments in Soviet relations with Africa. Among the topics highlighted during May are growing signs of Soviet support for Algeria's leadership role in Africa, the Soviet-Zambian aid agreement, Moscow's relations with Francophone Africa, and the noncommittal Soviet reaction to the secession of Eastern Nigeria. The repercussions in Africa of the Middle East crisis, insofar as they bear on Soviet policy, will be considered in subsequent analyses.

ABSTRACT

The USSR appears again, as during the Ben Bella period, to be underwriting "progressive" international conferences in Algeria, and probably again considers Algeria to be its prime propaganda ally (and instrument) in Africa. While hard evidence is lacking, Moscow is reportedly currently sponsoring at least two long-range conference-type activities carried out under Algerian auspices, one of them -- the African Progressive Parties conference --- of considerable potential importance. Reports of Soviet encouragement to the Algerian Government to undertake such conferences is indirectly corroborated by Soviet public commentary, which casts Algeria as the leader of "progressive" African opinion.

Zambia and the USSR signed an economic aid agreement in May by which the Soviet Union will give educational and technical assistance. The agreement

(6)
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RSB 95.31

POL AFR USSR

XR POL 12-3 ALC
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XR POL 7
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By MNA Date 10/5/05

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Intelligence
Note* - 556

July 3, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
Subject: Nigerian Crisis Heads Toward Naval Test

FMG Seeks Arms from US and UK. Major-General Gowon, chief of Nigeria's Federal Military Government (FMG), asked the US and UK in messages on July 1 for aircraft, patrol vessels, and other arms to "crush" the rebellion in the East. He requested delivery in 48 hours, stating that he would otherwise be forced to turn to other sources. He was apparently reacting to two developments: (1) a tough speech by C. O. Ojukwu, the East's secessionist leader, threatening total war if Biafra should be invaded and demanding that the oil companies in the East indicate by July 1 their willingness to pay royalties to Biafra's treasury, and (2) Biafra's recent acquisition of a B-26 bomber--reportedly one of several on the way. Whether or not Gowon knew it, he had a third reason as well. Shell-BP and SAFRAP bowed to Ojukwu's demands and agreed to make at least token payments to Biafra.

US and UK Response Cool. The UK is expected to respond somewhat sympathetically to Gowon's request, but only for anti-aircraft weapons and not by the deadline. The US does not plan to get involved even to that extent. The FMG will probably proceed, therefore, to ask for communist help; some contact has already been made with the Soviets and Czechs.

Soviets Probably Unenthusiastic. It seems unlikely that the Soviets, or any Eastern European country on their behalf, will make the urgent, major

(4)
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GROUP I
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POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR DEF 12.5 NIGERIA
XR DEF 19 NIGERIA
XR POL 16 BIAFRA

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POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SAH RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

L RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

H RUTAHN/ACCRA

EUR RUTGYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

P RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS

NSC RUTALS/AMCONSUL IBADAN

INR RUTALS/AMCONSUL KADUNA

ACDA RUTGYD/AMCONSUL DOUALA

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OPR UNCLAS ENUGU 943

OC FOLLOWING FULL TEXT OF MILGOV'S RADIO ADDRESS 1700Z JUNE 30:

1. FELLOW COUNTRYMEN AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA.

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CCO

PAGE 2 RUTANU 943 UNCLAS

IT IS A MONTH TODAY SINCE WE TOOK THE IRREVOCABLE DECISION TO ASSERT OUR AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY BECOMING THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA. GOWON'S IMMEDIATE REACTION TO OUR DECISION WAS TO VOW TO CRUSH US. SINCE THEN HE HAS CONSISTENTLY DESCRIBED HIS DECISION AS IRREVOCABLE. I HAVE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT HE AND HIS NORTHERN BANDITS HAVE NOW FINALIZED THEIR PLANS TO ATTACK US IN OUR HOMES. THEY HAVE TAKEN ALL THIS TIME TO PREPARE AND ACCUMULATE ARMS. FOR ABOUT FOUR WEEKS NOW SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS BOUND FOR BIAFRAN PORTS HAVE BEEN SCARED AWAY BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT LED BY GOWON.

2. AS A YOUNG NATION WE HAVE RESPECTED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONVENTIONS WHICH GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM OF SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS ON THE HIGH SEAS IN TIME OF PEACE. GOWON HAS FLOUTED THOSE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS. WHILE WE SHALL CONTINUE TO UPHOLD THEM, WE MUST IN THE INTEREST

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By MNA Date 10/5/05

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-2-ENUGU 943 JUNE 30, 1967

OF SURVIVAL DO EVERYTHING TO KEEP OUR PORTS OPEN. WE SHALL HOLD OURSELVES READY TO EXERCISE OUR RIGHT TO SELF PRESERVATION AND OF HOT PURSUIT.

PAGE 3 RUTANI 943 UNCLAS

3. YESTERDAY GOWON PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR WAR. YESTERDAY HE AND HIS GANGSTER CABINET DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO LAUNCH THE LONG AWAITED ATTACK ON

BIAFRA. YESTERDAY GOWON BEGAN TROOP MOVEMENTS TO COMPLETE HIS CONCENTRATIONS MENACING OUR BORDERS. FURTHERMORE, HE HAS OPENLY INCITED CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THIS REPUBLIC TO INSURRECTION AND HAS TRIED TO SUBVERT THE LOYALTY OF THE POLICE OF THIS REPUBLIC. IT IS RELIABLY LEARNED THAT HE HAS CONTINUED TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE PASSAGE OF HIS TROOPS THROUGH A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY. I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT ANY TERRITORY THROUGH WHICH GOWON'S TROOPS PASS SHALL BE CONSIDERED ENEMY TERRITORY.

4. FELLOW COUNTRYMEN AND WOMEN, WE HAVE ARRIVED AT ZERO HOUR. GOWON IS DETERMINED TO COME INTO OUR HOMES AND TO DESTROY US IN

ORDER TO CARRY AWAY WHAT BELONGS TO US. HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF LYING PROPAGANDA CALCULATED TO CREATE ALARM, FRIGHTEN OUR PEOPLE AND CAUSE DISSENTION AMONG US HAS FAILED COMPLETELY. GOWON FEELS THAT HE MUST PLAY THE MAN AND CARRY OUT HIS SUICIDAL THREATS TO LAUNCH A PHYSICAL

PAGE 4 RUTANI 943 UNCLAS

ATTACK ON US.

5. I WANT YOU ALL TO REMAIN CALM AND DETERMINED AS YOU HAVE BEEN. OUR SOLDIERS ARE READY. WHILE THEY WILL BE FIGHTING IN FOREIGN LAND OUR CIVIL DEFENCE ORGANIZATIONS, MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN MUST GUARD OUR HOMES. IF GOWON SHOULD MAKE THE MISTAKE OF CROSSING INTO OUR TERRITORY, EVEN BY A FEW YARDS, WE SHALL IMMEDIATELY GO INTO AN OPEN, OUTRIGHT AND TOTAL WAR AGAINST NIGERIA. OUR CONDUCT OF THE WAR WILL NOT BE CONFINED TO OUR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES.

WE SHALL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT REPEAT THEIR ADVENTURE EVER AGAIN. THIS WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DO HONOR TO THE MEMORY OF THE THOUSANDS OF OUR KITH AND KIN SAVAGELY MURDERED LAST

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Authority	VND959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

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-3-ENUGU 943 JUNE 30, 1967

YEAR BY AVENGING THEIR DEATH. IF THIS IS WHAT THE WORLD
WANTS IN ORDER TO BE CONVINCED THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO
KEEP OUR SOVEREIGNTY, WE NOW EAGERLY AWAIT THE OPPORTUNITY
OF GIVING THE PROOF. WE SHALL NOT BE BLAMED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF
WHAT IS NOW IMMINENT.

PAGE 5 RUTANU 943 UNCLAS
6. FELLOW COUNTRYMEN, PROUD AND COURAGEOUS BIAFRANS,
THIS IS YOUR MOMENT. WHEN WE GO TO WAR IT WILL BE A WAR
AGAINST NIGERIA, FOR IT IS NIGERIA THAT HAS VOWED THAT
WE SHALL NOT EXIST. WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE, WE SHALL
VANQUISH. LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA.
BARNARD.
BT

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RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS

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FOLLOWING FULL TEXT OF MILGOV'S RADIO ADDRESS 1700Z JUNE 30:

1. FELLOW COUNTRYMEN AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA.

PAGE 2 RUTANU 943 UNCLAS

IT IS A MONTH TODAY SINCE WE TOOK THE IRREVOCABLE DECISION TO ASSERT OUR AUTONOMY AND SOVEREIGNTY BECOMING THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA. GOWON'S IMMEDIATE REACTION TO OUR DECISION WAS TO VOW TO CRUSH US. SINCE THEN HE HAS CONSISTENTLY DESCRIBED HIS DECISION AS IRREVOCABLE. I HAVE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT HE AND HIS NORTHERN BANDITS HAVE NOW FINALIZED THEIR PLANS TO ATTACK US IN OUR HOMES. THEY HAVE TAKEN ALL THIS TIME TO PREPARE AND ACCUMULATE ARMS. FOR ABOUT FOUR WEEKS NOW SHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS BOUND FOR BIAFRAN PORTS HAVE BEEN SCARED AWAY BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT LED BY GOWON.

2. AS A YOUNG NATION WE HAVE RESPECTED INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CONVENTIONS WHICH GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM OF SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS ON THE HIGH SEAS IN TIME OF PEACE. GOWON HAS FLOUTED THOSE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS. WHILE WE SHALL CONTINUE TO UPHOLD THEM, WE MUST IN THE INTEREST

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-2-ENUGU 943 JUNE 30, 1967

OF SURVIVAL DO EVERYTHING TO KEEP OUR PORTS OPEN. WE SHALL HOLD OURSELVES READY TO EXERCISE OUR RIGHT TO SELF PRESERVATION AND OF HOT PURSUIT.

PAGE 3 RUTANU 943 UNCLAS

3. YESTERDAY GOWON PUBLISHED AND DISTRIBUTED A CODE OF CONDUCT FOR WAR. YESTERDAY HE AND HIS GANGSTER CABINET DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO LAUNCH THE LONG AWAITED ATTACK ON

BIAFRA. YESTERDAY GOWON BEGAN TROOP MOVEMENTS TO COMPLETE HIS CONCENTRATIONS MENACING OUR BORDERS. FURTHERMORE, HE HAS OPENLY INCITED CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THIS REPUBLIC TO INSURRECTION AND HAS TRIED TO SUBVERT THE LOYALTY OF THE POLICE OF THIS REPUBLIC. IT IS RELIABLY LEARNED THAT HE HAS CONTINUED TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE PASSAGE OF HIS TROOPS THROUGH A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY. I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE IT CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT ANY TERRITORY THROUGH WHICH GOWON'S TROOPS PASS SHALL BE CONSIDERED ENEMY TERRITORY.

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(#)

TO CARRY AWAY WHAT BELONGS TO US. HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF LYING PROPAGANDA CALCULATED TO CREATE ALARM, FRIGHTEN OUR PEOPLE AND CAUSE DISSENTION AMONG US HAS FAILED COMPLETELY, GOWON FEELS THAT HE MUST PLAY THE MAN AND CARRY OUT HIS SUICIDAL THREATS TO LAUNCH A PHYSICAL

PAGE 4 RUTANU 943 UNCLAS

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
WAR WILL NOT BE

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CONFINED TO OUR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES. WE SHALL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT REPEAT THEIR ADVENTURE EVER AGAIN. THIS WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DO HONOR TO THE MEMORY OF THE THOUSANDS OF OUR KITH AND KIN SAVAGELY MURDERED LAST

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YEAR BY AVENGING THEIR DEATH. IF THIS IS WHAT THE WORLD WANTS IN ORDER TO BE CONVINCED THAT WE ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP OUR SOVEREIGNTY, WE NOW EAGERLY AWAIT THE OPPORTUNITY OF GIVING THE PROOF. WE SHALL NOT BE BLAMED FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT IS NOW IMMINENT.

PAGE 5 RUTANU 943 UNCLAS

6. FELLOW COUNTRYMEN, PROUD AND COURAGEOUS BIAFRANS, THIS IS YOUR MOMENT. WHEN WE GO TO WAR IT WILL BE A WAR AGAINST NIGERIA, FOR IT IS NIGERIA THAT HAS VOWED THAT WE SHALL NOT EXIST. WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE, WE SHALL VANQUISH. LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA.
BARNARD.
BT

(#) OMISSION CORRECTION TO FOLLOW

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POL 16 Biafra
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TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Info : COLOMBO, LAGOS, RANGOON

JUL 6 8 31 AM 1967

FROM : Amembassy NEW DELHI

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: June 30, 1967

SUBJECT : Indian Position Regarding Nigeria and Biafra

REF :

From recent, separate, and informal conversations with the Nigerian High Commissioner and the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, I gather that the former is gratified that the GOI does not intend to recognize the "Republic of Biafra." High Commissioner DOVE-EDWIN has asked them not to and is satisfied that they will not.

Foreign Secretary C. S. JHA answered my question only slightly less categorically; he said India is not going to recognize Biafra in present circumstances, but could adjust to a new situation that looked like becoming permanent.

Dove-Edwin is planning to visit Rangoon and Colombo in the near future with messages from the Nigerian Government soliciting Burmese and Ceylonese support for Lagos in its problem with Enugu.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: Charge a.i.: JNGreene, Jr./mmf 6/30/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: JNGreene, Jr.

Clearances:

PE:EX:JGrant

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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FN 16 BIAFRA

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FM AMCONSUL ENUGU
TO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUDSLB/AMCONSUL IBADAN
RUDSLK/AMCONSUL KADUNA
STATE GRNC
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UNCLAS ENUGU 930

1. GOVERNMENT THIS WEEK PUBLISHED DECREE, SIGNED
BY MILGOV JUNE 10, APPROPRIATING POUNDS 28,038,450
FOR CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND. MONEY TO BE TRANSFERRED
FROM CONSOLIDATED REVENUE FUND.

2. MAJOR EXPENDITURES (IN POUNDS): TRADE AND INDUSTRY
(3271,640), TRANSPORT (4,637,170), EDUCATION (3,305,770),
TREE CROP SCHEMES (4,565,970), TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING
(2,297,030), WATER SUPPLIES (1,982,000), HEALTH (1,045,410),
GENERAL GOVERNMENT (1,835,670).

3. WILL PROVIDE COMMENT FIRST AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY.
BARNARD
BT

ENUGU 930

6-29-67

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- USIA 1. POLADS JUNE 27 DISCUSSION OF NIGERIA COVERED SUBJECTS
NSC OF (A) RECOGNITION, (B) ARMS SUPPLY POLICY, AND (C) OIL.
INR
CIA 2. ON RECOGNITION BIAFRA, FRG POLAD REPORTED THAT TWO
NSA EMIGRATES FROM BIAFRA WERE REFUSED REQUEST FOR PRIVATE CALL.
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AID PAGE 2 RUHNCR 20921 CONFIDENTIAL
E ON FONMINISTRY IN BONN. FRG HAS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED IT WILL
MC NOT RECOGNIZE NEW REGIME. NETHERLANDS POLAD REPORTED DUTCH
GDP PRIME MINISTER HAD RECEIVED CABLE FROM GOWON SIMILAR TO THOSE RECEIVED
COM BY OTHER ALLIES. DUTCH EMBASSY LAGOS HAS ORALLY ACKNOWLEDGED
INT RECEIPT OF CABLE AND CONFIRMED DUTCH POLICY OF NONINTERFERENCE
TRSY IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER STATE. PORTUGUESE POLAD
COMMENTED THAT PORTUGAL, ALTHOUGH HAVING NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH NIGERIA, INTERESTED IN DEVELOPMENTS AND HAD NOTED THAT
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION APPARENTLY NOT RELEVANT FACTOR
IN NATIONAL DECISIONS ON RECOGNITION EASTERN REGIME. CANADIAN
POLAD REPORTED RECEIPT COMMUNICATION FROM OJUKWU RAISING
QUESTION OF RECOGNITION. CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT REPLY.
3. HIS LED OFF DISCUSSION ON ARMS SUPPLY POLICY USING EXCELLENT
STATEMENT PROVIDED PARA 1 STATE 216367. FRG POLAD REPORTED
FRG FONOFF HAD MADE RECOMMENDATION TO "RESPONSIBLE FRG OFFICIALS"
TO REFUSE EXPORTS TO NIGERIA. HE REPORTED FURTHER THAT THERE WAS
UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT TWO FRG OFFICIALS, ONE BEING FRG MILATT
IN BONN, HAD VISITED MOSCOW VIA LONDON IN SEARCH OF MILITARY HARDWARE.
STATEMENT REPORTEDLY MADE IN LONDON TO EFFECT THAT FRG WOULD SEEK
SUPPORT "FROM ANYONE REGARDLESS OF IDEOLOGICAL COMPLICATIONS."

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

RUQSN I/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

RUQSON/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

STATE GRNC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 4093

REF: STATE CIRCULAR 213214

1. BIAFRA REP OKWU QUOTED IN NATIONALIST AS SAYING
HERE YESTERDAY "WE IN BIAFRA ARE GRATEFUL FOR SYMPATHY
OF OUR EAST AFRICAN BROTHERS AND DO LOOK UP TO THEM TO
TAKE THE ONLY INEVITABLE ACTION WHICH WILL PREVENT MORE
TROUBLE AND PREVENT MORE BLOODSHED IN THAT PART OF
AFRICA". HE SAID POSITION OF BIAFRA IS CLEAR AND ITS
CREATION AS A STATE IS IRREVERSIBLE.

2. EDITORIAL TODAY IN THE NATIONALIST, THE PARTY PAPER,
TAKES LINE THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE REALISTIC CONCLUSION:

PAGE 2 RUDTCR-4093D C O N F I D E N T I A L
"A PEACEFUL SOLUTION FOR NIGERIA MUST BE SOUGHT BY ALL
PARTIES CONCERNED. -- ONLY A COOL, WELL-BALANCED MATURE
APPROACH TO PROBLEMS OF NIGERIA CAN BRING ABOUT A PEACE-
FUL SOLUTION TO THAT TROUBLED COUNTRY. IF THIS CAN COME
FROM BROTHERLY AFRICAN STATES, NIGERIANS SHOULD NOT
REJECT IT." COMMENT. FOREGOING IS SO TEMPERATE FOR
NATIONALIST IT SOUNDS GOVT. INSPIRED.

3. WELL INFORMED AND VERY RELIABLE NEWSMAN TELLS US KAP-
WEPWE TOLD HIM WHEN PASSING THROUGH DAR JUNE 19-20 THAT HIS
TRIP DESIGNED TO PREVENT LARGE WESTERN COUNTRY SUCH AS
US, UK OR EVEN UN GETTING INVOLVED IN NIGERIA BY
STIMULATING EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES OR OAU TO COPE WITH
THIS AFRICAN PROBLEM.

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-2- DAR-ES-SALAAM 4093, JUNE 27

4. SAME SOURCE HAD TALKED WITH MULOKOZI, PRINCIPAL SECRETARY IN FOWOFF, ABOUT TANZANIAN VIEWS ON NIGERIA. MULOKOZI SAID BIAFRA WAS A REVOLUTION AGAINST A STATE THAT WAS ITSELF A REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND HENCE LEGAL SITUATION MUDDLED; NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE INCORRECT FOR TANZANIA TO SHOW ANY OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA. SOURCE INTERPRETED THIS VIEW AS REFLECTION OF SOME

PAGE RUDICR 4093D C O N F I D E N T I A L
SYMPATHY FOR BIAFRA ON AT LEAST MULOKOZI'S PART.
(DAR ES SALAAM 3856 NOTAL)
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By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

POL 16 Biafra

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RUTANU/ANCONSUL ENUGU

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUQSYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

STATE GRNC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 3701

REF ENUGU 844 MADRID 258 (NOTAL)

MFA OFFICER DEALING WITH AFRICAN AFFAIRS CONFIRMED TO EMBORF THAT SPAIN HAS NOT RECOGNIZED BIAFRA. HE ADDED THAT GOS HAS "REFUSED ALL OFFICIAL CONTACT" AND THAT TRAVEL OF IBO PLANTATION LABOR TO AND FROM FERNANDO POO SUSPENDED. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SEEN (IN MADRID) BIAFRA REPRESENTATIVE OKECHUKU IBE (MADRID 2258 AND 3603) ON INFORMAL BASIS " TO HEAR WHAT HE WANTED TO SAY". AND TO VERIDY (WHICH HE SAID HE HAD DONE BY "DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE") THAT IBE WAS GENUINE EMISSARY OF BIAFRA REGIME WALKER

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for Pol 16 Biafra
 Department of State

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 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
 INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 10674

SUBJ: OIL REVENUES TO NIGERIA

1. ERIC NORRIS (CO) TOLD EMBOFF DECISION WAS MADE AT MEETING WITH SHELL-BP REPRESENTATIVES ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON JUNE 23 THAT HE WOULD LEAVE FOR NIGERIA ON JUNE 27.

2. AS CONSEQUENCE ISSUANCE OF REVENUE COLLECTION DECREE BY OJUKWU (ENUGU 874) SHELL-BP IS MORE CONCERNED THAN FORMERLY ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE PAYMENT OF OIL REVENUES AFTER JULY 1. SINCE VIEWS OF SHELL-BP OFFICIALS IN EAST DIFFER FROM THOSE OF UK HICOM LAGOS, NORRIS WILL DISCUSS QUESTION WITH PARTIES CONCERNED

PAGE 2 RUDICR 10674 C O N F I D E N T I A L
 ON SPOT. SHELL-BP HAS URGED NORRIS TO VISIT EAST DURING TRIP, AND HE HOPES TO DO SO. WHETHER HE WILL ACTUALLY GET THERE OR NOT WILL DEPEND ON ATTITUDE OF UK HICOM HUNT AS WELL AS OTHER FACTORS.

3. IN ADDITION SPECIAL PROBLEM OF OIL REVENUES, NORRIS SAID THAT CW SECY BOWDEN CONTINUES TO THINK THERE OUGHT TO BE SOMETHING UK COULD DO TO BE HELPFUL IN PRESENT CRISIS, ALTHOUGH NEITHER HE NOR CW OFFICE HAS BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. WHILE NORRIS CONTINUES TO DOUBT THAT UK CAN TAKE ANY USEFUL INITIATIVE AT THIS POINT, HE WILL AGAIN EXPLORE SUCH POSSIBILITY. BRUCE
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 Authority VND959503
 By M/NARA Date 10/5/03

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SUBINAK- AIDTO CIRCULAR X 9133

~~REFERENCE~~ SUBJECT: Continuation AID Program in East

REFERENCE: (1) LAGOS 10258 (2) LAGOS 10213 (TOAID 2269)
(3) LAGOS 10442 (TOAID 2301)
(4) LAGOS 10540 (TOAID 2321), (5) LAGOS 10574

JOINT STATE/AID MESSAGE FOR AMBASSADOR AND MISSION DIRECTOR.

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To extent permitted by security conditions we desire continue existing assistance program in all parts of Nigeria under restrictive assistance strategy. In order assure equitable treatment all regions we wish do everything possible to resist efforts on part FMG or regional governments to place us in position where the AID program is used by Federal or Regional governments as instrument to further sectional interests in internal political conflict. Following guidance for Embassy/Mission discussions with FMG on continuing program in East.

1. Present efforts dissuade FMG from blocking currency transfers and suspending disbursements in support of Eastern assistance activities should be

PAGE	OF	PAGES
7	OF	11

DRAFTED BY

OFFICE

PHONE NO. _____

DATE _____

APPROVED BY:

W.R. Brown / WH North. rsw
AIR AND OTHER CLEARANCES

AFR/CA

7647

6-26-67

R. Peter Strang, AA/APP

AF/STATE - RMelbourne

6F - JPalmer 2nd

AA/AFB, DSEmitb

EUR/EMI - TMJudd (subs)

CC/ATR - J. Borsalsky

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POL 16 BIAFRA
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Action

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Info

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SECRET

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DE RUTALS 10610CC 1771640

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P R 261625Z JUN 67

FM DAO NIGERIA

TO RUEPJS/DIA PRIORITY

RUEHC/SECSTATE

RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE

INFO RUEHCL/CAS WASHDC

RUEPDA/DA

DA GRNC

BT

SECRET NOFORN 0254 JUN 67. SGD HALLIGAN. THIS IS SICR MSG. CITE D-5A-3-17755. COUNTRY: NIGERIA. SUBJECT: UPDATE FMG/ EASTERN FORCES. DIA FOR DIACO-1B. CINCSRIKE FOR STRJ2-C. DA FOR ACST.

1. GUESSING GAME AS TO IF AND WHEN FMG LIKELY INITIATE MIL ACTION AGAINST REBELLIOUS EASTERN REGION CONTINUES. ONCE AGAIN, QUOTE THIS IS THE WEEK UNQUOTE. ON SATURDAY 24 JUNE DEP IG NIGERIA POLICE T. OMO BARE, MEMBER SUPREME MIL COUNCIL, DURING COURSE LONG CONVERSATION DATT'S HOME, IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC QUESTION ON IMMINENCE MIL ACTION SAID QUOTE I DO NOT PERSONALLY BELIEVE THINGS CAN GO ON THIS

WAY VERY MUCH LONGER: I WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SUPRISED SEE ACTION INITIATED BEFORE NEXT WEEK IS OUT UNQUOTE. ON SUNDAY 25 JUNE LTC M.O. JOHNSON, MEMBER SUPREME MIL COUNCIL, MIL GOVERNOR LAGOS STATE, DURING COURSE LONG CONVERSATION WITH DATT IN JOHNSON'S HOME, AGAIN IN RESPONSE LEADING QUESTION, SAID QUOTE IT COULD COME ANY TIME NOW, I FEEL IT IS CLOSE UNQUOTE. BASIC PROBLEM EVALUATING THIS TYPE INFORMATION LIES IN FACT ALTHOUGH BOTH SOURCES MEMBERS SUPREME COUNCIL WITH DAILY ACCESS GOWON, IT SEEMED TO DATT NEITHER REALLY ACTUALLY CERTAIN THAT FIRM DATE FOR MILITARY MOVE HAD BEEN SET, ALTHOUGH BOTH THOUGHT IT IMMINENT AND NEITHER SEEMED HAVE DOUBTS MIL ACTION WOULD ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE. DATTS PROBING ON THIS POINT LEADS HIM BELIEVE DECISION RESTS WITH GOWON ALONE. THIS IS SO BECAUSE BOTH SOURCES REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT FINAL DECISIONS ON FMG COURSE ACTION RESTED WITH GOWON AND GOWON ALONE. IN EFFECT, BOTH SAID, GOWON GETTING AND LISTENING MUCH ADVICE. BUT DECISIONS ON WHAT. HOW

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DEFENSE DEPT. 6-26-67

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-2- DAO NIGERIA 0254 6/26/67

MUCH AND WHEN WERE MADE BY GOWON HIMSELF. NEITHER SOURCE INFERRED IN ANY WAY GOWON WAVERING ON USS MIL FORCE; ON CONTRARY, BOTH MADE POINT SEVERAL TIMES GOWON CONFIDENT AND

OPTIMISTIC ON SUBJECT MIL ACTION AGAINST EAST AND THAT HE READY TO GO WHEN EVER HE HAS TO.

2. DURING COURSE CONVERSATIONS REFERRED TO SEVERAL GENERAL THEMES REPEATED THEMSELVES WHICH BEAR ON MATTER WHEN GOWON MIGHT GIVE WORD FOR TROOPS MOVE AGAINST EAST. THESE WERE OIL PAYMENTS, POSSIBILITIES RECOGNITION BIAFRA, AND LIKELY IMPACT OF INITIATIVES ON NIGERIAN QUESTION TAKEN BY EAST AFRCIAN STATES. PARADOXICALLY, DESPITE FACT BOTH SOURCES HAS SAID THEY THOUGHT MIL ACTION IMMINENT, BOTH INDICATED IN NUMBER OF WAYS THEY THOUGHT GOWON'S DECISION ON WHAT TO DO AND WHEN DIRECTLY TIED TO WAY GOWON READ THREE FACTORS MENTIONED. REASONING HERE SEEMED TO BE THAT IF GOWON, ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED CRUSHING EASTERN REBELLION, READ ANY THESE THREE FACTORS, INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY, AS INDICATING SIGNIFICANT AND LASTING IMPROVEMENT CHANCES BIAFRA SURVIVE; HE, GOWON, WOULD MOVE SWIFTLY AND ACCORD-INGLY WITH MIL ACTION.

3. IN COURSE SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS OVER WEEKEND WITH U.K. DEFENSE ADVISOR, WHAT DATT TAKES TO BE U.K. LINE AS DEFENSE ADVISOR READS IT, CAME THROUGH CONTINUOUSLY AND LOUD AND CLEAR EACH TIME. DEFENSE ADVISOR, DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE.

MIL SITUATION WHICH ESSENTIALLY SAME AS DATTS; AND DEPITE FACT HE ACCEPTS FACT FMG SUBSTANTIALLY READY TO GO MILITARILY AS OF NOW; DOES NOT ACCEPT FACT FMG MIL ACTION AGAINST EAST IMMEDIATELY IMMINENT. SINCE THIS CRITICAL MATTER, DATT PUSHED HARD THIS ATTITUDE DEFENSE ADVISOR AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT DEFENSE ADVISORS APPRAISAL FMG POSSIBLE TIMING STEMS FROM CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN MERE READING MIL FACTS AVAILABLE. DATT BELIEVES, AS RESULT DEEP PROBING, DEFENSE ADVISORS VIEW DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO FACT HE AWARE CERTAIN U.K. HIGH COMMISSION ACTIONS WITH REGARD OIL PAYMENTS BY SHELL BP. DEFENSE ADVISOR AT ONE POINT IN CONVERSATION SAID QUOTE WE (SIC) HAVE BEEN URGING GOWON HOLD OFF MIL ACTION AGAINST EAST AS NOT BEING HIS BEST INTERESTS UNTIL HE SEES FOR CER-TAIN WHICH WAY OIL COMPANIES (READ SHELL BP) MOVE UNQUOTE. TO DATT'S QUERY AS TO WHICH WAY DEFENSE ADVISOR THOUGHT SHELL BP WOULD MOVE, DEFENSE ADVISOR SAID HE THOUGHT IT NOT YET

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-3- DAO NIGERIA 0254 6/26/67

DECIDED BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT HINGED ON ONE FACTOR AND ONE FACTOR ALONE; THAT IS, EFFECTIVENESS FMG NAVAL BLOCKADE AGAINST EAST (READ BONNY RIVER). SOURCE SAID QUOTE I AM TO

GO (IMPLICATION DATT RECEIVED WAS THAT THIS WAS ON OFFICIAL U.K. HIGH COMMISSION MISSION) TO SEE WEY AND RAWE (NIGERIAN NAVY) TOMORROW TO ATTEMPT DETERMINE BEYOND SHADOW DOUBT WHETHER THEY CONSIDER BLOCKADE REALLY EFFECTIVE AND WHETHER THEY ABLE MAINTAIN IT OVER LONG RUN. THEN I AM TO SEE GOWON AND ASK HIM SAME THING. UNQUOTE. SOURCE THEN SAID, QUOTE IF STAN GRAY (SHELL BP) BELIEVES BLOCKADE IS EFFECTIVE HE WILL GIVE MORE SERIOUS THOUGHT AS TO WHERE HE MAKES HIS PAYMENTS UNQUOTE. SOURCE SAID GRAY HAD THOUGHT ALL ALONG FMG COULD NOT MAKE BLOCKADE WORK BUT THAT AS RESULT INFO HE RECEIVED DURING RECENT TRIP PORT HARCOURT AREA HE NOW NO LONGER SURE OF THIS. INFERENCE ENTIRE CONVERSATION WAS INFO ON WHAT SOURCE DETERMINED ON EFFECTIVENESS BLOCKADE WOULD BE PASSED GRAY AT ONCE AS ONE OF BASES HE (GRAY) WOULD USE TO DETERMINE HIS COURSE OF ACTION ON OIL PAYMENTS. SEVERAL TIMES DURING SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS, SOURCE EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF THAT OIL COMPANIES COULD WELL SET OFF MIL ACTION BY FMG AGAINST EAST, IF IT HAD NOT ALREADY BEEN INITIATED FOR OTHER REASONS, BY MAKING PAYMENTS TO EAST. DATTS IMPRESSION WAS THAT DEFENSE ADVISOR HOPED BE ABLE CONVINCE GRAY THAT PAYMENTS SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO EAST. GP-3.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S=O 6/26/67, 5:42 PM.

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Info

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SC ZNY CCCCC
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1967 JUN 23 PM 9 47

USUN 5881
6-23-67

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 5881

NIGERIA

ELMENDORF (SECT) TOLD MISOFF THAT NIGERIAN PERM REP HAD SENT
MEMO TO SYG REQUESTING THAT SECT BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO COMMUNICATE
WITH ANY REPRESENTATIVE OF DIAFRA.

RSR

NARASIMHAN CIRCULATED MEMO WITH COVER NOTE STATING "TAKE
APPROPRIATE ACTION", WHICH BEING INTERPRETED MEAN "DON'T
SEE THEM."

RSC

DECON ONE YEAR FROM DATE OF ORIGIN

GOLDBERG
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RECEIVED IN DIA

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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 INCLUDING THEIRIA Department of State
 POL 23-9 NIGERIA
 XR POL 16 BIAFRA

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 Action RR RUENE RUTALS RUTANU
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 Info R 231100Z JUN 67
 TO RUENE/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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 1967 JUN 23 PM 1 35
 C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 2329
 REF YAOUNDE 2209 — POL 23-9 NIGERIA
 XR POL 16 BIAFRA
 SUBJECT/POSSIBLE MOVEMENT FNG TROOPS THROUGH CAMEROON.

020153

2329
 6-23-67

1. RE PORT OF NIGERIAN FNG ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN GRNC PERMISSION
 TO SEND TROOPS THROUGH CAMEROON TO ATTACK EASTERN NIGERIA HAS
 NOW BECOME PUBLIC. ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY "CAMEROON TIMES"
 (PUBLISHED IN VICTORIA, WEST CAMEROON) CARRIED FOLLOWING ARTICLE
 JUNE 21 UNDER HEADLINE: "NIGERIA SEEKS ROUTE TO INVAD BIAFRA

DOD
 ACDA
 ACD

FROM CAMEROON?" BEGIN QUOTE: ENUGU: ACCORDING TO THE BIAFRA
 NATIONAL NEWS SERVICE BROADCAST OF YESTERDAY MORNING, THE
 CAMEROON GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO GIVE TO A
 REQUEST OF THE NIGERIAN GOVT TO GIVE HER AN INVASION ROUTE
 THROUGH CAMEROON TERRITORY INTO BIAFRA REPUBLIC. FURTHER, THE
 BIAFRA RADIO WHICH CREDITED THE SOURCE OF THIS NEWS TO WELL-
 INFORMED DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES, ALLEGED THE CAMEROON GOVERNMENT
 HAS ALSO REITERATED HER REFUSAL NOT TO TAKE SIDES IN THE NIGERIAN
 CRISIS. RADIO BIAFRA ENDED BY WARNING THAT ANY SUCH CONCESSIONS
 BY THE CAMEROON TO THE REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA WOULD BE REGARDED
 AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT. UNQUOTE

2. THIS REPORT HAS NOT RPT NOT AS OF MORNING JUNE 23 BEEN CARRIED
 IN EITHER ENGLISH OR FRENCH LANGUAGE CAMEROON RADIO NOR HAS IT
 APPEARED IN "LA PRESSE DU CAMEROON" (COUNTRY'S ONLY FRENCH
 LANGUAGE DAILY) OR IN THE GOVERNMENT-PUBLISHED JOURNAL
 CAMEROUNAISE DE PRESSE (CAMP) DAILY FRENCH LANGUAGE BULLETIN.
 COMMENT: VOICE OF BIAFRA EASILY HEARD CAMEROON.

3. TO DATE NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON REPORT.

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 By MNA Date 10/5/03

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INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

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CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 10598

USIA

1. U.K. PRESS OF JUNE 21 REPORTED RECENT ARRIVAL IN LONDON OF ANTONWU AND MBU, "TWO SENIOR DIPLOMATS FROM SELF-PROCLAIMED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA."

NSC

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2. PATRICK KEATLEY WROTE IN GUARDIAN THAT ENVOYS MADE FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS AT PRESS CONFERENCE:

NSA

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E

A. BIAFRA FIRMLY HOPES BLOODSHED CAN BE AVOIDED SO THAT NO NEW LEGACY OF HATRED WILL BE CREATED TO ACT AS BARRIER AGAINST COOPERATION IN FUTURE.

COM

INT

RSR

PRC

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 10598 CONFIDENTIAL

B. BIAFRA IS ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT IT CAN RESIST ANY ARMED ATTACK FROM LAGOS.

C. OJUKWU GOVT IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL OF TERRITORY AND HAS SUPPORT OF ALL ITS PEOPLE.

D. PROBLEM OF OIL PRODUCTION HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION, WHICH WAS WHOLLY SEPARATE ISSUE. BIAFRA WOULD NOT ACCEPT DEVICE OF OIL COMPANIES PAYING INTO SUSPENSE ACCOUNT UNTIL ISSUE SETTLED. OIL REVENUES MUST BE PAID TO BIAFRA.

3. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS REPS OF CW OFFICE AND MINPOWER HAVE TOLD EMLOFFS THAT SHELL-BP AND OTHER OIL COMPANIES HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HMG BUT THAT HMG HAS NOT GIVEN ANY ADVICE NOR HAS IT BEEN ASKED FOR ANY. IN LAST RESORT DECISION WHETHER TO PAY OIL REVENUES TO FMG OR TO EAST RESTS WITH COMPANIES.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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RUTALS/AMCONSUL KADUNA
RUEDPSA/CINCEAFSA
RUEPJS/DIA
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS ENUGU 874

MILGOV OJUKWU SIGNED REVENUE COLLECTION (NO.2) DECREE
JUNE 21. FULL TEXT BELOW:

THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA HEREBY
DECREES AS FOLLOWS:

PAGE 2 RUTANU 874 UNCLAS

1. THIS DECREE MAY BE CITED AS THE REVENUE COLLECTION (NO.2)
DECREE, 1967, AND SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE COME INTO FORCE ON
THE 30TH DAY OF MAY 1967.

2. THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DECREE SHALL APPLIE NOTWITHSTANDING
ANYTHING IN ANY OTHER LAW TO THE CONTRARY.

3. IN THIS DECREE, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES
"APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY" MEANS THE PERMANENT SECRETARY, MINISTRY
OF FINANCE;

"COMPANY" MEANS ANY INCORPORATED BODY, BUSINESS OR UNDERTAKING;
"MILITARY GOVERNOR" MEANS THE MILITARY GOVERNOR AND HEAD OF
STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA;

"MINERAL" HAS THE SAME MEANING AS IN THE MINERAL ACT;

"THE REPUBLIC" MEANS THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA;

"REVENUE" INCLUDES MONEY FROM FEES, LEASES, LICENCES, PREMIUMS,
RENTS, RIGHTS AND ROYALTIES AS THE CASE MAY BE, PAYABLE UNDER
AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANY LAW IN FORCE OR DEEMED BY VIRTUE OF
THE CONSTITUTION (INTERIM PROVISIONS) DECREE, 1967, TO BE IN
FORCE IN THE REPUBLIC RELATING TO

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Authority VND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

POL 16 BIAFRA
POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
RUQSNL/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
INFO RUTAHN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA
RUDKJA/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY COTONOU
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY DAKAR
RUTANU/AMCONSUL ENUGU
RUTALS/AMCONSUL IBADAN
RUTAKA/AMCONSUL KADUNA
RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
RUTDCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUTANA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

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1967 JUN 21 PM 12 16

Handwritten: 2081
6/21/67

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
RUQSYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE/MEAFSA
STATE GRNC

BT
CONFIDENTIAL LUSAKA 2081

SUBJECT: ZAMBIAN DIPLOMACY IN NIGERIAN CRISIS

REF: STATE 213214 AND LAGOS 10401

1. DESPITE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY ZAMBIAN HIGH COMMISSION
LAV (LAGOS 10315 NOTAL) WE HAVE NOT DETECTED ANY INCLINATION
ON PART GRZ TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA. WE SUSPECT KAPWEPWE MISSION
EAST ANGICA IS FOR OPEN-ENDED EXCHANGES OF VIEWS RATHER THAN
TO PUSH ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AT THIS STAGE. MFA
OFFICIALS ARE CLOSE MOUTHED ABOUT ZAMBIAN POSITION.
FOLLOWING INFORMATION ALL COMES FROM NIGERIA HIGH
COMMISSIONER EJIWUNMI (PROTECT).

2. EJIWUNMI SAYS HE WAS UNABLE GET APPOINTMENT SEE PRESIDENT
KAUNDA BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE ON ASIAN TRIP DESPITE URGENT
REQUEST HE MADE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM LAGOS IN ORDER LEARN

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-2- Lusaka 2081, June 21

KAUNDA'S POSITION ON BIAFRA. HE DISCOVERED LATER THAT GRZ CABINET HAD DISCUSSED NIGERIA AT LENGTH BUT HAD NOT COME TO DECISION ON RECOGNITION, SO KAUNDA AND CABINET ASKED GRZ

PAGE 3 RUQSOH 2081K C O N F I D E N T I A L
FONMIN KAPWEPWE SEE EJIWUNMI. THIS WAS WHY KAUNDA MADE AIRPORT DEPARTURE STATEMENT EMPHASIZING HIS CONCERN ABOUT NIGERIA AND GIVING VICE PRESIDENT KAMANGA AND FONMIN KAPWEPWE MANDATE TO SOUND OUT OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN CONCERT WITH THEM (SEE LUSAKA A-324).

3. SUBSEQUENTLY, EJIWUNMI SAW KAPWEPWE WHO "CATEGORICALLY ASSURED HIM" GRZ WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE OJUKWU'S BREAKAWAY REGIME, BUT SAID THAT AFTER RETURNING FROM EAST AFRICA HE MIGHT HAVE TO MAKE TRIP TO NIGERIA AND CONSULT "VARIOUS OFFICIALS" THERE TO SEE WHAT OTHER AFRICAN STATES COULD DO TO HELP IN SITUATION. OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, KAPWEPWE REFUSED REVEAL HIS HAND REGARDING PROPOSALS HE MIGHT MAKE IN EAST AFRICA.

4. BY SHEER GOOD LUCK ONE OF THE TWO MEN ON FEDERAL NIGERIAN DELEGATION TO EAST AFRICA MANAGED TO GET TO LUSAKA ON VC-10 JUNE 19 IN TIME BRIEF KAPWEPWE AND RETURN NAIROBI ON SAME PLANE. EJIWUNMI THOUGHT BRIEFING OF KAPWEPWE BEFORE HE LEFT FOR EAST AFRICA HAD BENEFICIAL EFFECT.

5. EJIWUNMI SAID ONETIME NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER JAJA WACHUKU MADE TRIP TO EAST AFRICA ON BEHALF BIAFRA REGIME

PAGE 4 RUQSOH 2081K C O N F I D E N T I A L
LAST WEEK AND PLANNED COME TO ZAMBIA BUT MISSED PLANE TO LUSAKA. WACHUKU THEN TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO TELEPHONE KAUNDA, FINALLY MANAGED GET KAPWEPWE WHO TOLD HIM, "SPEAKING PERSONALLY," THAT HE DID NOT THINK GRZ COULD AGREE TO RECEIVE HIM AS REPRESENTATIVE OF BIAFRA BUT WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO WACHUKU VISITING ZAMBIA AS PRIVATE PERSON.

(#)
SEE KAUNDA
IN NAIROBI WHEN KAUNDA STOPPED THERE FOR FEW HOURS ENROUTE TO NEW DELHI JUNE 14. EJIWUNMI UNDERSTANDS FROM NIGERIAN

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Date	10/5/03

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-3- Lusaka 2081, June 21

MISSION IN NAIROBI THAT KAUNDA TOLD WACHUKU GRZ COULD NOT
RECOGNIZE BIAFRA WITHOUT FULLY CONSULTING OTHER AFRICAN STATES.

6. EJIWUNMI CONFIDED THAT HE SAW MADIYA NGALANDE, GRZ
HICOM LAGOS, WHILE LATTER WAS IN LUSAKA ON CONSULTATION,
AND GOT IMPRESSION NGALANDE WAS DISPOSED TO FAVOR EASTERN
NIGERIA. HOWEVER, FROM WHAT HE KNEW OF GRZ POSITION,
EJ IWUNMI HAD FEELING IT WAS "NOT IN ACCORD WITH NGALANDE'S
RECOMMENDATIONS."

7. EJIWUNMI THINKS KAPWEPWE AND GRZ ARE TAKING INITIATIVE
ON NIGERIAN CIRSIS SOLELY IN BELIEF THAT SOME AFRICAN COUNTRY
MUST TAKE A LEAD, NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE AXE TO GRIND OR

PAGE 5 RUQSON 2081K C O N F I D E N T I A L
DESIRE FOR PRESTIGE. WE INCLINED TO AGREE, WITH ADDED
ASSUMPTION KAUNDA MOVED BY GENUINE "HUMANIST" DESIRE HELP
PREVENT BLOODSHED IN NIGERIA. IN ANY EVENT BELIEVE GRZ WILL
CAUTIOUSLY AVOID GETTING VERY FAR AHEAD OF DISCERNIBLE
AFRICAN CONSENSUS.
GP3 EDMONDSON

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(#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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CORRECTION ISSUED:
JUNE 22, 1967 11 PM

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-2- LUSAKA 2081 JUNE 21 1967

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KAUNDA'S POSITION ON BIAFRA. HE DISCOVERED LATER THAT GRZ CABINET HAD DISCUSSED NIGERIA AT LENGTH BUT HAD NOT COME TO DECISION ON RECOGNITION, SO KAUNDA AND CABINET ASKED GRZ

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PAGE 3 RUSSON 2081K C O N F I D E N T I A L
FONMIN KAPWEPWE SEE EJIWUNMI. THIS WAS WHY KAUNDA MADE AIRPORT DEPARTURE STATEMENT EMPHASIZING HIS CONCERN ABOUT NIGERIA AND GIVING VICE PRESIDENT KAMANGA AND FONMIN KAPWEPWE MANDATE TO SOUND OUT OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN CONCERT WITH THEM (SEE LUSAKA A-324).

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5. EJIWUNMI SAID ONETIME NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER JAJA WACHUKU MADE TRIP TO EAST AFRICA ON BEHALF BIAFRA REGIME LAST WEEK AND PLANNED COME TO ZAMBIA BUT MISSED PLANE TO LUSAKA. WACHUKU THEN TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO TELEPHONE KAUNDA, FINALLY MANAGED GET KAPWEPWE WHO TOLD HIM, "SPEAKING PERSONALLY," THAT HE DID NOT THINK GRZ COULD AGREE TO RECEIVE HIM AS REPRESENTATIVE OF BIAFRA BUT WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO WACHUKU VISITING ZAMBIA AS PRIVATE PERSON.

AS IT WORKED OUT, EJIWUNMI SAYS, WACHUKU MANAGED SEE KAUNDA IN NAIROBI WHEN KAUNDA STOPPED THERE FOR FEW HOURS ENROUTE TO NEW DELHI JUNE 14. EJIWUNMI UNDERSTANDS FROM NIGERIAN

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Pol 23-9 NIGERIA

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Action

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L

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

H

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

NFA

INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO

RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

P

STATE GRNC

USIA

BT

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 20440

NFC

NATUS

TKR

SUBJECT/ NIGERIAN SITUATION

GA

REF: NATTO A-537

NSA

DOD

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INT

TRSY

RSR

1. CONTINUING JUNE 6 POLAD'S DISCUSSION OF EVENTS IN NIGERIA (REF AIRGRAM), NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS PROVIDED INFO ON NATIONAL ACTION ON COMMUNICATIONS FROM GENERAL GOWON URGING NON-RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA. FRENCH AND UK POLADS REPORTED RECEIPT OF COMMUNICATION AND SENDING OF NONCOMMITAL REPLY; GREECE HAS RECEIVED COMMUNICATION BUT HAS MADE NO DECISION PENDING INFO

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 20440 CONFIDENTIAL
ON ALLIES' POLICIES; BELGIAN POLAD REPORTED THAT FORM OF COMMUNICATION, I. E., CIRCULAR WITHOUT WRITTEN SIGNATURE DOES NOT APPEAR TO WARRANT REPLY; FRG POLAD STATED FRG HAS COMMUNICATED TO GOWON IT WILL NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZE EASTERN REGIME.

2. DURING GENERAL DISCUSSION OF EVENTS, UK POLAD RAISED SUBJECTS OF OIL REVENUES AND UK ARMS SUPPLY POLICY. HE STATED THAT BIAFRA'S EXPECTATION OF FIRST PAYMENT OF OIL REVENUES IN JULY COULD BE CRITICAL MOMENT. ON SUPPLY OF ARMS, HE STATED HMG POLICY IS TO PROVIDE TO FMG ARMS "ALREADY IN PIPELINE" AND CASE BY CASE CONSIDERATION ANY NEW REQUESTS. HE REPORTED THAT PRIOR TO SECESSION, HMG HAD PROVIDED "REASONABLE QUANTITY" OF ARMS OF TYPE PREVIOUSLY POSSESSED BY FEDERAL FORCES. THIS.

CONFIDENTIAL

0477

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Authority VND 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

37

POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

213214

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: [] (POLICY)
[] CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

POL 16 BIAFRA
POL 15 76 ZAMBIA
US NIGERIA
JUN 20 5 45 PM '67

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy ACCRA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
Amembassy KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
Amembassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE
Amembassy NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
Amembassy LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

INFO : Amembassy ABIDJAN
Amembassy ~~XXXXXXXX~~ COTONOU
Amembassy DAKAR
Amembassy KINSHASA
Amembassy LONDON
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Amembassy MONROVIA
Amembassy NIAMEY
Amembassy YAOUNDE
CINCSTR LKE/CINCNEAFSA
Amconsul ENUGU
Amconsul IRADAN
Amconsul KADUNA

STATE 213214 CIRCULAR

REF: Lagos 10401 and 10350 (NOTAL)

1. Department inclined to agree with Embassy LAGOS that it probably too late to bring external influences to bear which might prevent armed conflict between FNC and East. Yet it does not wish to discourage any well intentioned effort by Africans to avert such a tragedy. ^{believed to} initiative may have shifted from earlier reported view of seeking prompt recognition of Biafra as means to achieve peaceful adjustment of Nigerian problem. Thus would welcome discreetly obtained information on scope and specifics of proposals which Zambian Foreign Minister Kapwepwe will be making

Disturbed by: *RM*
AFW:RMW:Idourne:11
AFSE:Mr. McElhiney (sigs) *RM*
2619
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF:JP:mer 2nd
AF:JW:Fredericks *RM*

FORM DS-322
0-65
CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

0478

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/03

3
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* POL 16 BIAFRA
XR POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

50 ZNY SSSSS ZFH-2
P R 161710Z JUN 67
Action FM AMCONSUL ENUGU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AF RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
Info RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA
SS RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
GPM RUDKLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON
SF RUDKMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID
SC INFO RUYUVFACINCS/STRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
SAH RUEPJS/DIA
L ZEN/AMCONSUL IBADAN
H ZEN/AMCONSUL KADUNA
EUR STATE GRNC
IO BT
P SECRET ENUGU 844
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SECRET

014458

1967 JUN 17 AM 4 38

ENUGU 844 6-16-67

ACCRA 3605

1. SAW CHIEF JUSTICE SIR LOUIS MBANEFO THURS JUNE 15 WHO SAID HE RETURNED ENUGU FROM ACCRA ON TUES. SAID HE AND MOJEKWU HAD FOUND GHANAIANS "VERY UNDERSTANDING AND SYMPATHETIC" ALTHOUGH THEY DID NOT RPT NOT INDICATE WHERE THEY STOOD ON BIAFRA RECOGNITION, NOR, ACCORDING SIR LOUIS, WERE THEY FORMALLY ASKED TO RECOGNIZE.

2. SIR LOUIS SAID GHANAIANS NOW ATTEMPTING ARRANGE MEETING "BETWEEN BIAFRA AND NIGERIA" TO WORK OUT MEANS OF "COEXISTENCE" WITHOUT RESORT TO VIOLENCE. SAID GHANAIANS TOLD THAT BIAFRA WILLING PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATING FORMULA FOR COEXISTENCE BUT QUESTION IS ARE GOWON AND FMG WILLING. SAID GHANAIAN REPLY WAS THAT IF GOWON REFUSED NEGOTIATE, GHANA WOULD "REEXAMINE ITS POSITION" RE NIGERIA. SIR LOUIS WOULD NOT SAY WHICH GHANAIAN OFFICIALS MOJEKWU AND HE SAW.

3. TO QUESTION HOW HE RETURNED FROM ACCRA, SIR LOUIS SAID IT BY CHARTER PLANE VIA ISLAND OFF COAST WEST AFRICA OWNED BY THIRD COUNTRY. DENIED IT FERNANDO POO; WOULD NEITHER ADMIT NOR DENY IT SAO TOME. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THERE NOW TWO LEARJETS OWNED BY SWISS FIRM EXECUTIVE JET AVIATION NOW OPERATING FROM BIAFRA.)

4. SIR LOUIS ASKED FOR LATEST USG THINKING ON RECOGNITION AND WAS TOLD IT MUCH TOO SOON EXPECT DECISION ON THIS, YET IN ANY EVENT WASHINGTON AND PROBABLY EUROPEAN CAPITALS ALSO WILL AWAIT LEAD BY AFRICAN STATES. SIR LOUIS SAID ON EUROPEAN STATE HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS GIVE IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION BUT HAD NOT YET BEEN ASKED DO SO. HE NOTED ALSO THAT BIAFRA CONSIDERING WHETHER SUPPLY IBO PLANTATION LABOR TO FERNANDO POO SHOULD BE CONTINUED (EACH MAJOR TOWN IN EAST HAS SPANISH EMPLOYMENT AGENCY WHICH

SECRET

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By MNA Date 10/5/05

SECRET

-2- ENUGU 844, JUNE 17, 1967

RECRUITS. CLEARLY IMPLYING THAODSPAIN HAS NOT RPT NOT YET
OFFERED RECOGNITION.

5. SIR LOUIS SAID BIAFRA ATTEMPTING ARRANGE SCHEDULED AIR AND
MAIL SERVICES THROUGH NEARBY COUNTRY BY USE OF CHARTER AIRCRAFT;
SAID GHANAIS BEING APPROACHED ON THIS AND HINTED OTHERS AS
WELL.

6. SIR LOUIS SAID HE FULLY AWARE THAT ACCEPTANCE BIAFRA AS
SOVEREIGN STATE WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON QUESTION WHETHER BIAFRA
IS A GOING CONCERN. SAID QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED WHEN OILCO
PAYMENTS DUE IN JULY. OILCOS WILL THEN HAVE TO MAKE PAYMENTS

TO BIAFRA OR RISK SEIZURE AND IF GOWON DOES NOT OR CANNOT STOP
THIS IT WILL BE CLEAR WHERE THE POWER LIES.

7. CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH A MOST UNCHARACTERISTIC REMARK
FOR SIR LOUIS WHEN HE SAID IT MIGHT BE BEST IF GOWON WERE TO
ATTACK BIAFRA SINCE MATTERS COULD THEN BE SETTLED RATHER
QUICKLY.

GP-1
BARNARD

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY SENT TO S/S-O AT 5:25 A.M., 6/17/67
PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, AT 5:25 A.M., 6/17/67

SECRET

0480

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

146 POL 23-9 NIGERIA
 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State
 RR POL 16 BIAFRA

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Action

AF VERDEICGGG TAA141VV NDA048

Info 00 0000
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SS 0 160015Z JUN 68

GFM FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

SP TO RUENGA/SECSTATE WAS DC IMMEDIATE

SC RUENGA/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

SAH RUENGA/AMEMBASSY ENOGU IMMEDIATE

L BT

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 YAOUNDE 2289

H SUBJECT: CAMEROON AND THE NIGERIAN CRISIS: POSSIBLE MOVEMENT
 EUR NIGERIAN TROOPS THROUGH CAMEROON

IO REF: A. USDAO NIGERIA 0230

P B. USDAO CAMEROON 0129

NSC C. STATE 210669

INR POL 23-9 NIGERIA
 AID JOINT STATE-DATT-CAS MESSAGE

OPR 1. RE REF (A) ALLEGING GFRG PERMISSION FOR FMG TROOPS PASS
 THROUGH CAMEROONIAN TERRITORY TO ATTACK EASTERN REGION, EMBASSY

(RSC)
 RSC

PAGE TWO RUQSYD 228900 SECRET
 HAS NO FURTHER INTELLIGENCE TO LEND CREDENCE TO OR DETRACT
 FROM CREDIBILITY THIS REPORT. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED WITH
 RELATIVE CERTAINTY, HOWEVER, THAT AHIDJO SPENT SEVERAL DAYS
 GAROUA BETWEEN JUNE 6 AND 9, AND COULD THERE HAVE RECEIVED
 KATSINA OR OTHER NIGERIAN EMISSARIES (KADUNA'S 798).

2. IN EFFORT ASSESS DEGREE OF PROBABILITY THAT AHIDJO MIGHT
 HAVE GIVEN CONSENT FOR FMG TROOP MOVEMENTS, EMBASSY AGREES
 REF'S (B) & (C) THAT SUCH DECISION WOULD BE OUT OF CHARACTER.
 AT THIS JUNCTURE, HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE MUST NOT LET OURSELVES
 BE GUIDED TOO NARROWLY BY TRADITIONAL IMAGE OF AHIDJO AS
 INDEPENDENT, PRUDENT, AND CAUTIOUS STATESMAN. WHILE NO DOUBT
 AHIDJO WANTS NOTHING MORE THAN TO AVOID CAMEROONIAN INVOLVEMENT
 IN NIGERIAN STRUGGLE, BELIEVE WE MUST CONSIDER THAT HE IS NOT
 RPT NOT LEADING FROM STRENGTH IN THIS SITUATION. CONCEIVABLE
 THAT PRESSURE FROM NORTHERN TRIBAL AND RELIGIOUS BROTHERS
 MAY BE FORCING AHIDJO TO DEVIATE FROM NORMAL STANCE AS MODERATE
 AND PERSPICACIOUS NATIONAL LEADER ALL TRIBES, FACTIONS, AND
 RELIGIONS IN CAMEROON.

SECRET

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 Authority VND959503
 By M/NARA Date 10/5/05

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POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

XR POL 23-9 NIGERIA

89

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

ZNY CCCCC

AF

P 161732Z JUN 67

Info

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO RUTAHN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY

RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

SS

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY COTONOU

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RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

SP

RUQSOH/AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

SC

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

SAH

RUQSNH/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

L

RUQSYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

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RUEDPSA/CINCPAC/CINCPACAFSA

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CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 10315

NSC

1. ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR DAWIT TOLD AMBASSADOR JUNE 16 OF FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING ATTITUDE SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES TOWARDS NIGERIA AND BIAFRA.

INR

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2. DAWIT LEARNED FROM DEPUTY HICOM OF ZAMBIA IN LAGOS (C.S. MUKANDO) THAT PRESIDENT KAUNDA WAS QUITE SERIOUS IN HIS RECENT STATEMENTS ABOUT TRYING TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO NIGERIAN TROUBLES. KAUNDA HAS INSTRUCTED HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, KAPWEPWE TO GO TO ADDIS TO CONSULT ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT. KAUNDA'S IDEA IS THAT ZAMBIA AND ETHIOPIA SHOULD RECOGNIZE BIAFRA AND PERSUADE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO DO SAME IN NEAR FUTURE. KAUNDA APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT RECOGNITION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED IN NIGERIA.

3. DAWIT SAID HE DISCOURAGED ZAMBIAN SUGGESTION AND SAID HE WOULD RECOMMEND TO EMPEROR THAT ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT NOT RPT NOT JOIN IN THIS EFFORT. DAWIT, WHO IS QUITE SOPHISTICATED ABOUT NIGERIAN PROBLEMS, DOES NOT BELIEVE KIND OF FOREIGN PRESSURE KAUNDA HAS IN MIND WOULD IN FACT ARREST FORCES AT WORK IN NIGERIA. HE PROBABLY REALIZES, ALSO, THAT ETHIOPIAN PARTICIPATION IN SUCH MOVE WOULD CAUSE VERY UNFRIENDLY REACTION FROM FMG AND MIGHT ESTABLISH UNWANTED PRECEDENT RE ETHIOPIAN PROBLEMS WITH REBELS IN ETHIOPIA.

4. DAWIT SAID THAT FMG IS APPARENTLY TRYING TO HEAD OFF ZAMBIAN INITIATIVE BECAUSE ADEGOROYE, DEPUTY PERM SEC EXTAFF AND DR. SAMUEL ALUKO (FORMERLY CLOSE ADVISER TO OJUKWU BUT NOW PROFESSOR AT UNIVERSITY OF IFE) ARE LEAVING

CONFIDENTIAL

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1967 JUN 16 PM 310

POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR POL 16 BIAFRA
XR POL 23-9 NIGERIA
MICROFILMED BY RM/R

6-16-67
10315

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0482

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Authority

VND 954503


By

MARA Date

10/5/05

DEPT. DISTRIBUTION ORIGIN/ACTION				DEPARTMENT OF STATE		FILE DESIGNATION	
AF-5				AIRGRAM		POL 16 BIAFRA	
RS/R	REP	AF	ARA	Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.			
1							
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INR	E	P	IO	LIMITED OFFICIAL USE		RECEIVED A-159	
5		2		HANDLING INDICATOR		NO.	
L	FBO	AID		<p>TO : Department of State</p> <p>INFO: CAPE TOWN LAGOS MASERU MBABANE PRETORIA</p> <p>FROM : Amembassy GABERONES DATE: June 15, 1967</p> <p>SUBJECT : Botswana Position with Regard to "Biafra"</p> <p>REF :</p>			
				<p>The Secretary of the GOB Department of External Affairs in the President's Office has informed me that, for the time being, Botswana will continue with a "wait and see" attitude toward the so-called "Republic of Biafra" (Eastern Nigeria). He explained that this was in response to a telegram which President KHAMA had received from the Nigerian Head of Government, Yukubu GOWON, containing a personal plea that Botswana not recognize the break-away regime and indicating that Nigeria would consider such recognition an unfriendly act.</p> <p style="text-align: right; font-size: 1.2em;">PLETCHER </p>			
AGR	COM	FRB	INT				
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Initials:				For Department Use Only			
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Charge: CH Pletcher: cl: 6/13/67				Drafting Date:	Phone No.:	Contents and Classification Approved by:	
Clearances:				6/13/67			

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3

POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*
XR POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

48

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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Action

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FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

TO RUEHC/ SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUTALS/ AMEMBASSY LAGOS

RUDTOR/ AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUDTOR/ AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

RUDTOR/ AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

STAT E GRNC

BT

1967 JUN 15 AM 6 16

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE NAIROBI 5382

REF: NAIROBI'S 5213 (NOTAL)

1. NAIROBI "DAILY NATION" TODAY REPORTS PRESENCE
HERE OF BIAFRA "ROVING AMBASSADOR" AUSTIN OKWU, WHO
"OFFICIALLY SENT PLEAD WITH EAST AFRICAN STATES TO UNDER-
STAND CASE OF BIAFRA AND LOOK AT IT WITH OBJECTIVE AND
SYMPATHETIC APPRAISAL."

2. "NATION" QUOTES OKWU AS FOLLOWS FROM SPECIAL
INTERVIEW:

3. ONLY WAY STOP MORE BLOODSHED IN NIGERIA IS FOR
AFRICAN STATES TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA DE JURE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

4. OKWU CARRIES PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM OJUKWU TO
KENYATTA, CONTENTS OF WHICH CAN NOT DIVULGE
PUBLICLY.

5. DURING NIGERIA'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, IT
WAS EASTERNERS WHO PRESSED FOR UNITARY GOVERNMENT
BUT THEY ACCEPTED FEDERAL CONSTITUTION TO ACCOMMODATE
WISHES OF NORTH. AFTER FIRST COUP LAST YEAR, IT WAS
EASTERNER GEN. IRONSI WHO PRESSED FOR STRONG CENTRAL
GOVT BUT NORTHERNERS KILLED HIM TO FORESTALL LOSS OWN
FOOTHOLD IN LAGOS. NOW NORTHERNER GOWON WANTS
STRONG FEDERAL GOVT ON OWN TERMS. STRAW THAT BROKE CAMEL'S

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NAIRCB I 5382

6-15-67

2

0484

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Authority VNI 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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-2- NAIROBI 5382, JUNE 15

BACK WAS DISSOLUTION SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL AND
"ENTRENCHMENT GOWON AS DICTATOR NIGERIA."

6. NORTHERNERS HAVE KILLED 30,000 EASTERNERS AND
MADE SOME 8,000,000 REFUGEES IN OWN COUNTRY. "WE
CANNOT RELIVE SADISTIC GAME OF NORTHERNERS DISSECTING
PREGNANT WOMEN, PUTTING THEIR BABIES IN CALABASHES AND
MAILING THEM TO EAST."

7. BIAFRA CASE "WITHOUT HISTORICAL PRECEDENT; NEVER
BEFORE HAVE YOU HAD SECTION OF STATE THROWN OUT WITHOUT ANY

JUST CAUSE BUT THAT THEY ARE INDUSTRIOUS, EDUCATED AND
PREPONDERANT."

8. COMMENT: NO PRESENT REASON BELIEVE GOK WILL
ALTER ATTITUDE ON NIGERIAN BREAKUP REPORTED REFTEL.
FERGUSON
BT

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/03

37

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL

CONTROL NO.

10413

RS/11

TO EUR - Mr. Beneville

DATE June 15, 1967

SUBJECT Telegram to the President from Finé Agi dtd 6/12 (Biafra Union
of Great Britain and Ireland) urging US recognition of Biafra

Prepare a Read to _____
memo enclosing or containing:
_____ Draft reply for President's
signature.
_____ Draft reply for signature by
_____.
_____ Memo for use as enclosure to reply
by White House.
_____ Comment or recommendation.

Direct reply:

_____ Furnish information copy under
cover of a Read to _____
memo.
_____ Comeback copy required for S/S.

XXX Suitable acknowledgment or other
appropriate handling:
_____ Furnish information copy of
reply, if any, under cover of
a Read to _____ memo.

_____ Refer to White House request of
_____.

FYI

_____ Due in S/S by _____

NOTES

1. White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given below.
2. Direct replies to White House mail must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level.
3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addressee of the incoming letter, must begin: "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. _____ has asked me to reply".
4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback copy for the White House is requested.

REMARKS

*No action required. Telegram
filed in Dept (AFW) R.P. Smith June 16 '67*

COPIES TO:

AF - Mr. Garland (w/att)

George Kelly 7552

Secretariat Staff
Ext.

0486

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

37 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

10413

To: The Secretary of State

Date: June 14, 1967

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☐ Draft reply for:
☐ President's signature.
☐ Undersigned's signature.

☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.

☐ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.

☒ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.

☐ For your information.

☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

Letter: ☒ Telegram: Other:
 To: The President
 From: Fine Aji, General Secretary, Biafra Union of Great Britain and Ireland, London
 Date: 6/12/67
 Subject: Urging United States recognition of Biafra as an independent republic.


By direction of the President:

2 MICROFILMED BY RM/R

Paul M. Poppo
Assistant to the President

(Copy to remain with correspondence)

0487



POL 16 BIAFRA

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

To: The Secretary of State

Date: June 14, 1967

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☐ Draft reply for:
☐ President's signature.
☐ Undersigned's signature.
- ☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
- ☐ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.
- ☒ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.
- ☐ For your information.
- ☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

☐ Letter: ☒ Telegram: Other:

To: The President
From: Fine Aji, General Secretary, Biafra Union of Great Britain and Ireland,
Date: 6/12/67 London
Subject: Urging United States recognition of Biafra as an independent republic.


By direction of the President:

Paul M. Popple
Assistant to the President

rah

(Department or Agency copy)

0488



37

EW JUNE 11 9 51

WASO2 125 INTL FR

CD LONDON VIA RCA JUNE 12 2335

June 12, 1967

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

BIAFRA UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND GREATLY DEPLORE THE
AMERICAN EVACUATION BOGEY IN THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA MEASURE

SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO DEMORALIZE AND CAUSE PANIC AMONG THE
BIAFRANS STOP UNION CONSIDERS IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA
AS AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC WOULD SAVE THE 2000 AMERICANS AS WELL
AS THE 14 MILLION BIAFRANS WHO HAVE VERY GREAT

AFFECTION FOR AMERICA AND LOOK UPON YOU AS AN ALLY STOP

UNION THEREFORE CALLS ON YOU TO EFFECT SUCH IMMEDIATE
RECOGNITION AND SAVE ALL AND SUNDRY FROM THE IMPENDING
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHAOS ARISING FROM GOWANS MILITARY MOVES STOP
UNION ALSO CALLS FOR YOUR IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION ON BRITAIN
WITHDRAWING AIRCRAFT CARRIER ALBION NOW POISED AGAINST BIAFRA STOP

FINE AGI GENERAL SECRETARY.

MICROFILMED BY RM/R

POL 16 BIAFRA

FORM 005 PRINTED BY THE STANLEY REGISTER COMPANY, U.S.A.

0489

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

87

Action
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R 121700Z JUN 67 CONFIDENTIAL

FM AMCONSUL ENUGU
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
 RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 INFO RUDTCH/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
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6-12-67

1. EMBASSY OFFICER WACH ON TDY ENUGU SPOKE SEPARATELY JUNE 9 AND 10 WITH C. C. MORDI, MEMBER GOVERNOR OJUKWU'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND CHAIRMAN MARKETING BOARD, AND O. U. IKPA, PRINCIPAL TO WORK GOVERNOR OJUKWU AND MEMBER NEWLY CREATED EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY OF "BIAFRA." EMBOFF ALSO SPOKE AT LENGTH WITH D. O. EGBUE, LEGAL ADVISER TO MILITARY GOVERNOR.

2. IKPA AND MORDI BOTH COMMENTED THAT FMG HAD FAILED TAKE STRONG ACTION AGAINST SECESSIONIST EASTERN REGION DURING FIRST TEN DAYS INDEPENDENCE DESPITE PREVIOUS THREATS. OFFICIALS HERE SURPRISED, AND SPECULATED THAT GOWON MUST HAVE EXPECTED DRAMATIC RESULTS FROM PROCLAMATION OF NEW STATES IN EAST AND HAD WAITED FOR UPRISING AMONG MINORITY PEOPLES. IKPA AND MORDI REMARKED THAT THIS HAD GOVEN "BIAFRA" AT LEAST TEN DAYS UNINTERRUPTED START TOWARDS ESTABLISHING ITSELF AS ENTITY AMONG NATIONS.

3. IKPA SAID HE STILL EXPECTED WESTERN REGION LEAVE NIGERIAN FEDERATION IN VIEW PAST AWOLOWO PRONOUNCEMENTS BUT IKPA NOW TELLING HIS COLLEAGUES HERE THAT AWOLOWO STATEMENT RE "AUTOMALUC SECESSION OF WEST IF EAST LEAVES" MEANT THAT WEST WILL SECEDE IF EAST SECESSION IS "SUCCESSFUL".

4. MORDI AND IKPA SAID "BIAFRA" INTENDS CAPOYYYPWYIT OUT PERIOD NEEDED TO GAIN RECOGNITION. MORDI CLAIMED SOME PRODUCE MOVING OUT BUT OBVIOUSLY AVOIDED GIVING DETAILS OR FIGURES. ALL OFFICIALS DBNTACTED BY EMB OFF SAID PEOPLE OF EAST ARE ABLE AND WILLING SUFFER PRIVATIONS FOR SEVERAL MONTHS IF NECESSARY UNTIL "BIAFRA" RECOGNIZED AND NORMAL BUSINESS RESUMES. IKPA SAID DELEGATIONS ARE ABROAD WORKING FOR RECOGNITION.

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 By MNARA Date 10/5/03

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-2- ENUGU 813, JUN 14, 1967,

5. MINORITIES PROBLEM NO ADMITTED AS SUCH BY IBO OFFICIALS WHO POINT OUT NUMBER MINORITY LEADERS IN ENUGU GOVERNMENT AND PRO-OJUKWU ACTIVITIES OF MINORITY SPOKESMEN IN CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY, WHO REPORTEDLY WANTED TO WAIVE NORMAL PROCESS ON SECESSION QUESTION BUT OJUKWU INSISTED ON IT FOR RECORD. ON OTHER HAND, EMB OFF
HEARD ANTI IBO COMMENTS BY MINORITY TRIBESMEN SAID MINORITY PEOPLES REGARD GOWON HIGHLY AS PERSON BUT PREFER GO ALONG WITH "BIAFRA."

6. IKPA AND MORDI AND MOST OTHERS BITTER AT "PRO-GOWON SLANT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT." THEY CLAIMED VOA BROADCASTS OVER PERIOD SEVERAL DAYS REPORTED ON "AMERICAN EVACUATION FROM EASTERN NIGERIA" WITHOUT MENTIONING DEPARTURES ANYWHERE ELSE IN FORMER FEDERATION, THUS GIVING "FALSE IMPRESSION" THAT "BIAFRA" IS LESS SAFE FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS THAN AGOS OR EST. COMMENT: THIS OPINION OF VOA WAS NOTED AMONG BOTH AFRICANS AND RESIDENT AMERICANS.

7. EMB OFF SPOKE TO FEW MILITARY FIGURES BUT UNIVERSAL OPINION OF CIVILIAN OFFICIALS (AND APPARENTLY POPULACE) IS THAT "BIAFRA" WELL PREPARED TO TAKE ON "NORTHERN TROOPS" WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. SEVERAL CLAIMED THEY HOPING FOR CHANCE AT "VENGEANCE." IN THIS CONNECTION FREQUENT GREETING GIVEN EMB OFF WAS "WHY ARE AMERICANS LEAVING BIAFRA? FIGHTING WILL NOT GET PAST OUR BORDERS."

8. G. OBIAMIWE AND PETER CHIGBO, COUNSEL AND SECRETARY FOR ATROCITY TRIBUNAL (WHICH NOW WINDING UP) SAID 1966 MASSACRES AND RESULTANT SAD EFFECTS ARE STILL PRIMARY FACTOR IN POPULAR SUPPORT FOR EASTERN SECESSION AND POPULARITY OF OJUKWU. OBIAMIWE FRIEND OF PHILIP ALALE, LEFTWING YOUTH LEADER, BUT AT SOCIAL MEETING OF SEVERAL LAWYERS ALL CLAIMED THAT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN FUTURE OF "BIAFRA" NOT PROMISING BECAUSE OF STRENGTH OF BOTH TRIBALISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN COUNTRY AND POOR QUALITY LEFTWING LEADERSHIP SUCH AS ALALE.

COMMENT: NKRUMAH AND SEKOU TOURE NOT REGARDED AS LEFTISTS BY THESE COMMENTATORS BUT AS SELFISH NONIDEOLOGICAL LEADERS.

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* As received.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/03

37 INCOMING TELEGRAM POL 16 BIAFRA
Department of State

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1967 JUN 10 PM 7 49

CONGOLESE VIEWS ON NIGERIA

KINSHASA 7635

AMB IDZUMBUIR (CONGO K) TOLD MISOFF JUN 9 THAT PNG'S ATTEMPT BLOCKADE EAST WOULD FAIL AS WOULD BE EVIDENT WHEN OIL FIRMS' PAYMENTS MADE JUL 1. SAID NIGERIAN PROBLEM TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM CONGOLESE IN THAT CONGO HAD NO HISTORY OF ONE AREA'S DOMINATING OTHERS AS MOSLEMS ATTEMPT DOMINATE REST OF NIGERIA. BELIEVED GOWON'S FATAL ERROR HAD BEEN REFUSAL ACCEPT EXTERNAL MEDIATION AND ASSISTANCE, ELEMENT THAT HAD PROVED DECISIVE IN HOLDING CONGO TOGETHER. THOUGHT TANZ ANI WOULD BE FIRST AFRICAN STATE RECOGNIZE BIAFRA AND THAT OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW.

COMMENT: IDZUMBUIR, WHO INTELLIGENT AND WELL-INFORMED ON AF AFFAIRS, CLEARLY SYMPATHIZES WITH BIAFRA.

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Authority VND 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 23-4 NIGERIA
XR POL 16 BIAFRA

NATTO-A 357 **CONFIDENTIAL**

TO : Department of State, Lagos, London DEPT OF STATE

RECEIVED
JUN 9 10 19 AM 1967

AS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: June 8, 1967

FROM : USRO, Paris

SUBJECT: POLADS Discussion of Nigerian Crisis

REF :

The UK POLAD (Bushell) reported in POLADS June 6 on the situation in Nigeria. The item had been placed on the agenda unexpectedly, and only the UK was in a position to report at length. There were some questions from around the table, however, which elicited some expansion to the UK report.

Bushell predicted the central government would find it necessary to resort to military action of some sort. He observed that the North, which dominates army ranks, was pressing for this, and thought it possible that the army would find some way to act even if Gowon refrained from doing so. He foresaw infiltration of guerrillas into the Eastern Region as a possibility.

Commenting on military capabilities, Bushell said the central government commands an army of 9-10 thousand men and a small navy, which includes one frigate. The East, by contrast, has only about four thousand men and no navy. A possible line of action for the central government to take, therefore, would be to declare a blockade of Eastern ports and station the frigate off shore as a symbol of enforcement hoping to frighten off shipping.

DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: POL:CJGrip/vl/6-6-67

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:DDickinson

Clearances: SECDEL:STJohnson

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Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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On the question of recognition of Biafra, Bushell said Tanzania, Ethiopia and Gambia have issued statements critical of the independence move, and said Lesotho has called for an OAU meeting. He said Gowon had asserted to the OAU that any step toward recognition of Eastern independence would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Bushell went on to say the UK has not received a request from the new state for recognition, and knew of no government which has extended recognition. Noting that the UK standard for recognition of a state is that it have (a) active control over its population and territory and (b) a reasonable prospect of permanence, Bushell said the UK thought it important nonetheless that any recognition of Biafra come first from African, not Western, governments.

The Norwegian POLAD (Vaerns) reported that Gowon had communicated with the Norwegian Prime Minister on May 31 urging Norway to do nothing which might injure the corporate integrity of Nigeria's central government. Vaerns said the communication had been sent directly through commercial channels, rather than through the Norwegian Embassy at Lagos, and thought it may have been part of a recent exchange between the two heads of government. POLADS present had no information of other communications to governments, and Bushell expressed interest in having this verified.

The French POLAD (Renard) expressed interest in knowing how Western oil companies planned to manage their relations with Lagos now that the oil-rich East has tried to break off. Bushell identified Shell and British Petroleum as the main oil firms operating in the East, but there was no wider exchange on this point.

It was agreed that the item would be kept on the agenda.

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MW NARA
Date	10/5/03

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17 DEPARTMENT OF
AIRGRAM

A-943

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NO.

TO : Department of State

INFO: ASMARA, ENUGU, LAGOS

FROM : Amembassy ADDIS ABABA

SUBJECT: Former Nigerian Diplomat Distributes Propaganda for Biafra

REF : Addis 3859

F.A.C. Enwonwu, former Second Secretary at the Nigerian Embassy, resigned a few weeks ago and returned to his home in Eastern Nigeria. According to an African diplomat he re-appeared in Addis for a few days during the week of June 12, mailed to all diplomatic missions in Addis two pro-Biafra pamphlets entitled "Address by H.E. Lt. Col. Ojukwu - May 26, 1967" and "Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra", (enclosures) and then left Ethiopia.

Enclosures:

1. Address by H.E. Lt. Col Ojukwu
2. Proclamation of The Republic of Biafra

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by:
POL:APM:cer:6/19/67

Contents and Classification Approved by
DCM - Robert Donhauser

Clearances:

POL:WLS


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Authority VND 954503
By M/NARA Date 10/5/05



PROCLAMATION OF



THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA

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THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO RM/R OFFICIAL FILES

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Authority VND 959/503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

PROCLAMATION
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA

1967 PRINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT PRINTER • ENUGU

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VN12959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

PROCLAMATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA

IT IS RIGHT and just that we of this generation of Eastern Nigerians, should record for the benefit of posterity, some of the reasons for the momentous decision we have taken at this crucial time in the history of our people.


The Military Government of Eastern Nigeria has, in a series of publications, traced the evils and injustices of the Nigerian political association through the decades, stating also the case and standpoint of Eastern Nigeria in the recent crisis.

Throughout the period of Nigeria's precarious existence as a single political entity Eastern Nigerians have always believed in fundamental human rights and principles as they are accepted and enjoyed in civilized communities. Impelled by their belief in these rights and principles and in their common citizenship with other Nigerians after Amalgamation, Eastern Nigerians employed their ideas and skills, their resourcefulness and dynamism in the development of areas of Nigeria outside the East. Eastern Nigerians opened up avenues of trade and industry throughout the country; overlooked the neglect of their homeland in the disposition of national institutions, projects and utilities; made available their own natural resources to the rest of the country; and confidently invested in the general economic and social development of Nigeria. Politically Eastern Nigerians advocated a strong, united Nigeria; for ONE COUNTRY, ONE CONSTITUTION, ONE DESTINY. Eastern Nigerians were in the vanguard of the struggle for national independence and made sacrifices and concessions for the cause of national unity. They conceded the inauguration of a Federal instead of a Unitary system of Government in Nigeria.

Leaders of Northern Nigeria have told us several times that what our former colonial masters made into "NIGERIA" consisted of an agglomeration of peoples, distinct in every way except in the colour of their skins, and organized as a unit for their own commercial interests and administrative convenience. The name "Nigeria" was regarded by many as a mere "geographical expression".

In course of time, the peoples of the other parts of Southern Nigeria found that they possessed many things in common with those of Eastern Nigeria, and while the colonial master made adjustments to accommodate these common ties between the Southern inhabitants, the peoples of the North insisted on maintaining their separateness.

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On October 1, 1960, independence was granted to the peoples of Nigeria in a form of "federation", based on artificially made units. The Nigerian Constitution installed the North in perpetual dominance over Nigeria. The Federation was predicated on the perpetual rule by one unit over the others. The Constitution itself contained provisions which negated the fundamental human freedoms which it purported to guarantee for the citizens. Thus were sown, by design or by default, the seeds of factionalism and hate, of struggle for power at the Centre, and of the worst types of political chicanery and abuse of power. One of two situations was bound to result from that arrangement: either perpetual domination of the rest of the country by the North, not by consent, but by force and fraud, or a dissolution of the federating bond. National independence was followed by successive *crises each* leading to near disintegration of the country. Some of the major events which are directly attributable to the defective and inadequate Constitution may here be mentioned.

In 1962, an emergency was imposed on Western Nigeria. Jurists agree that the imposition was unconstitutional; it was a ruse to remove certain elements in Western Nigeria known to have taken a firm stand against the misuse of political power. A puppet of the North was manoeuvred into power in Western Nigeria.

Also in 1962, and again in 1963, Nigerians tried for the first time to count themselves. What should ordinarily be a statistical and dull exercise was, because of the nature of the Constitution, turned into a fierce political struggle. The official figures established by these censuses have been discredited.

Federal elections followed in December, 1964—elections which have been described as the most farcical in our history. Candidates were either kidnapped, killed or forced to withdraw from the elections. Results announced were in direct opposition to the actual facts. The Southern parties had boycotted the election, and the deadlock which followed brought the country near to dissolution. The situation was patched up; the conflagration was brought under control, but its embers lay smouldering.

On October 11, 1965, elections were held to the Western House of Assembly. The puppet Government of that Region existed, not by the will of the people of Western Nigeria, but because of the combined power of the Federal Government and the Northern Nigeria Government which installed it. The electorate of Western Nigeria was not permitted to declare its will in the elections. Fraud, foul play and murder were committed with impunity. The smouldering embers

of the recent past erupted with unquenchable virulence. The irate electorate showed its resentment in its own way. Complete disorder followed. Yet, the Federal Government dominated by the North fiddled with the issue and even refused to recognize what the whole world had known, namely, that Nigeria was on the brink of disaster.


Only the Armed Forces remained politically uncommitted and non-partisan. Some of their officers and men revolted against the injustices which were perpetrated before their very eyes and attempted to overthrow the Federal Government and Regional Governments. In desperation, the Ministers of the Federal Government handed over power to the Armed Forces under the Supreme command of Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi.

The Military administration under Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi made the first real attempt to unite the country and its peoples. The Northerners saw in his efforts the possibility of losing their control of the affairs of the country. So while its leaders paid lip service to unity, they laid plans for making sure that it could never be achieved. Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi was, of course, an Easterner, but the majority of the individuals at the head of affairs were not. At no time under the civilian rule did Eastern Nigerians hold a dominating position in the government of the Federation.

On May 24, 1966, the Military Government issued a decree designed to provide a more unified administration in keeping with the military command. The people of Northern Nigeria protested against the decree and on May 29, 1966, thousands of Easterners residing in the North, were massacred by Northern civilians. They looted their property. The Supreme Military Council set up a tribunal to look into the causes of those unprovoked acts of murder and pillage and determine what compensations might be paid to the victims. The Northern Emirs declared their intention to pull Northern Nigeria out of the Federation rather than face the tribunal. But the Supreme Military Council justly decided that the tribunal must do its duty.

Then on July 29, 1966, two months after the May murders and despoliation, and four days before the tribunal was due to commence its sitting, the real pogrom against Eastern Nigerians residing in the Federation began. Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi and his host, Lt.-Col. Francis Fajuyi, were kidnapped at Ibadan and murdered. This time Northern soldiers acted in concert with Northern civilians. Defenceless men, women, and children were shot down or hacked to death; some

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were burnt, and some buried alive. Women and young girls were ravished with unprecedented bestiality; unborn children were torn out of the womb of their mothers.

Again on September 29, 1966, the pogrom was resumed. Thirty thousand Eastern Nigerians are known to have been killed by Northerners. They were killed in the North, in Western Nigeria, in Lagos; some Eastern soldiers in detention at Benin were forcibly removed from prison by Northern soldiers and murdered.

At the time of the incident, millions of Eastern Nigerians resided outside the East and persons from other parts of the country lived in this Region. While Eastern Nigerians who assembled at Northern airports, railway stations and motor parks, were set upon by Northern soldiers and civilians armed with machine guns, rifles, daggers and poisoned arrows, the Army and Police in the East were specifically instructed to shoot at sight any Eastern Nigerian found molesting non-Easterners living in the Region. By early October, the sight of mutilated refugees, orphaned children, widowed mothers and decapitated corpses of Eastern Nigerians arriving at our airports and railway stations inflamed passions to such an extent that it was found necessary to ask all non-Easterners to leave the region in their own interest. Since the events of July, 1966, there has been a mass movement of population in this country. Nigerian society has undergone a fundamental change; it is no longer possible for Eastern Nigerians to live outside the Region without fear of loss of life or of property.

Two facts emerge from the events described above. The widespread nature of the massacre and its periodicity—29th May, 29th July, and 29th September—show firstly, that they were premeditated and planned, and secondly, that Eastern Nigerians are no longer wanted as equal partners in the Federation of Nigeria. It must be recalled that this was the fourth in a series of massacres of Eastern Nigerians in the last two decades.

At the early stages of the crisis, the world was told that it was a conflict between the North and the East. That pretence collapsed when it became clear that Northern soldiers moved into Western Nigeria and Lagos as another step in Northern Nigeria's bid to continue her so-called conquest to the sea. Belatedly, it was generally accepted that the fundamental issue was not a struggle between the East and the North, but one involving the very existence of Nigeria as one political entity.

Throughout the Nigerian crises, some of the indigenous judges have been found quite unequal to their calling by reason of their involve-

ment in partisan politics. People soon lost faith in them, and would not go to their courts for redress. In some measure, they were responsible for the collapse of the rule of law in certain parts of Nigeria. Providence has spared us in the East from this terrible calamity.

It is now necessary to summarise the attempts of the Government and people of Eastern Nigeria to solve the crisis, and of the bad faith with which these attempts have been received.

On August 9, 1966, representatives of the Military Governors meeting in Lagos made decisions for restoring peace and for clearing the way for constitutional talks notably the decision that troops be all repatriated to their region of origin. These decisions were not fully implemented.


On September 12, the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference consisting of delegates representing all the Governments of the Federation met in Lagos, and for three weeks sought to discover a form of association best suited to Nigeria having regard to the prevailing circumstances and their causes, and future possibilities. This Conference was unilaterally dismissed by Lt.-Col. Gowon, the Head of the Lagos Government.

It had become then impossible for the Supreme Military Council, the highest governing body in the Federation, to meet on Nigerian soil. As long as Northern troops were in Lagos and the West, no venue could be found acceptable to all the Military Governors for a meeting of the Supreme Military Council in Nigeria. It met at Aburi in Ghana on 4th and 5th January, 1967, on the basis of an agenda previously determined by the official of the Governments of the country and adopted by the Supreme Military Council. Decisions reached at the meeting were ignored by Lt.-Col. Gowon and the North. In the interest of this Region and of the whole Country, the East stood firmly by those decisions, and warned that they would be applied to Eastern Nigeria if steps were not taken by the Lagos Government to apply them generally. The East rejected all measures which did not reflect the decisions at Aburi.

The Aburi accord was not implemented by the Lagos Government. All the meetings of Military Leaders held since Aburi were held without the East. All the decisions taken by Lagos were taken without comment and concurrence from the East.

It became evident that each time Nigerians came close to a realistic solution to the current crisis by moving towards a loose form of association or confederation, Lt.-Col. Gowon, unilaterally frustrated their efforts. When the representatives of the Military Governors decided on August 9 that troops be repatriated to their Regions of origin, and it

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appeared to him that this would lead to confederation, he unilaterally refused to fully implement that decision. When in September the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference appeared near to agreement on a loose Federation, he unilaterally dismissed them indefinitely. When in January, 1967, the Military Leaders agreed at Aburi on what the Federal Permanent Secretaries correctly interpreted as confederation, he unilaterally rejected the Agreement to which he had voluntarily subscribed. When in May, 1967, all the Southern Military Governors and the Leaders of Thought of their Regions spoke out in favour of Confederation, he dismissed the Supreme Military Council and proclaimed himself the dictator of Nigeria—an act which, to say the least, is treasonable.

Following the pogrom of 1966, some two million Eastern Nigerians have returned from other Regions, refugees in their own Country. Money was needed to care for them—not to give them mere relief but to rehabilitate them and, in time, restore their outraged feelings. The Lagos Government was urged to give the Eastern Nigeria Government its share of the statutory revenues. Lt.-Col. Gowon refused to do so in the hope that the weight of the burden would lead to the economic collapse of Eastern Nigeria.

Ultimately, and beginning from April 1, 1967, steps were taken to recover what was due to Eastern Nigeria and to enable this Region and her people to survive. These are the "Survival Edicts": The Revenue Collection Edict, the Legal Education (Eastern Nigeria) Edict, the Statutory Bodies Edict and the Court of Appeal Edict.

At each stage during the crisis, in accordance with the democratic and republican spirit of Eastern Nigerians, the people were fully consulted for their advice and guidance.

On August 31, 1966, the First Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders consisting of four representatives from each administrative division and other interests were summoned and the facts relating to the crisis put before them. Their advice was as follows:

"Be it resolved as follows:—


1. We, the representatives of the various communities in Eastern Nigeria gathered in this Consultative Assembly, hereby declare our implicit confidence in the Military Governor for Eastern Nigeria, Lt.-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, in all the actions he has so far taken to deal with the situation which has arisen in Nigeria since May 29, 1966.

2. In view of the grave threat to our survival as a unit in the Republic of Nigeria, we hereby urge and empower/advise him to take all such actions that might be necessary to protect the integrity of Eastern Nigeria and the lives and property of its inhabitants.
3. We advise constant consultation by His Excellency with the Consultative Assembly.
4. In view of the gravity of the present situation we affirm complete faith in and urge the need for solidarity of Eastern Nigeria as a unit.
5. In view of the present situation of things no delegates be sent to Lagos for any constitutional talks unless the safety of the delegates is guaranteed."

After the adjournment of the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference, these bodies, now enlarged to consist of ten representatives from each administrative division in Eastern Nigeria and other sectors of the community were summoned. The delegates to the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference placed a full report before them, and by a resolution dated October 7, 1966, the Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders advised as follows:

1. PLACES on record its deep gratitude to the Eastern Nigeria Delegation to the Constitutional Conference in Lagos for the diligent and faithful way in which, under conditions of severe strain, tension and fear, they carried out the mandate given to them by the Consultative Assembly and the Chiefs and Elders of Eastern Nigeria.
2. ENDORSES the stand of the Eastern Delegation at the Lagos Constitutional Conference.
3. URGES that as an interim measure, a beginning be made to implement those aspects of the recommendations as relate to the Armed Forces at least to the extent of returning them to their Regions of origin and vesting the operational control of the regional contingents in the respective Military Governors.
4. RE-AFFIRMS its acceptance of the Report of the Committee on the Pattern of Constitution for Eastern Nigeria within the Federation of Nigeria and the additional suggestions proposed by the Graham-Douglas Constitutional Committee regarding the legislative and executive functions to be devolved upon the Provincial Units, and urges that the Constitutional Committee should forthwith study the details of the scheme, with particular reference to the number and

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size of provinces, the distribution of functions between the Provinces and the Regional Government, financial arrangements and the method and timing of implementation.

5. ENDORSES both the principle of the creation of more states in Nigeria and the statement of the Eastern Delegation to the Lagos Constitutional Conference to the effect that the splitting up of the country at this stage is not what is needed to normalize conditions of life in the country and provide a sense of security for its inhabitants, and that immediate constitutional arrangements for the country as a whole should be made on the basis of the existing Regions in order to save the country from impending disintegration.

6. SINCE the issue of the creation of more states is a vital and inevitable item on the Agenda of the Lagos Constitutional Conference, RECOMMENDS the following as the conditions upon which the creation of states should proceed:—

- (a) The basis for the creation of states must be mutually agreed upon beforehand and must be uniformly and consistently applied throughout the country.
- (b) The creation of states must take place simultaneously throughout the country.
- (c) The creation of any new state must be based upon the consent of the people of the area which is to be included in the proposed state and where two or more distinct tribal groupings are comprised within such area the wishes of each such grouping must be separately ascertained and respected.
- (d) The population, area and economic resources of any new state which it is proposed to create must be reasonably commensurate to the enormous functions which the states will be expected to perform under the new constitutional arrangements envisaged for Nigeria.

7. IN VIEW of the fact that the desire on the part of the minority groups for self-determination is the active force behind the demand for the creation of more states, and since in the context of present-day Nigeria minorities are defined by reference to tribe, AFFIRMS its belief that the best hope for a satisfactory solution to the problems of Nigeria lies in the recognition and preservation of the separate identity of the various tribal or linguistic groupings and their right to develop each along its own line and at its own pace; accordingly

RECOMMENDS that the creation of states throughout Nigeria should be on the basis of tribal or linguistic groupings or mutual consent between the linguistic groupings.

8. ADVISES that, until the agreements reached by the personal representatives of the Military Governors on August 8 and 9 are fully implemented, and until immediate compensation is paid by the Federal Military Government for the lives and property of Easterners lost in the disturbed areas of Nigeria, the Eastern Nigeria Delegation should no longer participate in future Constitutional Conference.

9. SATISFIED that the interim report of the Constitutional Conference has been completely overtaken by the most recent events in the country, ADVISES that the only possible and logical solution to the problem of political association for Nigeria lies in the organization and running of common services.

A. IKOKU
Chairman

DATED 7th October, 1966.

On November 23, 1966, they met again to consider the progress of the crisis. They resolved as follows:—


RECALLING the atrocious murders of persons of Eastern Nigeria origin and other acts of barbarism and inhumanity committed against us in other parts of Nigeria by fellow countrymen among whom they lawfully resided;

AWARE of the planned and determined effort to exclude Eastern Nigeria and her people from the public affairs and public offices of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;

CONSCIOUS of the attempt made and being made, by the Government and people of Eastern Nigeria, in spite of the wrongs done to Eastern Nigerians, to promote peace and salvage what is left of Nigeria and her honour;

DETERMINED to protect and defend the integrity of Eastern Nigeria and the dignity of her people;

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CONFIRMING the mandate given by us to our Delegates to the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference, and our confidence in them, and, having noted with regret the indefinite adjournment of the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference by Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon for alleged inability to agree upon the venue of the meeting as well as according to him, because of other difficulties which he has not named;

OBSERVING that, even though the decision to appoint the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference was a unanimous agreement of the Governments of the Federation, yet the adjournment was made without consultation with or consent by the Eastern Nigeria Government;

HAVING also noted the many acts of bad faith on the part of the Gowon Government and its inability to fulfil promises or implement agreements unanimously reached;

FINDING now that there is a plot hatched up by certain civil servants and other officials with the active involvement of Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon to impose a constitution and certain other measures on Nigeria;

RE-AFFIRMING the implicit confidence of the people of Eastern Nigeria in His Excellency, Lt.-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu and assuring him of the solidarity of Eastern Nigeria and their support and admiration for the way he has handled the present crisis facing Nigeria;

ALSO ASSURING His Excellency of the admiration of the people of Eastern Nigeria in the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria and their desire for its continued administration until it has achieved its objective of creating a new society in Eastern Nigeria;

WE DO HEREBY RESOLVE that our Military Governor be advised as follows:—

- (1) To take any measures he considers appropriate for the defence and protection of the integrity of Eastern Nigeria, the lives and property of its inhabitants.
- (2) To maintain utmost vigilance against subversion of the Government of Eastern Nigeria not only from outside the Region, but also from within and to deal ruthlessly with anybody, high or low, engaged in subversion.
- (3) To resist the imposition on the people of Eastern Nigeria of any constitutional, administrative or legislative measures taken without prior consultation and agreement.

- (4) To reject any solution which will undermine the economic and industrial progress and prosperity of Eastern Nigeria or which will tend to sow the seeds of future friction among the Regions of this Country.
- (5) To continue with the good progress made so far in the rehabilitation of refugees.
- (6) To speed up the implementation of Provincial Administration with legislative and executive powers, and the re-establishment of Customary Courts.
- (7) To spare no efforts at the right time to purge former holders of public offices of corrupt practices so as to set a shining example for the youths of this Region, and inculcate into the people the spirit of honesty, integrity, fair-play, mutual trust and a feeling of oneness which will provide the basis for our future progress.
- (8) To continue Your Excellency's efforts to bring about a meeting of Military Leaders and the reconvening of the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference under conditions of adequate security satisfactory to Your Excellency.
- (9) To ensure that only men and women of integrity and merit are appointed to public offices in the Region and that a code of conduct for public officers be drawn up for Eastern Nigeria.

LASTLY, we assure Your Excellency that no Eastern Nigerian, whether living inside or outside this Region, has the mandate or support of the people of this Region to speak for or represent them UNLESS appointed with the recommendation and approval of Your Excellency acting on behalf of Eastern Nigeria.


Dated 23rd November, 1966.

A IKOKU
Chairman

Eastern Nigeria Consultative Assembly Meeting

Since that date matters had become worse; sanctions had been imposed on Eastern Nigeria, warlike preparations made against her; her isolation was complete. Men and women in the Region, incensed by the treatment meted out to them by an unrepentant Lagos and the North, called for the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as a sovereign independent state.

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In these circumstances, the joint meeting of the Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders was reconvened for a clear statement on the future course of action. After an appraisal of the development in the Nigerian crises past and present had been presented to the joint session, a telegram just received from the Lagos Government was read. The full text is as follows:—

"FURTHER MY TELEX OF TWENTIETH MAY X I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR LETTER PG/0897/11 OF MAY 16, 1967 X AS YOU ARE AWARE ECONOMIC MEASURES COMPLAINED OF WERE LIFTED IN RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF NATIONAL CONCILIATION COMMITTEE WITH EFFECT FROM MAY 23 X THEREFORE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU HAVE NOT RESPONDED POSITIVELY X IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO COMMENCE MEASURES TO RESOLVE CRISIS WITHOUT BLOODSHED AND KEEP THE COUNTRY TOGETHER X

IT IS DESIRABLE YOU DECLARE YOUR AGREEMENT WITH POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMME RECENTLY PROCLAIMED BY THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL X THIS YOU WILL RECALL REQUIRES THE URGENT CREATION OF STATES SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL OVER THE COUNTRY TO REMOVE THREAT OF DOMINATION, PREPARATION OF NEW CONSTITUTION ON THEIR BASIS X NEW CONSTITUTION CAN PROVIDE ALL SAFEGUARDS CONSIDERED NECESSARY FOR STATES GOVERNMENTS X ALSO PROGRAMME ENVISAGES IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT OF A REVENUE ALLOCATION COMMISSION TO FIND NEW FORMULA ON BASIS OF PRINCIPLE OF DERIVATION AND NEED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE FUNDS FOR ESSENTIAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS X PROGRAMME WILL ENSURE FAIR PLAY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY X

THEREFORE I EARNESTLY APPEAL TO YOU TO COOPERATE TO ARREST FURTHER DRIFT INTO DISINTEGRATION X ON THE BASIS OF THE FOREGOING REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL GOVERNMENTS CAN MEET WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY TO PLAN FOR SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY ALL YOUR COLLEAGUES OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL X MOST IMMEDIATE"

On the evening of Saturday, May 27th, 1967 the joint session of the enlarged Consultative Assembly and the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders, after full deliberation, passed a resolution the text of which is as follows:

"WE, THE CHIEFS, Elders and Representatives of Eastern Nigeria, gathered at this Joint Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs

and Elders and the Consultative Assembly do solemnly declare as follows:

"WHEREAS we have been in the vanguard of the national movement for the building of a strong, united and prosperous Nigeria where no man will be oppressed and have devoted our efforts, talents and resources to this end;

"WHEREAS we cherish certain inalienable human rights and state obligations such as the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; the right to acquire, possess and defend property; the provision of security; and the establishment of good and just government based on the consent of the governed;

"WHEREAS in practical demonstration of these beliefs, our people settled in other parts of Nigeria, served their country in many capacities, and contributed immensely to the growth and development of Nigeria;


"WHEREAS we are living witnesses of injustices and atrocities committed against Eastern Nigeria, among which are the pre-meditated murder of over 30,000 of our innocent men, women and children by Northern Nigerians, the calculated destruction of the property of our sons and daughters, the shameless conversion of two million Eastern Nigerians into refugees in their own country, all this without remorse;

"WHEREAS in consequence of these and other acts of discrimination and injustice, we have painfully realized that the Federation of Nigeria has failed, and has given us no protection;

"WHEREAS in spite of these facts, the Government and people of Eastern Nigeria have persisted in their efforts to find a practical and just solution that would preserve the continued existence of Nigeria as one corporate unit and restore peace and confidence as demonstrated by the initiative of our Military Governor in getting all the military leaders together at Aburi, Ghana;

"WHEREAS the hopes which the Aburi Agreement engendered have proved to be misplaced and have been destroyed by a series of acts of bad faith and distortions and finally by a refusal on the part of the "Lagos Government" to implement these and other Agreements notwithstanding the fact that they were freely and voluntarily entered into;

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"WHEREAS the Federation of Nigeria has forfeited any claim to our allegiance by these acts and by the economic, political and diplomatic sanctions imposed against us by the so-called Federal Government;

"AND WHEREAS the object of government is the good of the governed and the will of the people its ultimate sanction;

Now, THEREFORE, in consideration of these and other facts and injustices, we, the Chiefs, Elders and Representatives of all the Twenty Provinces of Eastern Nigeria, assembled in this Joint Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders and the Consultative Assembly, at Enugu this 27th day of May, 1967, we hereby solemnly:

- (a) MANDATE His Excellency Lt.-Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria to declare at the earliest practicable date Eastern Nigeria a free, sovereign and independent state by the name and title of the REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA.
- (b) RESOLVE that the new REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA shall have the full and absolute powers of a sovereign state, and shall establish, commerce, levy war, conclude peace, enter into diplomatic relations, and carry out, as of right, other sovereign responsibilities.
- (c) DIRECT that the REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA may enter into arrangement with any sovereign unit or units in what remains of Nigeria or in any part of Africa desirous of association with us for the purpose of running a common services organization and for the establishment of economic ties.
- (d) RECOMMEND that the REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA should become a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Organization.
- (e) RECOMMEND the adoption of a Federal Constitution based on the new provincial units.
- (f) RE-AFFIRM His Excellency's assurance of protection for the persons, properties and businesses of foreign nationals in our territory.
- (g) DECLARE our unqualified confidence in the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt.-Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, and assure him of our unreserved support for the way and manner he has handled the crisis in the country.

So help us God."

THE DECLARATION

Fellow countrymen and women, YOU, the people of Eastern Nigeria:

CONSCIOUS of the supreme authority of Almighty God over all mankind, of your duty to yourselves and posterity;

AWARE that you can no longer be protected in your lives and in your property by any Government based outside Eastern Nigeria;

BELIEVING that you are born free and have certain inalienable rights which can best be preserved by yourselves;

UNWILLING to be unfree partners in any association of a political or economic nature;

REJECTING the authority of any person or persons other than the Military Government of Eastern Nigeria to make any imposition of whatever kind or nature upon you;

DETERMINED to dissolve all political and other ties between you and the former Federal Republic of Nigeria;


PREPARED to enter into such association, treaty or alliance with any sovereign state within the former Federal Republic of Nigeria and elsewhere on such terms and conditions as best to subserve your common good;

AFFIRMING your trust and confidence in ME;

HAVING mandated ME to proclaim on your behalf, and in your name, that Eastern Nigeria be a sovereign independent Republic, NOW THEREFORE I, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CHUKWUEMEKA ODUMEGWU OJUKWU, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA, BY VIRTUE OF THE AUTHORITY, AND PURSUANT TO THE PRINCIPLES, RECITED ABOVE, DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIM THAT THE TERRITORY AND REGION KNOWN AS AND CALLED EASTERN NIGERIA TOGETHER WITH HER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND TERRITORIAL WATERS SHALL HENCEFORTH BE AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE OF THE NAME AND TITLE OF "THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA". AND I DO DECLARE THAT—

- (i) all political ties between us and the Federal Republic of Nigeria are hereby totally dissolved;
- (ii) all subsisting contractual obligations entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or by any person, authority, organization or government acting on its behalf, with any person, authority or organization operating, or relating to any matter or thing, within the Republic of Biafra, shall henceforth be deemed to be

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
entered into with the Military Governor of the Republic of Biafra for and on behalf of the Government and people of the Republic of Biafra, and the covenants thereof shall, subject to this Declaration, be performed by the parties according to their tenor;

- (iii) all subsisting international treaties and obligations made on behalf of Eastern Nigeria by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, shall be honoured and respected;
- (iv) Eastern Nigeria's due share of all subsisting international debts and obligations entered into by the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on behalf of the Federation of Nigeria shall be honoured and respected;
- (v) steps will be taken to open discussions on the question of Eastern Nigeria's due share of the assets of the Federation of Nigeria and personal properties of the citizens of Biafra throughout the Federation of Nigeria;
- (vi) the rights, privileges, pensions, etc., of all personnel of the Public Services, the Armed Forces and the Police now serving in any capacity within the Republic of Biafra, are hereby guaranteed;
- (vii) we shall keep the door open for association with, and would welcome, any sovereign unit or units in the former Federation of Nigeria or in any other parts of Africa desirous of association with us for the purposes of running a common services organization and for the establishment of economic ties;
- (viii) we shall protect the lives and property of all foreigners residing in Biafra; we shall extend the hand of friendship to those nations who respect our sovereignty, and shall repel any interference in our internal affairs;
- (ix) we shall faithfully adhere to the charter of the Organization of African Unity and of the United Nations Organization;
- (x) it is our intention to remain a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations in our right as a sovereign, independent nation.

LONG LIVE THE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA !

AND MAY GOD PROTECT ALL WHO LIVE IN HER !!

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Price: One Shilling

WT 1579/567/10,000

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/03

*Pol 16 Briefing Em A-943
Addis Ababa*



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RS/R*

ADDRESS

by His Excellency the Military Governor

LT.-COL. C. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU

to the Joint Meeting of the
Advisory Committee of Chiefs
and Elders and the Consultative
Assembly

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO RM/R CENTRAL FILES

ENUGU FRIDAY 26 MAY 1967

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND954503
By	MNARA Date 10/5/03

GOVERNOR'S ADDRESS TO THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Telegram received from Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon by His Excellency the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, while Addressing the Joint Meeting of Chiefs, Elders, and the Consultative Assembly on Friday, May 26.

"FSH/13 OU 218

From:—COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LAGOS 25TH MAY, 1967.

To:—MILGOV. ENUGU.

Info:—MILGOVS. KADUNA/IBADAN AND BENIN.

BT

FURTHER MY TELEX OF TWENTIETH MAY X I HAVE JUST RECEIVED YOUR LETTER PG/0897/11 OF MAY 16, 1967 X AS YOU ARE AWARE ECONOMIC MEASURES COMPLAINED OF WERE LIFTED IN RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS OF NATIONAL CONCILIATION COMMITTEE WITH EFFECT FROM MAY 23 X THEREFORE DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED THAT YOU HAVE NOT RESPONDED POSITIVELY X IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO COMMENCE MEASURES TO RESOLVE CRISIS WITHOUT BLOODSHED AND KEEP THE COUNTRY TOGETHER X

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
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MOST IMMEDIATE"

THI ... 251615 HOURS ... (4615—OGBISE) ...

COR:— 'CONSTITUTION' AND 'IMPLEMENTATION'

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HIS EXCELLENCY'S ADDRESS
TO THE JOINT MEETING OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF
CHIEFS AND ELDERS AND THE
CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VN12959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

An Address by His Excellency the Military Governor, Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, to the Joint Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Chiefs and Elders and the Consultative Assembly, on Friday, 26th May, 1967.

Highly respected Chiefs and Elders, Loyal Patriots of Eastern Nigeria, Distinguished Fellow Countrymen,

Once again it is my privilege to welcome you to this Assembly. I do this with all humility and a sense of duty. Although we have not met in this body for sometime, I have continuously and daily met people from all walks of life, visited various places and discussed with the people.

In tackling the day-to-day problems which have confronted us, my task has been made much lighter than it would otherwise have been by your absolute support and understanding in all we have tried to do. On all the occasions I have had the privilege of addressing you, either personally as I am now doing, or through other media of communication, I have made it clear that my paramount aim as the Military Governor of this Region has always been to preserve the integrity of this Region, to provide adequate security for its citizens, to assure peace and progress amongst us and to prevent any recurrence of ill-treatment and atrocity against this Region and its people; and also, in consultation with my military colleagues, to establish a framework within which all the component units of this country could work together in the future on a basis of absolute equality. These have been the joint objectives of everyone of us and our paths towards them have always been made very clear and unmistakable.

Your meeting today is very crucial. The East is at the cross-roads. Since our last meeting everything possible has been done by enemies of the East to escalate the crisis in an attempt to bring about the collapse of this Region. They have failed and will continue to fail. Nevertheless, I find it necessary to put all the facts before you, indicating the issues, the difficulties and the dangers, so that you can examine them fully and advise me on the path we are to follow from now on. As usual, I call upon you to be free, frank and objective.

For a better understanding and a proper appreciation of the problems facing the country today, and in particular of the attitude of Eastern Nigeria to them, we need to go back to the historic statements on Nigerian unity made by leaders of Northern Nigeria.

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By	MV NARA
Date	10/5/03

We all know that before the amalgamation in 1914 of Southern and Northern Nigeria, the North was administered as an entity quite distinct from the South. The amalgamation was, however, not intended to, and did not in fact, result in a fusion of either the peoples of both areas or of their institutions. When, for example, a Legislative Council was established in 1922, it could not, and did not, legislate for the North rather the Governor-General in Lagos legislated for the North by means of Proclamations. This was so because the amalgamation was forced on Northerners who made no secret of their dislike for it. The late Sir Ahmadu Bello, in his book, *My Life*, at page 135, said:

"The Colonial master who ruled Nigeria introduced a system of unitary government not for the present or future unity or well-being of all the indigenes of the country but for his own administrative convenience. Lord Lugard and his amalgamation were far from popular amongst us at that time".

In 1953, the late Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa in a speech in the Legislative Council, said:

"Since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country only on paper. It is still far from being united. The country is inhabited by peoples and tribes who speak different languages, who have different religions, different customs, and traditions and entirely different historical backgrounds in their way of life, and who have also attained different stages of development . . . We do not want our southern neighbours to interfere in our development . . . But I should like to make it clear to you that if the British quitted Nigeria now at this stage the Northern people would continue their interrupted conquest to the sea".

"Interrupted conquest"! That has always been the Northern intention. Thank God that the East has now awakened to its responsibilities, and with that awakening, that ambitious dream will never be fulfilled in this country.

The Self-Government motion in the Central Legislature in March, 1953, evoked the following reply from late Sir Ahmadu Bello:

"It is true that we politicians delight in talking loosely about unity of Nigeria . . . What is now called Nigeria consisted of large and small communities all of which were different in their outlooks and beliefs. The advent of the British and of Western education has not materially altered the situation and these many

and varied communities have not knit themselves into composite unit . . . In 1914, the North and South were amalgamated though the administration of the two sections are distinctly different. Since then, no serious attempt has been made by the British or by the people themselves to come together *and each section has looked upon the other with suspicion and misgiving*".

In supporting him, Isa Kaita said:

"The mistake of 1914 has come to light and I should like to go no further".

During this period, secession was the talk of every Northern leader, and Sir Ahmadu again said during one of the Legislative Council Debates:

" . . . There were agitations in favour of secession; we should set up on our own; we should cease to have anything more to do with the Southern people; we should take our own way.

" . . . I must say it looked very tempting. We were certainly 'viable', to use the current phrase; we could run our own show; the Centre would have to hand over to us our share of Nigeria's accumulated sterling assets. We had the men and production and minerals and the will to act".


The Northern House of Assembly debated the issue of self-government for Nigeria later that year, and in the course of this, her leaders adopted the now famous 8-point proposal, the purport of which is that the political arrangement best suited to Nigeria was complete regional autonomy with common services maintained by a central agency which would have neither legislative nor executive powers.

This attitude of the North delayed Nigerian Independence for two years. History will record that leaders from Southern Nigeria, and from Eastern Nigeria in particular, preached and worked for twenty years to achieve the unity of this country. History will also bear witness to the fact that the North had for so long resisted the idea of unity, and had, on four occasions in the recent past, expressed this resentment through brutal killings.

In 1964, when the most farcical election in Nigeria took place, a Northerner, Mallam Bala Garuba, published the following statement in the December 30 issue of the "*West African Pilot*":—

"The conquest to the sea is now in sight. When our godsent Ahmadu Bello said some years ago that our conquest will reach

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the sea shores of Nigeria, some idiots in the South were doubting its possibilities.

"Today have we not reached the sea? Lagos is reached. It remains Port Harcourt. It must be conquered and taken after December 30, 1964.

"I remember when the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. were boasting about their day-dreams of snatching power from us. Today, their great brains are in our bag. Imagine such personalities as Akintola, Benson, Davies, Akinjide, Olowofoyeku . . .

"I still hope that it will not be long when Okpara, Adegbenro and Aminu Kano will come to beg. Osadebay and other Mid-West leaders are half way to us. As for Awo, he will spend the last day of his term of imprisonment there for his inordinate ambition. Some Southern fools must understand that to suggest secession after their defeat is suicide for them. Let them think about all these things and understand the implications in secession.

"(a) Where is the Nigerian Military Academy? (b) Where is the Nigerian Air Force base built? All these are up here in our region.

"After the election, we will call upon our leaders to make a Northerner the leader of the Nigerian Army. Those who propose Ironsi are day-dreaming.

"After the next five years those southern so-called educated fools must realize where they are. *Once we will be able to connect the Borno Railway with those of our brothers in the neighbouring country and from there to Egypt, we can allow secession to take place.*

"Our exports could be sent out through that way. Thanks to Allah that the Kainji Dam will soon be completed. It is up to Tarka to come back now or face what will follow when we achieve our aim.

"We must do anything possible to win the coming jihad. But we must keep our weather eyes open on those from the West as they could do anything at any time. Immediately we win, we can lose some members from the West at any time. We must not take things for granted.

"With our 167 seats in the North we can go it alone. There is no need sharing the post of Prime Ministership and Presidentship with anyone. I have a genuine fear that we keep the posts and then concede some important ministries to some Yoruba members,

"The time has come. *We are going to show these intellectual fools that we are only in the morning of our leadership of this country.*

"We try N.N.D.P. in the next five years and see whether they will be too forward and ambitious as the ungrateful N.C.N.C. and A.G. If some still doubt that we haven't conquered our way to the sea, let them go through these facts.

(a) Who is the Prime Minister of the country?

(b) Who is the Minister of Lagos Affairs? Is Lagos not our capital?

"Our only obstacle are the Ibos. They have played their card. They will sink."

This statement summarises the stand of the North in relation to the rest of the country. In August, 1966, just after the murder of Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, Gowon stated publicly *that there was no basis for Nigerian unity.*

I have quoted these and other statements in order to remind us of the consistency of the North in their feeling of separateness except where they are in relation to other peoples of Nigeria as Master is to servant.

In May 1966, the ill-fated Decree No. 34 was promulgated after it had been discussed and approved by General Aguiyi-Ironsi's Supreme Military Council which was composed as follows:—

North (Two members) ...	Lt.-Col. Hassan. Lt.-Col. Gowon.
East (Two members) ...	Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu. Lt.-Col. G. T. Kurubo.
West and Lagos (Three members)	Lt.-Col. F. A. Fajuyi. Commodore J. Wey. Brigadier B. O. Ogundipe.
Mid-West (One member)	Lt.-Col. D. Ejor.

At the same time, his Federal Executive Council consisted of:

North (Three members)...	Lt.-Col. Hassan. Lt.-Col. Gowon. Alhaji Kam Selem—Deputy Inspector-General of Police.
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East (Three members) ... Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu.
 Mr L. E. Edet, Inspector-General
 of Police.
 Lt.-Col. G. T. Kurubo.

West and Lagos (Three
 members) Lt.-Col. F. A. Fajuyi.
 Commodore J. Wey.
 Major M. Johnson.

Mid-West (One member) Lt.-Col. D. Ejoor.

The Heads of the Federal Civil Service were distributed as follows:

North	8
East	3
West and Lagos	5
Mid-West	7

The Heads of Federal Corporations and Institutions then were distributed thus:

North	6
East	3
West	12
Mid-West	1

I have given you these facts because after the promulgation of Decree No. 34, evil-minded persons in the North and elsewhere propagated the mischievous lie that Easterners were dominating the affairs of the country. At no time since independence did Easterners dominate the politics of the Federation.

The reaction of the North to Decree No. 34 was to massacre Easterners in the North and to loot their property in May 1966.

Thereafter, the Supreme Military Council decided that a tribunal should be set up to enquire into the causes of that disturbance. Northern Emirs rejected it and demanded the secession of the North from the Federation. Nonetheless, the tribunal was scheduled to begin its sittings on August 2, 1966. On July 29, and for several days thereafter, Northern soldiers in conspiracy with Northern civilians unleashed against defenceless Easterners the bloodiest acts of brutality. Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi was murdered. His host, Lt.-Col. Fajuyi, was also murdered. Dead they are but their memories will live from age to age as a shining example of heroism, courage and loyalty.

In the heat of these outrageous acts, Gowon, a fairly junior Colonel in the Army, and himself one of the rebels, hoisted himself on the seat of the Supreme Commander; his first act was to demand secession for the North as a condition for stopping the massacre. I was left with no other alternative than to agree. However, on the advice of certain foreign nationals, he abandoned the idea, telling his people of the North that Allah had once more put the Government of Nigeria into the hands of "another Northerner".

On August 8 and 9, 1966, representatives of all the Military Governors met in Lagos and recommended, among other measures, that—

- (a) Troops should be sent back to barracks in their region of origin.
- (b) All decrees which centralized affairs in Lagos should be abrogated.
- (c) Lagos should be garrisoned in a manner to be determined by the Military Governors.
- (d) A Constitutional Conference should be constituted to work out a constitution for Nigeria.

These recommendations were ignored by Gowon, and to this day Northern troops have been stationed in Lagos and Western Nigeria. The proposed Constitutional Conference began its sitting on September 12, 1966. Gowon charged it to discover a form of association suitable for Nigeria no matter the name by which it may be called.


Memoranda were exchanged by the Delegates, and vital features of some of them are as follows:—

NORTH:

"A great deal of passion has been generated within the last six years between the peoples of this country. We have moved from one crisis to another and have on each occasion congratulated ourselves for that Nigerian spirit of compromise about which we have been flattered by the rest of the world. *We have failed to accept that each crack, whether patched up or not, represented a progressive weakening of the base of our association.*

All Nigerians realize the advantages of a united country which is economically strong, politically and socially stable and respected all over Africa and the entire globe. This is the ideal which

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anyone will desire for his country if only because it is more comforting to feel that one belongs to a strong group.

In a young country as large as Nigeria where the ethnic groups are not homogeneous, where the cultures differ and where values are not necessarily the same from one part of the country to another, the textbook rules for political association between the various groups will not necessarily be applicable. *The leaders of such a country must be ever prepared to grope for new ways of association which while preserving the aspirations of the individual groups will, at the same time, preserve some forms of association which will make possible co-operation in fields which are of mutual interest to all the groups without bringing the component groups into direct physical or economic conflict.*

Recent events have shown that for Nigerian leaders to try and build a future for the country on rigid political ideology will be unrealistic and disastrous. We have pretended for too long that there are no differences between the peoples of this country. The hard fact which we must honestly accept as of paramount importance in the Nigerian experiment especially for the future is that we are different peoples brought together by recent accidents of history. To pretend otherwise will be folly.

We all have our fears of one another. Some fear that opportunities in their own areas are limited and they would therefore wish to expand and venture unhampered in other parts. Some fear the sheer weight of skills and the aggressive drive of other groups which they feel has to be regulated if they are not to be left as the economic, social and possibly political under-dogs in their own areas of origin in the very near future.

These fears may be real or imagined; they may be reasonable or petty. Whether they are genuine or not, they have to be taken account of because they influence to a considerable degree the actions of the groups towards one another and more important perhaps, the daily actions of the individual in each group towards individuals from other groups.

The colonial master who ruled Nigeria introduced a system of unitary government not for the present or future unity or well-being of all the indigenes of the country but for his own administrative convenience. But even he had to devolve powers to his Governors or Commissioners in the Provinces partly because of the difficulties

of communication and partly because he realized that administrative needs and practices vary from one part of the country to the other because of the differences between the peoples.

The unitary system was changed to a Federal system towards the end of colonial rule as the Nigerian was politically coming to his own and becoming increasingly vocal about his own affairs. The colonial masters accepted the Federal system of government as being most suitable for the differing interests in Nigeria. This system was reviewed and modified and it carried us into independence. We have since worked this system with varying degrees of success but the fears which have earlier been listed constituted great snags in the working of the system.

In all, we have had two attempts at a Unitary system of Government. The first attempt proved unsatisfactory, and the second proved a disaster. We have also had two attempts at the Federal system. The two attempts ended in chaos, and we are again presented with an opportunity to look dispassionately at our future association.


In putting forward its suggestions, the Northern delegation has taken into account the mood of the people and the mood of the army which must be a matter for serious consideration if we are not to deceive ourselves. The delegation has also taken into account the very wise recommendations made recently by a meeting of the representatives of the Regional Governors that army personnel should be posted to barracks in their Regions of origin. It has also taken into account the areas of lasting mutual trust, in whatever pockets they may exist, which have so far not been completely destroyed by recent events. It has also taken into account the need to preserve the economy of the component parts of the country and avoid as far as possible its disruption.

The Northern delegation advocates a system of government which differs from anything that has been attempted in Nigeria in the past. As each Region has managed to preserve some measure of order and sense of unity within its confines, *each region should be constituted into an autonomous state.* Subjects or groups of subjects which are of common interest to the component states should be delegated to a Common Services Commission to operate.

The North then proposed:—

“(1) The new Nigeria shall comprise a number of autonomous States.

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- (2) *The autonomous States of Nigeria, that is to say, Northern Nigeria, Eastern Nigeria, Western Nigeria, Mid-Western Nigeria or by whatever name they may choose to be called later and such other States as may be formed subsequently should agree to enter into a Union which shall have a Central Executive Council, representation to which shall be on equal representation from all the States comprising the Association. The powers of the Central Executive Council shall be delegated by the component States except that powers connected with external or foreign affairs, immigration can be unilaterally withdrawn by the State Government while all other functions or powers delegated to the Central Executive Council can only be withdrawn by the State Governments after a unanimous decision by their representatives in the Central Executive Council. The Chairmanship of the Council shall rotate. Each Chairman shall hold office for one year.*
- (3) *Any member State of the Union should reserve the right to secede completely and unilaterally from the Union and to make arrangements for co-operation with the other members of the Union in such a manner as they may severally or individually deem fit.*
- (4) Each State must have its own Army, Air Force, Police, Civil Service and Judiciary. There shall be a Navy composed of personnel in proportion to the population of each State.

The Northern memorandum then went on to propose a detailed form of Common Services Organization within the existing Regions as sovereign states. The terms of this memorandum are in consonance with the eight-point proposal adopted by the North on the 23rd of May, 1953.

WESTERN NIGERIA AND LAGOS:

The alternative proposal of the Delegates of Western Nigeria and Lagos is as follows:—

"In the event of the other Regions feeling unable to accept the foregoing proposals for the establishment of true Federalism in Nigeria, then it is proposed that what is now the Federation of Nigeria should become the Commonwealth of Nigeria comprising

the existing Regions and such other Regions as may be subsequently created, with Lagos forming part of the present Western Nigeria".

"The Government of each State within the Commonwealth shall be completely sovereign in all matters excepting those with respect to which responsibility is delegated to the Council of States".

You can see that the position of the West then was very similar to the Northern proposal which suggested the loosest type of association for Nigeria. In the words of the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, this association would be:

"A looser structure for Nigeria while preserving its general pattern—a structure which would give the Regions the greatest possible freedom of movement and action: a structure which would reduce the powers of the Centre to the absolute minimum".

The Gowon junta now preaches unity not because it believes in unity but because the dominating position of the North is threatened.

The *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference sat for about three weeks, and when it looked as if it was going to achieve a form of association unsuitable to Northerners, the pogrom of September and October was unleashed. The story of this pogrom is now being recorded by the Atrocities Commission in the interest of posterity.


The events of that period have made fundamental changes in the structure and pattern of Nigeria society and government. Some two million Eastern Nigerians have returned to the East. All the Northerners in the East have gone home. Relationship between peoples of the two Regions have come to an end, and if ever revived, will be on an entirely different basis.

I refused to recognize Gowon for reasons which I gave at Aburi. To recognize him would mean to accept the authority of a rebel in the Army, and that would be bad for discipline. The stalemate which followed culminated in the Aburi Meeting.

The main decisions reached at Aburi were:

- (i) All the military leaders solemnly declared that they renounced the use of force as a means of settling the problems confronting the country and they re-affirmed their faith in discussions and negotiations as the only way of resolving the Nigerian crisis.

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
- (ii) A Military Committee comprising representatives of the Regions should meet to exchange information on the quantity of arms and ammunitions held in each unit of the Army in all parts of the country. Unallocated stores of arms and ammunitions held in the country should be shared out equitably between the various commands in the Federation.
- (iii) The Army itself should be re-organized in order to restore discipline and confidence. Specifically, the Army should be governed by the Supreme Military Council under a Chairman to be known as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government. Area Commands corresponding to existing Regions and under Area Commanders should be created. During the period of the Military Government, Military Governors should have control over Area Commands for internal security.
- (iv) There should be created a Lagos Garrison, including Ikeja Barracks. A Military Headquarters comprising equal representation from the Regions and headed by a Chief of Staff should also be established.
- (v) In accordance with the decision of 9 August, 1966, Army personnel of Northern Nigeria origin should return to the North from the West. In order to meet the security needs of the West, a crash programme of recruitment and training was necessary but the details should be examined after the Military Committee had finished its work.
- (vi) All matters of policy, including appointments and promotions to commissions or senior posts in the Armed Forces and the Police should be dealt with by the Supreme Military Council.
- (vii) The legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government should be vested in the Supreme Military Council to which any decision affecting the whole country should be referred for determination, provided that where it is not possible for a meeting to be held the matter requiring determination should be referred to the Military Governors for their comments and concurrence.
- (viii) Appointments to the Diplomatic and Consular service as well as to superscale posts in the Federal Public Service

- and equivalent positions in Statutory Corporations must be approved by the Supreme Military Council.
- (ix) All decrees or provisions of decrees passed since 15 January, 1966, which detracted from the previous powers and positions of Regional Governments should be repealed with a view to promoting mutual confidence. All the Law Officers of the Federation should meet in Benin on 14 January, 1967, and list all the decrees or provisions of decrees concerned, so that they may be repealed not later than 21 January, 1967, if possible.
- (x) A meeting of Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries of Finance should be convened within two weeks to consider ways and means of resolving the serious problems posed by displaced persons all over the country.
- (xi) Displaced civil servants and Corporation staff (including daily-paid employees) should continue to be paid their full salaries until 31 March, 1967, provided they have not secured alternative employment. The Military Governors of the East, West and Mid-West should send representatives (Police Commissioners) to meet and discuss the problems of recovery of property left behind by displaced persons.
- (xii) The *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Committee should resume sitting as soon as practicable and the unanimous recommendations of that body made in September 1966, should be considered at another meeting of the Supreme Military Council.

It is to be noted that the meeting of the 4th and 5th of January at Aburi was held largely on my own initiative. Although I had strong forebodings about the outcome of the meeting, I went to it with a genuine desire to make it succeed. I decided that as soon as I set foot on the Ghana soil, I should be nothing but a Nigerian. It was my aim that the Military Leaders must come to an arrangement whereby the right climate could be created for all of us to carry out the duties and responsibilities to which we had dedicated ourselves. I wanted an atmosphere created for a return of normalcy, peace and confidence in the country, an atmosphere in which all sources of fear and suspicion would be removed.

My genuine desire for all these was borne out by the fact that, before the start of the meeting, I pressed for a resolution eschewing

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the use of force in the settlement of our problems. I did so because of the widespread fear and suspicion in other parts of the country that the East was planning an attack. Nobody with knowledge or discernment could doubt our ability, even at that time, to take effective actions of revenge against the North, or even Lagos, if we had wanted. But our aim was and has remained that we should avoid further bloodshed, even though it has been the innocent blood of Easterners that has been most wantonly shed. Subsequent events seem to indicate that our opponents mistook my action in pressing for that resolution on the use of force as a sign of weakness.

On the question of political and administrative control of the country as a whole, executive and legislative powers were vested in the Supreme Military Council. In other words, all what used to be the legislative powers of the Nigerian Parliament, and what used to be the executive and policy-making powers of the Council of Ministers, under the civilian regime, were vested in the Supreme Military Council as a collective organ. To make sure that the Regions had effective voice in all decisions affecting the whole country, all such decisions must receive the concurrence of all Military Governors; and where any Military Governor was unable to attend a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, any decision reached in his absence must be referred to him for comments and concurrence.

This principle of concurrence by Military Governors was prompted by an appreciation of the special responsibilities which each Military Governor had over his area of authority. Having regard to the general welfare of the people under his charge, he should be in a position to delay any decision affecting the country as a whole until a consensus was reached.

As far as the Regions were concerned, it was decided that all the powers vested by the Nigerian Constitution in the Regions and which they exercised prior to 15th January, 1966, should be restored to the Regions. To this end, the Supreme Military Council decided that all decrees passed since the Military take-over, and which tended to detract from the previous powers of the Regions, should be repealed by the 21st of January, after the Law Officers should have met on the 14th January to list out all such decrees.

None of these agreements has been carried out. The meeting of Military Officers was abandoned because Gowon withdrew the Federal representatives. The Law Officers met on the 14th of January as agreed and listed out the relevant decrees which had detracted from the

previous powers and positions of the Regions, to enable the Supreme Military Council to promulgate the necessary decree by the 21st of January as decided at Aburi. The Officers of the Ministry of Finance never met within the time stipulated at Aburi because the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Finance did not consider that such a meeting would serve any useful purpose.


I have said that what the decisions at Aburi amounted to in terms of political and military control of the country was that the country should be governed as a Confederation. As soon as we came back from Aburi, I considered it my duty to explain to the Eastern Nigeria public, through the press, the decisions taken at Aburi, and, as far as my sense of responsibility allowed me, the implications. In Lagos, the Permanent Secretaries there studied the recommendations and, to their credit, brought out clearly and unmistakably their meanings and implications. Having seen these, however, they unfortunately went beyond their rights and duty as civil servants to advise against the implementation of the Aburi agreements. From here our difficulties started and have taken us to our present stalemate.

This leads me to the publication by Lagos of the controversial Decree No. 8. That is the Decree by which Gowon and his group claim to have implemented the Aburi agreements. I have mentioned that aspect of the Aburi decisions which stipulated that a Decree restoring the Regions to their position before the military take-over should be passed by 21st of January, 1967. The Law Officers met, as required, on the 14th of January but no signs of action appeared forthcoming from Lagos after that meeting. On or about the 19th of January, I despatched a telegram calling for the necessary draft decree to be circulated for concurrence.

Gowon's reply was the negative one of giving untenable reasons for his failure to carry out that aspect of the Aburi decisions. He, however, assured me that the decree was being drafted and asked for an urgent meeting of the Supreme Military Council. I promptly replied to his telegram as follows:

"Glad learn Decree being drafted to repeal all decrees or aspects of decrees which detracted from position and powers of regional governments as they existed before January 15th 1966. Imperative that repealing decree be published immediately in order to confirm confidence and clear way of meeting Supreme Military Council. I agree that matters affecting constitution for which there were questions or reservations should be referred to Supreme Military

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Council which should follow soon after publication of decree repealing over-centralizing decrees or aspects of decrees. Surprised that my press statement embarrassed anyone. I know people with vested interests have tried through representations to you and others to capitalize viciously on that press conference. Honest acquaintance with and appreciation of feelings in East would show that it was in the interest of all that the conference was given. Silence would be misinterpreted here and difficulties created for smooth return to normalcy and of confidence. Every word spoken at Press Conference completely in accord with transcript of Aburi meeting."

You will see in that telegram my willingness to attend the Meeting of the Supreme Military Council provided the repealing Decree acceptable to all was published without delay. Such an action on the part of Gowon would have proved his sincerity to keep faith and honour agreements in the interest of public confidence. I should add here that the West Military Governor took the same stand with us on the need for an immediate publication of the repealing Decree.

Eventually a draft decree came forward from Lagos; but it was a document which was a complete departure from, indeed the very opposite of, what was intended at Aburi. It was even at variance with the agreements reached by the Solicitors-General at their Benin meeting of the 14th of January. Both the West and ourselves rejected the draft outright. Then followed a period of public controversy, confusion and uncertainty, until it was agreed that officials of the different Governments, led by their respective Secretaries to the Military Governments, should meet at Benin to advise on how best the Aburi agreements should be implemented.

The officials of the five Governments of the Federation held meetings on the 17th and 18th of February and at the end made recommendations which have since been published and which I believe you all have seen. Another draft decree was prepared by Lagos. Although it must be admitted that this draft (which, incidentally, was, I am told, the 5th attempt!) was an improvement on the first one, yet it contained extraneous features which, at best, went contrary to the agreements of the officials and, at worst, were directed against the East. We promptly raised our objections to those features, but without any further comments from the Federal Government a meeting of the Supreme Military Council was arranged to be held in Benin on the 10th of March.

They expected me to attend that meeting even though they knew perfectly well that I could not do so for three obvious reasons. First,

Northern troops were still present in the West and Lagos, and, secondly, all the confidence and marks of good faith generated at Aburi had been systematically undermined by Lagos. Thirdly, the passing of the right decree had been my pre-condition for attending such a meeting. However, they met on the 10th of March and, that very day, approved their Decree No. 8.


As if to underline their action of perfidy and double-dealing, a message was sent through, even after they had taken a final decision on the Decree, for Law Officers of the Regions to meet in Lagos to finalize a draft Decree. As a mark of my genuine desire for a peaceful settlement and return to normalcy, I sent my Law Officers to the meeting in Benin, where they were simply told that as the Decree had been passed by the Supreme Military Council, there was really nothing for them to do! All the same, our men reduced into writing and handed to their colleagues, this Region's objections. A few days later, on Friday the 19th of March, the Decree was formally published.

The Decree gave Gowon a veto power over the concurrence of all the Military Governors in matters affecting the exercise of legislative and executive powers of the Federation; it gave the Supreme Military Council power to declare a state of emergency in a Region against the wishes of the Governor. It is important that you should know that two days after the promulgation of the Decree, Gowon requested the other members of the Supreme Military Council to approve his proposal for a declaration of a state of emergency in the East. But for the wisdom of some members of the Council who refused to be so used, the story of the past two months would have been different.

For the foregoing reasons, I found Decree No. 8 unacceptable and rejected it. It was a Northern instrument for political power over the South. An important fact to bear in mind is that at Aburi it was agreed that all the members of the Supreme Military Council should meet to appoint the Commander-in-Chief and Head of the Federal Military Government. Up till now that decision has not been implemented.

I think I should here tell you my personal efforts since July to ensure a quick, realistic and peaceful settlement of our problems. Soon after the July 29th rebellion and the usurpation of office by Gowon, I told him that even though I was not prepared to accept him either as the Supreme Commander or the Head of the Federal Government, I would be prepared to co-operate with him in the task of keeping the country together, stopping further bloodshed and ensuring a quick return to normalcy.

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It was for that reason that I sent representatives of this Region to Lagos on the 8th of August although I knew perfectly well the type of risks to which they were at that time exposed. It was for that reason that I did everything to make it possible for the meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Constitutional Conference to be held in Lagos with our representatives attending. All along Gowon and I were keeping in daily contact with each other on the telephone. Even after the pogrom which started on the 29th of September and which has, more than anything else, changed our previous conception of Nigeria as one country, I continued the daily dialogue with Gowon.

There was a meeting of Secretaries to the Military Governments immediately followed by that of Advisers to the Military Governors. The outcome of these efforts was the famous Aburi meeting of the 4th and 5th of January.

Although the attitude of Lagos to the Aburi agreements was nothing but a catalogue of bad faith, I still felt that all chances of a peaceful settlement, which would lead to the maintenance of this country as a unit, had not all been lost. Meanwhile the Federal Government was owing us heavy amounts of money due to us as our right under the Constitution. I pressed that this debt should be paid promptly in view of our pressing needs for funds to meet our refugee problems. Nothing was done; the drift continued; the stalemate persisted, and the clouds thickened.

On the 16th of February, I sent a lengthy letter to Gowon with copies to Commodore Wey and other Military leaders. Because of its interest a copy of that letter has been printed as an appendix to this speech for you to see. I shall, therefore, not recount the details of that letter, but in it I brought out as forcefully as possible the dangers inherent in the continued stalemate. I pointed out to Gowon that, in spite of all his public protestations to that effect, he was not serious about saving the country. I repeated this Region's absolute stand on the Aburi decisions. I then gave him a catalogue of his acts of bad faith and perfidy following the Aburi meeting. Finally I gave the warning that if by the 31st of March the Aburi agreements were not implemented, I would have no alternative but to feel free to take whatever measure was possible to implement the decisions unilaterally. I ended my letter with these words:—

"I say this with the deepest sense of regret and fully conscious of the consequences of such unilateral action. But, I shall be able to tell the world when the time comes what part I have played at

different stages and in different circumstances since the emergency which started in May last year, to avoid the situation. The responsibility will not be mine.

"I still hope that good sense will prevail and that God will save us from such a bleak future. Let us at once implement the Aburi agreements, and preserve the country as one."

There was no reaction from Gowon to that letter. We continued to drift. On the 10th of March, a meeting of the Supreme Military Council was held in Benin, and on Friday the 19th of March, the so-called Decree No. 8 was promulgated. The financial year was coming to an end, as was fast approaching my dateline of 31st March.


My aim was still to avoid a point of no return. Thus, on Easter Sunday, the 26th of March, I paid a visit to Ghana for discussions with General Ankrah and his colleagues on the National Liberation Council. I explained to them the position of this Region and the dangerous consequences of Gowon's continued indifference. I undertook not to take unilateral action provided Lagos paid its debt to us before the 31st of March. General Ankrah and his colleagues for their part undertook to bring together in Ghana all the officials of the Nigerian Governments to discuss the settlement of Federal debts to this Region.

On Monday the 27th, I held a meeting at Onitsha with Colonel Adebayo, Military Governor of Western Nigeria, accompanied by Commodore Wey, Head of the Navy, and Mr Omo-Bare, Deputy Inspector-General of Police. We held a lengthy, detailed and frank talk, in which I made the position of the East absolutely clear. The meeting ended on a high note of optimism. The delegation undertook to get Gowon to do two things: first, to make sure that the debt owed to the East was paid by 31st March; secondly, either to suspend Decree No. 8 or to repeal those sections which were obnoxious to the East. They also suggested that the North should express public apology to the East for their atrocities.

I should also have mentioned that I had previously paid a visit to my colleague and friend, Lt.-Col. David Ejoor with whom I held intimate discussions. I had made quite clear to him the course open to the East unless there was a change of attitude in Lagos.

True to their word, the Ghanaian authorities were able to bring together in Ghana representatives of the Governments of the Federation, comprising economists, financial experts and legal experts, for a meeting which was held on Wednesday the 29th of March. The painful

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result of that meeting was the knowledge that the Federal Government had no intention of paying to this Region debts owed to it.

Here, I must place on record my unqualified gratitude and tribute to General Ankrah and his colleagues for the untiring efforts in trying to help this country solve its problems. The sincerity in all their approaches has always been transparent. Apart from telephone contacts and letter correspondence, the Ghanaian Government has sent representatives to Nigeria on several occasions to hold personal discussions, all aimed at helping us resolve our difficulties. Even if it turns out that Nigeria cannot remain as one, the efforts of Ghana in trying to avoid that situation will never be forgotten. If in the end some other solution is achieved, Nigeria will have yet greater reason to be grateful to the Government and people of that sister country of Africa.

Eventually, the date-line of 31st March arrived, and I considered it my duty to take appropriate actions effected through Edicts. Not surprisingly, the Federal Government and its associates immediately read everything vicious into my action. I think I should here explain again the reasons behind the various edicts passed since the 31st of March:—

REVENUE COLLECTION EDICT:

The purpose of this edict was to make sure that the Federal Government is no longer in a position to owe this Region its statutory revenues. It is legitimate that we take what belongs to us; it did not attempt to change the formula for revenue allocation as provided in the Nigerian Constitution, nor to take away what rightly belonged to the Federal Government. The truth of this statement is borne out in our estimates for this year where the revenues expected from Federal sources have been shown strictly on the existing formula.

LEGAL EDUCATION EDICT:

Following the disturbances of 1966, our students in the Lagos Law School were compelled to return to this Region. As a result of the stalemate, it became clear that they would never return to Lagos for their studies. We asked Lagos to open a law school at our expense but they refused even though under the Act it was possible. These students had a right to continue with their legal studies and also to practise their chosen profession. This Government would have failed in its duty to them if it did not take appropriate action to safeguard their interests. Our action was guided by the same principle that led us to establish a Medical School and a Teaching Hospital.

STATUTORY BODIES COUNCIL EDICT:

As part of its acts of retaliation and repression the Federal Government stopped the payment of salaries and wages to the employees of the various Federal statutory bodies operating in this Region, stopped the supply of necessary equipment, material and spare parts for them, and suspended the services of some of them, while making every effort to stifle others. The aim of the edict was to enable this Region take over the control and administration of these bodies to ensure co-ordination and efficient management. I do not need to mention that the Federal Government had failed to honour the Aburi agreement to pay employees of Governments and Statutory Corporations up to the 31st of March. The result is that this Government had to take over responsibility for the payment not only of the salaries and wages of refugees, but even of other employees of those Corporations operating in this Region. As at the end of April, this Government had spent £600,000 on this account.

COURT OF APPEAL EDICT:


This edict was enacted to ensure that our people have opportunities of prompt justice and redress. The Federal Supreme Court last held sessions in the East in February, 1965. As a result of the events which started in July 1966, our people, as lawyers or clients, could not pursue their appeals in Lagos. As the Federal Chief Justice was unwilling to arrange sittings of the Court in the East, the representative of Eastern Nigeria on the Supreme Court has since returned to the East, and the Bar Association of Eastern Nigeria has taken a resolute stand against its members going to Lagos for cases, we saw no alternative than to enact an edict establishing our own final Court of Appeal.

REGISTRATION OF COMPANIES EDICT:

This edict requires companies to be registered in Eastern Nigeria; it does not deal with incorporation. It will enable us to collect and collate statistics of businesses operating in this Region for the purposes of planning.

No sooner had the Revenue Edict been passed than Lagos stopped all flights of Nigeria Airways, of which this Region is a joint-owner, to the East. Business and official travel has been disrupted and movement of mails has been disturbed. Talking of mails, I can illustrate the situation by mentioning that a letter signed in the Cabinet Office in Lagos on the 28th of April and addressed to my office was not received until the 19th of May.

0522



In addition to this Lagos ordered that Federal employees serving in this Region, whether in Government or Corporations, should not be paid their salaries and abandoned all financial responsibility for Federal projects established in this Region.

As if all these were not enough, Gowon convened a meeting of his Military colleagues and presented to them a memorandum seeking authority for diplomatic, military and further economic sanctions against the East. You know the details of that iniquitous memorandum, which I promptly published as soon as it came into my hands.

You have heard about the withdrawal of diplomatic passports from citizens of this Region, the stoppage of postal order transactions between this Region and the rest of the country. There is, of course, the blockage of foreign exchange not only against this Government as such, but also against Statutory Corporations and institutions and even private industrial concerns in which this Government has a financial interest.

Importers from this Region have been denied import licences, and our industries the right to import essential raw materials for their operations. Further, Lagos has sent emissaries abroad to interfere with this Region's sale of its produce. Lagos has done everything within its power to strangle this Region economically.

I think that here I must mention the radio announcement by Gowon that his sanctions against the East have been lifted with effect from Tuesday the 23rd of this month. The unfortunate thing is that Gowon should tag on to his announcement the suggestion that the East should reciprocate by repealing the different Edicts which I have already mentioned and even the release of Railway rolling stock. If Gowon's action is to be taken as a sign of a change of heart, belated though it may be, let him go further and support it by paying to the East all moneys owed by Lagos, pay all Federal Corporation staff, reconstitute the Federal Supreme Court in a manner acceptable to all. No, we have had and known enough of Lagos not to be so foolish as to take Gowon's words on their face value. There must be concrete proof of genuine intentions and good faith.

Let me give you the background to Gowon's announcement about the lifting of his sanctions against this Region. I had repeatedly stated categorically that neither I nor my representatives would attend any further meeting to discuss the problems of Nigeria while the economic strangulation continued. I said it to the last delegation from

Ghana; I said so to Mr Justice Arthur Prest who came here as a representative of a body called the Nigerian Peace Committee; I said so to Chief Awolowo and others who came as the representatives of the so-called National Conciliation Committee.

Indeed I should say a little more on the visit of Chief Awolowo and his group. They had come, in the name of the so-called National Conciliation Committee, to plead with us to send delegates to attend a meeting of that Committee. We could not understand the basis on which the Committee was constituted; it contained two self-exiled Eastern Nigerians resident in Lagos, in whom we have no confidence. The Committee has, however, invited two prominent men in this Region to serve as members, Sir Francis Ibiam, my Adviser, and Sir Louis Mbanefo, my respected Chief Justice. I informed the delegation that, as my Adviser, Sir Francis could not be expected to serve on a Committee to mediate between me and other military leaders; I told them that in this Region we regard the Judiciary as sacrosanct and would not want it involved in political matters of this nature.

However, we offered concrete proposals which were reduced into writing as follows:

1. The East is willing, and indeed prepared, to participate in discussions designed to resolve the present Nigerian crisis.
2. With regard to the request made by the delegates of the Conciliation Committee that the Eastern Government should appoint representatives to the Committee, it would appear anomalous that whilst the other members of the Committee have been personally invited by the sponsors/conveners, the Eastern delegates should be appointed by their own Government.
3. Other members of the Committee, therefore, ought also to be appointed by their respective Governments. A Committee constituted in this way would be in a better position to achieve effective results.
4. Such a Committee should be set up in such a way that it is made up of people who have the authority and mandate of their Governments, with the Regions having equal representation and equality of status.

0523

5. Necessary preparations should be made to ensure that there are:—
 - (a) agreed agenda, with emphasis on the terms of association between the Regions;
 - (b) an acceptable venue, with due regard to conditions of safety and free discussion; and
 - (c) a time limit set for the completion of the work of the Committee so that the discussions do not become unduly protracted.
6. If the delegates are to participate in the discussions in an atmosphere of freedom and equality, then—
 - (a) the economic strangulation of the East should be discontinued;
 - (b) the occupation of West and Lagos by Northern troops should end."

We have heard that the Committee subsequently met, and submitted recommendations to Gowon, who has accepted them. Gowon is, of course, always prepared to accept recommendations from any body or any organization provided the Eastern viewpoint is not represented.

Last week, Gowon sent me a telegram informing me that he had arranged with the British Government to supply two companies of British troops to neutralize Benin or nearby so that the Military leaders might meet and that as an alternative to the supply of troops the British Government had agreed to make available an aircraft carrier or frigate on which we could hold a meeting. I, of course, promptly rejected the proposals in a telegram which read as follows:—

"Reference British invasion Mid-West. Proposal not acceptable for following reasons—

- (1) Meeting of Military Leaders without proper preparation and agreed agenda cannot achieve good results;
- (2) Request for British troops without prior consultation with East makes whole business suspicious in the extreme;
- (3) British agreement not in consonance with their policy of non-intervention nor your declared policy of non-internationalization of crisis;
- (4) Presence of British troops in Benin will be regarded inimical to East.

In view of British attitude in present crisis other alternative not acceptable. East will resist British or Northern incursion into Mid-West with force.

If, however, you are now prepared to approach matter with realism and sincerity meeting of Military Leaders should be preceded by meeting of Government representatives on an agenda mutually agreed. Representatives would be fully briefed by respective Military Leaders so that they can reach agreement for ratification by Military Leaders or place proposals for them to decide upon. In any case, the East will not, repeat not, attend any meeting whilst subject to economic strangulation. See my letter of 16th May."

Two days before, I had addressed what I regarded as a final letter to him part of which read as follows:—


"The purpose of this letter is to tell you that in the face of all these unfriendly and destructive acts, deliberate and well calculated against this Region, we have no alternative but to make plans for a separate existence in the interest of self-preservation. Contrary to what you have chosen to believe, and have taken great pains to get the world to believe, it has always been my genuine desire to keep this country in existence. But for this desire I could have taken all the measures now taken or proposed to be taken, six months ago, and there would have been no power to stop us. I believed that this country should exist as one in a realistic form of association. Since this wish cannot be fulfilled the responsibility is yours and history will know where to lay the blame."

Before I go on, I should like here to stress that while Gowon is only too anxious to ask Britain for troops, his attitude towards the efforts of African Heads of State and the OAU to mediate has been one of stout and consistent rebuff bordering on contempt.

Having said that, there are certain facts which we must bear in mind. In the context of Nigeria, the history of this Region has been one of retarded progress because we are too prone to compromise and sacrifice in the interest of national unity.

The year 1966 has been for us a year of great lessons, opening our eyes to realities and dispelling our illusions. We came to this position months ago, but unfortunately we were alone. We had seen the need that if this country was to be saved, its component parts were to move

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apart. For this we were misunderstood and even abused. But because we believed our stand to be right we stuck to it.

One thing that has come out of the evils of 1966 is that they have clearly identified for us areas of conflict and friction as well as what powers can be used or abused by one authority to the detriment of others.

I am happy that at last our brothers in the South have come to realize the wisdom and sanity of what we have been advocating these last months. A great deal has, however, happened that our people are now demanding sovereignty.

Another good sign of the recent weeks is the acknowledgement by the people of the South that the stand of the East against the North has not been a mere struggle for itself; but a struggle against all forms of injustice, and for the natural rights of every citizen to have and enjoy life and property in an atmosphere and under environments free from fear and molestation. It has been a struggle of progress against reaction. If then, by hitherto standing alone, we have been able to convince others that we have been championing their cause as well as ours, we have every reason to feel proud of our stand, without regret for whatever sacrifices we have so far sustained.

Those of you who have been following the utterances in the North and Lagos during the past months would have heard threats of force against this Region. May I take this opportunity to assure you all that there is no power in this country, or in Black Africa, to subdue us by force. I make this statement not to intimidate anyone but to reassure you all, as well as to warn those who might be misguided.

As I pointed out in my letter of 16th May to Gowon, he seems to believe that time is on his side and against us. We know that the Federal Government has been importing arms, and preparing troops for purposes best known to them. We shall not launch an attack on anybody. But should anybody want to use force against this Region, he will find us neither unprepared nor inadequate. I think a word to the wise should be sufficient.

No Easterner would want to pass through the events of the past ten months again. Only a loose association, call it confederation or what you may, can ensure this. But Gowon and the North have categorically rejected confederation. The position of the East, and indeed the West and Mid-West on the one hand, and that of the North

on the other, are at once irreconcilable. It is for you as the representatives of the 14 million people of Eastern Nigeria to choose from (a) accepting the terms of the North and Gowon and thereby submit to domination by the North, or (b) continuing the present stalemate and drift, or (c) ensuring the survival of our people by asserting our autonomy. If we have no alternative to the third choice, we shall leave the door open for association with any of the other Regions of the country that accepts the principle of association of autonomous units.

In such a situation the present units of the country would emerge as sovereign units each capable of maintaining its integrity at home and abroad but at the same time co-operating in the operation of common services in such fields as transport and communications, particularly shipping, harbours and ports, railways and airways. This form of association would envisage the movement of goods and services across the borders without customs restrictions. Appropriate machinery could be devised for co-ordination in currency management and monetary policy.


While I cannot here go into the details of this arrangement, the association could provide for dual citizenship so that nationals of the associating units need not carry passports from one territory to another.

It is my belief that such arrangements are the only practicable and realistic ones in the present circumstance and hold greater promise for the future than complete disintegration. Given good faith on all sides we cannot rule out the possibility of closer ties in the near future.

I consider it my duty to warn that if we are compelled to take that decision we must be prepared for a period of real sacrifice, hardship, and inconvenience. To start with, we may be without friends for a period. We may have to face the hostilities of the North acting in desperation. For a time there would be financial and economic difficulties. There will be the problems of external communications, of immigration, including passports.

All these would prove uncomfortable but only for a while. But we are bound to pull through it all. We have already made contingency plans to mitigate as much of those difficulties as possible. I shall not pursue the point, except to warn that time is running out. The people of this Region are totally tired of the present stalemate and state of uncertainty. We do not have much longer to wait. If Lagos and the North are now prepared that we settle the matter peacefully, they must act quickly.

0525



We have a way of life and proud heritage to defend and preserve. We want to preserve our democratic and free institutions as a progressive society unhampered in its progress and development by feudalistic and reactionary forces with which it has been our misfortune to contend all these years.

As I said at the beginning of this address, I shall need your advice and guidance on the path we are to follow from now on. If, as is now customary, the Lagos and Kaduna authorities continue to spurn our genuine proposals for a form of association of sovereign units, merely because they wish to dominate the entire country, through a strong central government, I would expect the people of this Region to resist to the last man their aggressive designs on this Region. I am encouraged by the massive demonstrations throughout the Region supporting the Government's stand in this crisis. There have also been persistent requests and appeals to me for a formal break with some parts of the country. I now look to this august assembly for clear guidance on what to do should all our peaceful and constructive overtures fail.


Before concluding, I should like to refer to a few matters which are of particular interest to everyone in this Region at this moment. It has come to my notice that a number of expatriates have been worried about their future and personal safety. I want to assure them that Eastern Nigeria is safe for all friends; we need their services and their assistance and friendship. We guarantee them the safety and security not only of their persons but also of their property and business. I regret that in the past week or so circumstances have arisen where the people of this Region have had to react unfavourably towards a long-established expatriate business in this Region. I personally regret the incident and do sincerely hope that the type of circumstances borne out of the present crisis will not occur again.

This speech has been fairly long, and I must bring it to an end. Quite a number of you here might be wondering what this Government has been doing to give effect to the new Provincial Administration system. I want to assure you that everything is being done in this direction. There has been a lot of administrative and technical details to be completed before the system can come into full operation. What could be done has been done, such as the posting of administrative officers to the new Divisions and Provinces. What remains to be done will be done as expeditiously as possible.

I also appreciate the inconvenience which the absence of Customary Courts has caused to every man and woman of this Region as well as to the Local Government authorities, which have been handicapped in the collection of rates and in the maintenance of law and order. Here again things have been moving as fast as practicable and I hope, within a short time, to announce the constitution and members of the different Customary Courts.

Finally, it remains for me to thank you all for coming to this meeting. I do not need to extol the value of your understanding and co-operation which you have all along extended to me in the present crisis. The struggle has been the people's struggle not the struggle of one individual. With God on our side we shall emerge from the dark clouds now overshadowing us into a glorious and happy future.

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By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

Military Council; contrary to the agreements, purchase and importation of arms have continued. The meeting of Military Officers to discuss the reorganization of the Army as agreed at Aburi has been unilaterally postponed by you. The Meeting of Finance Officials, with particular reference to the problem of rehabilitation, has not even been held because your Finance Permanent Secretary in Lagos does not think it will serve any useful purpose.

7. You failed to publish the Decree on 21st January repealing all Decrees or aspects of Decrees which detracted from the previous powers and positions of the Regional Governments. After strong pressure from me and the Military Governor of the West, you have got a comprehensive Decree drafted which, for all intents and purposes, aim at strengthening the powers of the Federal Government at the expense of the Regions. You have denounced the decision (which incidentally was taken on your own personal initiative and proposal at Aburi) to pay employees who had been compelled to flee their places of work in other parts of the country until the 31st of March.

8. In support of these defaults on your part, you and your Federal advisers have looked for one reason or another. You have described the Press statement I gave soon after my return, as causing "serious embarrassment to all", when, in fact, my honest motive was to assure the people of the East of the sincerity and determination of the Military Regime to face realities and save the country from ruin.

9. You have on another occasion accused me of distorting the decisions of Aburi when in fact, I was very careful in my choice of words to conform with the actual ones we used. Another reason to support your efforts to abandon the Aburi agreements is the ridiculous one that I went to the meeting prepared while others were not. This is an information which has repeatedly filtered through to me and it surprises me that mature people should expose themselves to such ridicule. It was our first meeting since July 29 and it certainly could not be a picnic but business. The agenda was prepared beforehand in consultation with all concerned. If anybody went to that meeting unprepared, then one can only infer that he was not seriously concerned with the sad problems which had beset the country, let alone with how to solve those problems.

10. Following your denunciation of the agreement to pay fleeing employees up to the end of March, your officials have given the fact that railway wagons are now in the East as excuse. When the decision was taken at Aburi, everybody knew that those wagons were here. One should have thought that the implementation of the Aburi agreement would be a pre-condition for the release of these wagons and not the other way round. Your Government has further complicated matters by denying the Coal Corporation the right to collect their just debts from the Nigerian Railway Corporation, and have refused to send the necessary funds for the payment of salaries for railway workers. These acts are nothing but a deliberate attempt to cause trouble and disaffection among the people of Eastern Nigeria, because you and your Federal officials know the large number of persons involved and the seriousness of their dissatisfaction following non-payment of their salaries at the beginning of a new year when they have to meet commitments for their children's school fees and other personal matters.

11. The authorities in Lagos have not stopped there. They are using all their power to impede the smooth operation of private industries in this Region. Not only are they doing everything to obstruct investors and industrialists coming to do business here, they are doing everything to kill even those industries which are operating in this Region.

12. On the political front, I have evidence that the Federal Government is encouraging acts of subversion and sabotage within this Region, all of which are unfriendly and unbecoming of a people who regard themselves as belonging to one corporate country.

13. I have in this letter tried to catalogue some of the actions of the Federal authorities which are nothing but breaches of faith and exhibition of hostility towards this Region. I do not want to go over what I have often repeated and of which you are well aware, of similar acts prior to the Aburi meeting and beginning from July 29.


14. Since your assumption of office you have constantly told me one thing and done another. You have never honoured any of our mutual agreements, let alone those reached by accredited representatives of our Governments at conferences. I had thought that the meeting would put an end to all these acts of hostility and deception.

15. As far as I am concerned, I have now on my hands one million, eight hundred thousand refugees who must be catered for. In addition to these people thousands of people have left Secondary Schools and other training institutions, and have entered the labour market looking for employment in the East. I accept with disfavour the attempts on the part of the Federal authorities to increase this problem by refusing to pay the railway employees up till 31st of March as agreed, following your own personal suggestion at Aburi, and of doing everything to see that the Coal Corporation folds up. I have separately addressed you on the subject of the Federal Government's refusal to pay this Region its statutory share of revenue.

16. Now that I have been driven right to the wall, I have no alternative but to consider certain actions of which I have always hated to think. But I have a responsibility and as a soldier of honour, I will not run away from them. The people of this Region have a right to decent life, peace and harmony. As a people who once claimed the honour of being looked upon as the most matured in Africa, the leaders of this country must show that maturity by honouring agreements. Organized society, confidence, good faith and progress cannot exist if people who call themselves civilized cannot honour agreements voluntarily and maturely taken. The survival of this country, its normalcy and peace, hinge on the implementation of the Aburi agreements. I would be the last to say that those agreements were perfect. I have already on several occasions said that I took them as no more than interim arrangements for the smooth running of the Military Regime. Having admitted that they could not be perfect, I believe that they may have to be modified in the light of experience in their operation.

17. We are coming to the end of our fiscal year when estimates must be finalized and plans made for the coming year. These are not possible under the present stalemate and unsettlement. If, therefore, the Aburi agreements are not implemented by the 31st of March, I shall have no alternative but to feel free to take whatever measure is unilaterally possible to carry out the spirit of the Aburi agreements. I say this with the deepest sense of regret and fully conscious of the consequences of such unilateral action. But, I shall be able to tell the world when the time comes what part I have played at different stages and in different circumstances since the emergency which started in May last year, to avoid the situation. The responsibility will not be mine.

0528



18. I still hope that good sense will prevail and that God will save us from such a bleak future. Let us at once implement the Aburi agreements, and preserve the country as one.

Sgd. C. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU
Military Governor
Eastern Nigeria

No. EMG/S.62/A
STATE HOUSE, ENUGU
16th February, 1967.

Copy to:—

Commodore J. E. A. Wey,
Nigerian Navy,
Lagos.

His Excellency Col. R. A. Adebayo,
Military Governor,
State House,
Ibadan.

His Excellency Lt.-Col. David Ejoor,
Military Governor,
State House,
Benin City.

His Excellency Lt.-Col. Hassan Katsina,
Military Governor,
Northern Nigeria,
State House,
Kaduna.

For information.

Sgd. C. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU
Military Governor
Eastern Nigeria

0529

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INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

ZEN/AMEMBASSY ENUGU

STATE GRNC

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 7635

SUBJECT: BIAFRA RECOGNITION

1. AT BOMBOKO'S REQUEST, FILLED HIM IN ON US POLICY RE RECOGNITION BIAFRA AS PER STATE 204937. BOMBOKO SAID GDRG HAS NO INTENTION RECOGNIZING BIAFRA AND WOULD CONTINUE AS POSSIBLE WORK FOR RECONCILIATION ALL NIGERIAN REGIONS. SHOWED ME NOTE WHICH HE HAD RECEIVED FROM OJUKWU, SIGNED "MILITARY GOVERNOR, REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA" (COPY NOTE BEING POUCHED ADDRESSEES), IN WHICH LATTER ASKED GDRG COOPERATION WITH BIAFRA FOR DEVELOPMENT FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO GOVTS AND PEOPLE." OJUKWU ALSO SAID HE WISHED SEND SPECIAL ENVOY TO EXPLAIN

PAGE TWO RUQSUC 7635 C O N F I D E N T I A L
SITUATION. IN REPLY MY QUESTION WHAT GDRG INTENDED DO THIS REGARD, BOMBOKO SAID GDRG WOULD NOT REPLY IN WRITING TO OJUKWU AS THIS MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS TACIT RECOGNITION AND WOULD NOT AT PRESENT RECEIVE SPECIAL ENVOY.

2. I GOT IMPRESSION FROM HIM, HOWEVER, THAT IF BIAFRA ABLE WITHSTAND ATTACKS OF NIGERIAN GOVT, GDRG MIGHT RECOGNIZE IT AND TO THIS END WOULD MAINTAIN DISCREET CONTACTS WITH OJUKWU THROUGH AMB BAHIZI IN LAGOS. IT WAS APPARENTLY BAHIZI WHO NOW HERE WHO BROUGHT OJUKWU'S LETTER TO KINSHASA.

GP-4.

BLAKE

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

TO RUTALE/AMEMB SSA LAGOS PRIORITY

RUTALE/AMEMB LAGOS ENUGU

INFO RUSSON/SECSTATE WASHDC

RUSSON/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUSSON/AMEMBASSY PARIS

ZNY/AMEMBASSY DOUALA

STATE GRNC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 2250

1967 JUN 7 PM 5 22

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1. AMEMB DOUALA MET DR. PIUSSEKIGBU IN DOUALA AIRPORT MORNING JUNE 7. OKIGBU WAS ACCOMPANIED OTHER EAST NIGERIANS, CHIEF JUSTICE SIR LEUIS MBANEE AND FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL CHRISTOPHER HOJENKU. ALL THREE HAD BEEN BOOKED ON JUNE 7 PANAM FLIGHT TO ABIDJAN BUT CANCELLED OUT AT LAST MINUTE WHEN THEY LEARNED THIS FLIGHT NOW STOPS LAGOS. OKIGBU PROMISED TO COME TO SEE CONSUL PARKER AGAIN LATE AFTERNOON JUNE 7.

2. BRITISH JOURNALIST NAMED CHECKLEY OF LONDON HIROR FILED STORY JUNE 6 OVER PANAM DOUALA TELEX TO HIROR DESCRIBING HOW

PAGE TWO RUTAND 129700 C O N F I D E N T I A L

HE MET MBANEE AND HOJENKU IN NIMFE, CAMEROON (NO DATE GIVEN) WHERE THEY HAD COME BY CAR FROM ENUGU. PER CHECKLEY'S STORY THE THREE NIGERIANS WERE "BELIEVED TO BE ON WAY TO LONDON TO SEEK BRITISH RECOGNITION 'REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA'."

3. THE THREE EASTERN NIGERIANS APPARENTLY HAVING DIFFICULTIES GETTING OUT OF DOUALA. PARKER WILL REPORT FURTHER ON WHAT HE LEARNS FROM OKIGBU, IF LATTER MEETS PARKER. (COMMENT: POSSIBLY OKIGBU, MBANEE AND HOJENKU WERE THE THREE EASTERN NIGERIAN EMISARIES REPORTED CAS REPORT AGY-690, WHO ARRIVED IN YAOUNDE LATE ON JUNE 2 TO ASK PRESIDENT AHIDJO TO RECOGNIZE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA.

4. DR. OKIGBU'S SON MAY BE REMEMBERED AS THE MYSTERIOUS INTENDED PASSENGER ON WARTON'S MUNITIONS EXPRESS WHICH CRASHED NEAR OASQUA. PAYTON

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
NOTE: PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA 4:20PM 6/7/67

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Although "Nigerian unity has gone, the situation is not yet a Congo."

Observer (June 4) sees the breakup of Nigeria as a disaster but "by no means the worst disaster" that could befall the country. Far more serious consequences could result from attempts to subjugate the Ibos in the newly proclaimed state of Biafra by force.

It is the Observer's view that "the old Nigeria is dead and cannot be revived by either military or economic coercion." The best hope now is to "recognize the essential truth about Nigeria," specifically that none of the three major nations (Ibos, Yorubas and Hausa-Fulani) can impose itself on the others; but they can reach an accommodation as a "Confederation of Nigerian States or as a West African Economic Association." To achieve this, "cooperation and understanding, not coercion" are necessary.

The Observer urges all friends of Nigeria in Africa, in the Commonwealth and its major trading partners to try to influence the Nigerian leaders to pursue a course of negotiation and conciliation as "the only sure way of avoiding a major disaster being turned into a possible Congo tragedy."

Desmond White in the Sunday Telegraph (June 4) reports that "chaos and disintegration on the Congolese scale have become a distinct possibility" in Nigeria. He doubts that Gowon is likely to win any war and suggests the only rational solution is the "loose association which Ojukwu wanted," which inter alia could guarantee the North's route to the sea.

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By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

POL 16 BIAFRA
POL 15 NIGERIA
XR POL 18 NIGERIA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Kaduna 733

11

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Action

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OPR

(RSR)

VZCZCQSA765
RR RUDTCR RUEHC
DE RUTALS 733KK 1501645
ZNY CCCCC
R 301300Z MAY 67
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO RUEHC/ SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO ZEN/ AMEMBASSY LAGOS
RUDTCR/ AMEMBASSY LONDON
ZEN/ AMCONSUL ENUGU
ZEN/ AMCONSUL IBADAN
RIEPCS/DIA
RIEDPSA/CINCSRIKE/CINCEAFSA
STATE GRNC
BT

005939

1967 JUN 6 AM 10

MICROFILMED BY 68/R

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE KADUNA 733

1. IN VISIT TO SIR KASHIM, ADVISOR TO FORMER MILGOV KATSINA, WITH BPAO TODAY, SIR KASHIM COMMENTED ON EAST SECESSION AND FUTURE OF NIGERIA, NEW STATES AND WITHDRAWAL OF NON-WESTERN TROOPS FROM WEST.

2. SIR KASHIM WAS CALM AND SHEXHA NO SURPRISE OVER ANNOUNCEMENT EASTERN SECESSION. HE WOULD NOT SAY WHETHER HE THINKS USE OF FORCE LIKELY BUT SAID THERE STILL LONG HOPE T HAT

UNITY OF N IGERIA CAN BE REESTABLISHED IN NEW FORM BY UP-COMING GENERATION SOMETIMES IN DISTANT FUTURE. HE BELIEVES, HOWEVER, USE OF FORCE WOULD MAKE FUTURE REASSOCIATION HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

3. ON CREATION STATES, SIR KASHIM OBVIOUSLY VERY SATISFIED AND SAID HE THOUGH GOWON HAD APMED WISELY AS HE OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE HAD IT FORCED ON HIM. THE NEWLY-APPOINTED GOVERNORS WERE NOT CHOSEN, HE SAID, ON BASIS THEIR STATE OF ORIGIN (EXAMPLE MAJOR KYARI, KANURI FROM BORNU, TAKING OVER KATSINA-ZARIA STATE). SIR KASH IM SAID HE BELIEVES THIS BETTER PRINCIPLE THAN CHOOSING GOVERNORS ON BASIS THEIR AREA OF ORIGIN. HE SAID MAJOR MUSA USMAN, NORTHEAST STATE GOVERNOR, IS KANURI BY ORIGIN BUT WAS BORN AND RAISED IN BENUE.

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(3)

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

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-2- KADUNA 733 MAY 30

HE SAID NEW GOVERNORS WILL BE GOING TO LAGOS FOR INSTRUCTIONS
BUT DID NOT KNOW DATE THEIR DEPARTURE. GOVERNORS WILL TAKE
UP SEATS IN NEW CAPITALS AND STATES WILL BE IN OPERATION
WITHIN ONE YEAR. SAID HE FAVORS GOMBE AS NEW NORTHEAST
STATE CAPITAL BECAUSE CENTRAL LOCATION AND ACCESS BY RAIL.
BUT BELIEVES MAIDUGURI MAY HAVE TO SERVE AS INTERIM CAPITAL.
KASHIM SAID KATSINA ONLY COORDINATOR OF ADMINISTRATION

TRANSITION TO NEW STATES. NEW GOVERNORS NOT RPT NOT
RESPONSIBLE TO KATSINA BUT DIRECTLY TO LAGOS.

4 KASHIM SAID DECISION WITHDRAW NON-WESTERN TROOPS FROM
WEST "MIGHT BE CHANGED" DUE TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES.
DECON 5/30/72 STOKES
BT

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Authority	VND 954503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/03

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

POL 16 BIAFRA

NR POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL

11
Action

AF MVZCZCQSA770
Info PP RUDTCR RUEHC
DE RUTALS 739KK 1511330
ZNY CCCCC
SS P 311315Z MAY 67
GPM FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
SP TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
SC INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
SAH RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
L RUTANU/AMCONSUL ENUGU
H ZEN/AMCONSUL IBADAN
EUR RUEPJS/DIA
IO RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE/CINCEAFSA
P STATE GRNC
BT
NSC C O N F I D E N T I A L KADUNA 739

INR
ACDA FIRST NORTHERN REACTIONS TO EASTERN SECESSION

AID
PC 1. IMPRESSION OF KADUNA IN FIRST DAY OF SECESSION AND
SR MOBILIZATION IS QUIET MOOD, PEOPLE GOING ABOUT NORMAL
ORM BUSINESS. CONSULATE LOCAL EMPLOYEES REPORT AIR OF
SCA HAPPINESS (POSSIBLY PRIMARILY RELIEF THAT OJUKWU HAD
SCS AT LEAST REVEALED HIS INTENTIONS).
QPR 2. FOR THE PAST FEW DAYS CONSULATE HAS DETECTED A
RSR PULLING BACK OF NIGERIANS FROM CONTACT WITH EXPATRIATES
AND UNWILLINGNESS DISCUSS POLIL PROBLEMS.
3. NIGERIAN AIR FORCE BASE ON TEST ALERT, BLACK-OUT
AFTER 2200 AND ADDITIONAL GUARDS POSTED. HOWEVER NO
UNUSUAL ACTIVITY OR PREPAREDNESS SEEN AT KADUNA AIRPORT
LATE LAST NIGHT. NO UNUSUAL ARMY ACTIVITY OBSERVED.
4. GREAT NERVOUSNESS HIGH AND LOW ABOUT REPORTS EAST
POSSESSES JET PLANES AND APPARENTLY SOME MINISTRIES
CIRCULARIZED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO BE FOLLOWED IN CASE.

PAGE 2 RUTALS 739KK C O N F I D E N T I A L
OF ATTACK.

5. DESPITE STORIES OF GREAT RESPONSE BY VETERANS TO
MOBILIZATION ORDER, LITTLE EVIDENCE OF THIS SEEN AT
MILITARY POSTS IN KADUNA. ENTHUSIASM FOR ENLISTMENT WAS
HEARD FROM ONE TRIBALISTIC HAUSA AND FROM FORMER NPC
REGIONAL PUBLICITY SECRETARY DANTSOHO WHO HAS URGED HIS
BROTHER TO RE-ENLIST, SAYS HE ALSO WILL SIGN UP.

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MICROFILMED BY RM

Kaduna 739

0537

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954/503
By MNARA Date 10/3/05

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-2- KADUNA 739 MAY 31

6. EXPATRIATE NEW NIGERIAN MANAGING DIRECTOR SHARP SAID THERE STRONG PRESSURE FROM UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS IN GOVERNMENT TO USE NEWSPAPER TO CREATE WAR FEVER. SHARP SAID THEY COULD COUNT HIM OUT OF THAT. HIS VIEW THAT OF MOST EXPATRIATES WE HAVE MET, NAMELY THAT STORIES OF EASTERN MINORITY OPPOSITION TO OJUKWU HIGHLY EXAGGERATED AND THAT ANY USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY EITHER SIDE UNFORTUNATE AND LIKELY TO BE INCONCLUSIVE.
7. EXPATRIATES SEEM TO TAKE POINT OF VIEW THAT FMG SHOULD LET THE EAST GO. UNCERTAIN WHETHER MANY NIGERIANS NOW FEEL SAME WAY.
8. AMERICAN AND OTHER EXPATRIATES SEEM COOL, POSSIBLY ALSO RELIEVED, AND UNMOVED ABOUT POSSIBLE MILITARY ACTION. AS YET NO WORRIED CALLS OR VISITS BY AMCITS TO CONSULATE.

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9. COMMENT: VERY EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER THERE GREAT ZEAL FOR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST EAST. SEVERAL WEEKS AGO WE REPORTED WIDESPREAD ATTITUDE OF GOOD-RIDDANCE TOWARD SECESSION OF IBOLAND ALONE. PERHAPS THE KEY QUESTION IS WHETHER ANY SIGNIFICANT RESISTANCE TO OJUKWU APPEARS IN EASTERN MINORITY AREAS. IN ANY CASE IT DIFFICULT YET TO TELL WHETHER THERE EITHER MASS OR HIGH-LEVEL ENTHUSIASM FOR LIBERATION OF THE MINORITIES.

GP-4 STOKES

BT

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Authority	VND959503
By	MMNARA
Date	10/5/05

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POL

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BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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Info

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VZCZCDSA810

PP RUEHC

DE RUDSCU 084M 1542250

ZNR UUUUU

P 032220Z JUN 67

FM AMEMBASSY BATHURST

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY DAKAR

RUDSLC/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

STATE GRNC

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UNCLAS BATHURST 67

003906

1967 JUN 3 PM 6 58

JUNE 2 THE GAMBIA GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA (PROCLAIMED BY MIL GOV EASTERN NIGERIA) BBC MAY 30 BROADCAST REPORTING GAMBIAN RECOGNITION WAS MADE WITHOUT AUTHORITY GAMBIA GOVERNMENT.
LOUGHRAN
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

0539

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

POL 16 BIAFRA

TRPS7-6 US

207423
NIGERIA

JUN 2 7 02 PM '67

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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE
AmCon ENUGU IMMEDIATE

Info:

STATE

207423
POL 16 BIAFRA ENUGU

REF: Enugu 780; Lagos 9754 and State 205686

We do not believe it would be desirable to collaborate even indirectly with GOEN on contents of public statement it may issue. Any effort at collaboration might be used for propoganda purposes and be inconsistent with our efforts to maintain an ~~an~~ evenhanded policy. Consider that material contained in statements reported Department and Lagos reftels already brought to GOEN attention should suffice.

807423

RUSK

ENCLOSURE BY RS/R

Drafted by: AMEMB LAGOS:NTF:RMelbourne:sgb:6/2

8711

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Nigerian Task Force - Mr. Melbourne

Clearances:

AF - Amb. Trimble (draft)

Rm

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0540

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VIND 954503
By: MMNARA Date: 10/5/03

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EP 6-1 ENUGU
XR PS 7-6 US-NIGERIA
POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action
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Info

VZIZCEIC104(5--482
SS OO RUDTCR RUEHC
GPM DE RUTA 1531351
SP ZNXXR UUUUU
SC O C21314Z
SAH FM AMCONSUL ENUGU
L TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
H AMEMBASSY LAGOS
EUR AMEMBASSY LONDON
IO GRNC
P BT
P UNCLAS

RE STATE 20664C, ENUGU 780

1. DISCUSSED WITH AKPAN ALONG LINES APPROPRIATE SECTIONS REFTELS.
AID HE HAS SEEN MILGOV AND INFORMED ME ORALLY NECESSARY CLEARANCE SHIPS AND
PC
E AIRCRAFT ENUGU AND PORT HARCOURT WOULD BE GRANTED ON WRITTEN REQUEST
SR IN WHATEVER NUMBERS REQUIRED.
ORM 2. WISH EMPHASIZE AGAIN ENORMOUS DIFFICULTY COORDINATING MOVEMENT
SCA INDETERMINATE NUMBER WIDELY DISPERSED CITIZENS IN NORTHERN HALF RE-
SCS GION THROUGH PORT HARCOURT. IF SIZEABLE NUMBER UKCITS REQUEST
O FACILITIES, UNCERTAIN THIS TIME HOW MANY WILL BE INVOLVED IN
SY MOVEMENT BUT HOLD TO OUR ESTIMATE ENUGU 780. IT IMPERATIVE THEREFORE
PER THAT IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE FOR NECESSARY AIRCRAFT. FYI
OPR ENUGU AIRSTRIP RECENTLY IMPROVED AND CAN HANDLE FOUR ENGINE PISTON
OC PLANES.
CAB 3. AKAPAN RECOMMENDING TO MILGOV THAT GOEN ISSUE PUBLIC
COM STATEMENT ANNOUNCING GOEN CONCURRENCE AND COOPERATION WITH EVACUATION.
DOT URGENTLY REQUEST POINTS WE MIGHT SUGGEST BE INCLUDED IN SUCH STATEMENT.
FAA

BT
RSR PASSED S/S-O, 6/267, 11:00 AM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA NSA, 6/2/67, 11:55 PM

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1967 JUN 2 AM 10 27

ENUGU 781
BIAFRA
XR EP 6-1 ENUGU

0541

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VNI 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Classification

PRIORITY

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PRIORITY

REF: State 204937 —

1. On May 30, Nigeria's Eastern Region declared its independence and designated itself as QTE Republic of Biafra UNQTE. Col. Gowon (now Major General), Head of Nigeria's Federal Military Government (FMG), reacted to East's announcement by declaring it QTE an act of rebellion which will be crushed. UNQTE. He ordered general mobilization, proclaimed blockade of Eastern coastal waters, and severed air, road, postal and telecommunications links with East.

FYI We doubt that FNG has military capability of crushing East by force.

End FYI.

3. In view of increasing ~~fi~~ risks to 7320 U.S. citizens in Nigeria, we have advised our nationals against all except absolutely essential travel to any

Drafted by: AFW:MLOP4met/RPMrch:sm AFKAKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK 6/2/67 Clearance: KKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKKK	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
	7573	AF - Ambassador Trimble
Nigerian Task Force - RRMelbourne		

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MV 150303
By MV NARA Date 05/01

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*
POL 23-9 NIGERIA
XR POL 16 BIAFRA

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45
Action
AF

002765

Info ERVZCZCQSA276
PP RUDTCR RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEPJS
DE RUTALS 307BB 1531600
SS ZNY CCCCC
GPM P 021545Z JUNE 67
SP FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
SC TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
SAH INFO ZEN/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
I RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
H RUTANU/AMCONSUL ENUGU
EUR ZEN/AMCONSUL KADUNA
IO RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
P RUEPJS/DIA
NSC STATE GRNC
LNR BT
AID C O N F I D E N T I A L IBADAN 307
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1967 JUN 2 PM 4 29

MICROFILMED BY RH/R

IBADAN 307 6-2-67

1. DURING CALL AT SECRETARIAT, ASST. AID DIRECTOR REED
UNEXPECTEDLY ENCOUNTERED WEST MILGOV BRIG. ADEBAYO WHO
MADE FOLLOWING BRIEF COMMENTS ON PRESENT CRISIS:
A) FMG WILL NOT ATTACK EAST ALTHOUGH UNAUTHORIZED
SKIRMISHES POSSIBLE;
B) EAST WILL BE BROUGHT BACK TO FEDERATION WITHIN THREE
MONTHS. HE IMPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED
THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AND/OR POLITICAL PRESSURE.

PAGE 2 RUTALS 307BB C O N F I D E N T I A L
2. ADEBAYO HAS YET TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON
CRISIS AND I HAVE NOT SOUGHT HIM OUT BELIEVING IT
BEST TO LET WESTERN LEADERS SORT OUT THEIR POSITION
DURING LAST FEW DAYS.
GP-4 SHERRY
BT

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Authority VNP954503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

37

POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State^{XR}

POL 23-9 NIGERIA

SECRET

Action

AF

Info

002914

SS VZCZCDT4501
 GPM 00 RUEHC RUTALS
 SP DE RUEHDT 5586 1532210
 SC ZNY SSSSS
 H O 022202Z ZFF6 JUN 67
 IO FM USMISSION USUN NY
 P TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 NSC INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
 INR STATE GRNC
 AID BT
 PC S E C R E T USUN 5586
 O
 OPR EASTERN REGION SECESSION
 AGR

1967 JUN 2 PM 6 20

MICROFILMED BY RM/R

USUN 5586
6-2-67

(RSR)

PAGE TWO RUEHDT 5586 S E C R E T
 IYALLA (NIGERIA) TOLD FINGER HE HAD JUST BEEN ASSURED BY
 TELEPHONE BY GOWON LATTER WOULD PUT DOWN EASTERN REGION SECESSION
 BY FORCE WITHIN FEW DAYS. IYALLA HAD CALLED GOWON TO URGE
 IMMEDIATE ACTION BECAUSE HE FEARS SUCCESSFUL SECESSION BY EAST
 WOULD MEAN BREAKUP NOT ONLY OF NIGERIA BUT OF MANY OTHER AFRICAN
 COUNTRIES WITH MULTI-TRIBAL POPULATION. GOWON TOLD IYALLA
 HE WAS WAITING TWO OR THREE DAYS SO THAT AMERICANS COULD GET
 THEIR DEPENDENTS OUT BEFORE MILITARY ACTION TAKEN.

GP-3

GOLDBERG
 BT

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 JUN 2 7 PM

SECRET

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 Authority VMD959503
 By MMNARA Date 10/5/03

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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
33	10	3
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AIRGRAM

Pol Nigeria
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XR Pol 18 Nigeria
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 6 2 03 PM 1967

Pol 15 Nigeria
Pol 16 Biafra

FROM : USUN - New York

DATE: June 2, 1967

SUBJECT : Communication from the Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to the SYG-UN

REF :

Em. J. J. J.
On May 31, 1967, the UN Secretariat transmitted, at the request of the Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria, the enclosed communication dated May 31, 1967, concerning Nigeria's efforts in achieving a peaceful solution to its problems and appealing to the SYG to refrain from doing anything that will impair the corporate existence sovereignty and integrity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The note states that any attempt at recognition of the so-called Republic of Biafra as a sovereign State will amount to interference in the internal affairs of his country and will be regarded as an unfriendly act.

GOLDBERG

Enclosure:

Communication from the Head of the Federal Military Government of Nigeria

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by ADMIN:DADarrer:da

Contents and Classification Approved by ADMIN:ES GARNER

Clearances:

Kallen

0545

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

JUN 2 3 49 PM '67

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Origin

Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS -- PRIORITY
INFO: USUN NEWYORK
US Mission GENEVA

STATE: 206887

POL 23-9 NIGERIA
TR POL 16 206887
BIAFRA

1. Assume prime consideration of UN Resrep in asking us to rpt Lagos 950 and Enugu 769 to UN was concern for safety approx 235 UN personnel in Nigeria.
2. Believe Embassy should keep UN Resrep Macy generally informed our evac plans and ascertain Macy plans for evacuating UN personnel. If asked, Emb should indicate USG willingness assist evac UN dependents or personnel when possible should situation develop in which regular commercial transport not adequate.
3. FYI -- Dept. believes that evac UN personnel in response to local Resrep request would underscore fact our evac, and that of other western powers, motivated solely by consideration safety individuals and had no political overtones. END FYI

END

RUSK

Drafted by:

IO/UNP/EPicard:jc:mf 6/2/67

Tel. Ext.
7043

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: AF-Amb. WCTrimble

Classified by:

UNP - Miss Brown EAB

WLG - Mr. McDonnell(draft)jk

AFW-RPSmith

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0546

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Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State* *Pol 16 Biafra*

48

UNCLASSIFIED

002048

Action

AF VZCZCQSA 183
RR RUDSLC RUEHC
DE RUQSUC 7546 1531235
Info ZNR UUUUU
R 021230Z MAY67
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDSLC/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
STATE GRNC
SAH BT
L UNCLAS KINSHASA 7546
II

1967 JUN 2 AM 8 55

EUR GOVERNMENT-OWNED CONGOLESE PRESS AGENCY REPORTED WITHOUT
TO COMMENT JUNE 2 THAT PRESIDENT MOBUTU HAS RECEIVED MESSAGE
P FROM COLONEL GOWON REQUESTING GDRC REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT
CELA THAT MIGHT CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION OF "BIAFRA" INDEPENDENCE.
NSC ELAKE
INR BT
CIA
NSA
DOD
AID

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6/2/67

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

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POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

XR POL 15 BIAFRA

82

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

AF P R 011540Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
RUTALS/AMCONSUL ENUGU
GEM STATE GRHC
SP BT
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CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 10028

1967 JUN 1 PM 4 57

SUBJ: NIGERIA

TALKS WHICH FREDERICKS AND EMPOFF HAD TODAY WITH SIR
MORRICE JAMES AND ERIC NORRIS OF CO ELICITED FOLLOWING
INFORMATION ON NIGERIA.

1. RECOGNITION. GOWON SENT PERSONAL MESSAGE TO WILSON
ASKING HMG NOT TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA. HMG IN NO HURRY TO
RECOGNIZE, BUT WILL WAIT AND SEE WHAT OTHER AFRICAN
COUNTRIES DO.

RSR

PAGE 2 RUDTCP 10028 CONFIDENTIAL

2. AT SAME TIME, HMG MUST MAINTAIN POST IN ENUGU TO LOOK
AFTER UK INTERESTS AND CITIZENS IN EAST. HMG HAS ALREADY
TOLD FMG OF ITS NEED TO MAINTAIN WORKING RELATIONS WITH
EAST. THIS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN VIEW OGBU'S STATEMENT
THAT FMG NO LONGER ABLE TO GUARANTEE PROTECTION OF UK
NATIONALS IN EAST.

3. DEPUTY NCOM PARKER WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO TELL
OJUKWU THAT HMG DESIRES TO MAINTAIN WORKING RELATIONS
WITH ENUGU ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. PARKER WILL
MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OJUKWU CANNOT EXPECT EARLY DECISION
ON RECOGNITION; THAT IT NECESSARY FIRST TO GET COUNTRY
FIRMLY ESTABLISHED AMONG AFRICAN STATES.

4. NORRIS THOUGHT IT LIKELY THAT OJUKWU WOULD USE
OCCASION TO RAISE QUESTION AGAIN OF ESTABLISHING AGENT
GENERAL'S OFFICE IN LONDON. IF THIS ONLY WAY TO KEEP UK
OFFICE IN ENUGU, HMG WOULD PROBABLY BE AGREEABLE TO SUCH

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LONDON 10028

0548

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954503
By MNA Date 10/5/03

66 POL 23-9 NIGERIA
TR POL 16 BIAFRA
Department of State

48
Action NNNNVZCZCQSA262
AF DE RUENI 5213 1521250
Info ZNY CCCCC
R 311000Z MAY 67 ZFO
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUENI/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUTAL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
SP RUOSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
SC RUDTCA/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
SAH RUOSMC/AMEMBASSY MOGADISHU
L STATE GRNC
H RT
EUR C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 5213
P REF: DEPCIRG 204037
NSC SURJ: NIGERIAN CRISIS
INR
CIA
NSA
DOD
AID
PC

000586
1967 JUN 1 AM 9 24

1. EMPLOYED USED OCCASION OF VISIT TO MINFORN AFFAIRS
ON ANOTHER MATTER THIS MORNING TO SEEK KENYAN REACTION
TO SECESSION BIAFRA. ALTHOUGH LEVEL RELATIVELY LOW (UNSEC
INDIRE) OBSERVATIONS DERIVED FROM MEETING MAY BE OF INTEREST.

2. KENYA'S CONCERN OVER BREAK-UP NIGERIA HAS BEEN AND
CONTINUES GENUINE BECAUSE PROBLEM HAS INTERNAL
RELEVANCE TO MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES, INCLUDING KENYA WITH
ITS OWN CONALI SEPARATIST PRESSURE.

FROM 2 RUENI 5213 C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. COK UNLIKELY ENTERTAIN THOUGHIF RECOGNITION BIAFRA
IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE BECAUSE IT CONTINUES REGARD SECESSION
ISSUE AS INTERNAL NIGERIAN PROBLEM AND KENYAITA TOOK THIS
LINE DURING RECENT WY MISSION HERE (NAIROBI'S 3951)
AND IN HIS ANSWER TO LETTERFROM OJUKWU.
4. COK-GOVT UGANDA CONSULTATION ON NIGERIAN PROBLEMS
HAS REVEALED IDENTITY OF VIEWS.
5. OAU WILL PROBABLY KEEP NIGERIAN CRISIS IFDCONTEXT
OF INTERNAL PROBLEM, REFUSE TAKE ANY STEP WHICH WOULD LEND
LEGITIMACY TO BIAFRA SECESSION, AND TAKE FIRM ROLE IN
DIRECTION OF RECONCILIATION. HOWEVER, ANY SIGNIFICANT
RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA BY AFRICAN STATES WOULD INEVITABLY
COMPLICATE PO POSITION EWU. FERGUSON
RT

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Nairobi 5213
6-1-67

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0549

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By MNA Date 10/3/05

46

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassies YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE

Info:

INFO: * DOUALA

ENUGU
LAGOS

STATE 206370

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

If Nigerian evacuation plans develop in such a way that Douala should be safe haven for evacuees from East Nigeria and Parker should need additional help, can you provide one or more officers to assist on short-term basis?

GP-3

END

RUSK

7
AF/AFCW:MLC:ook:1sr

6/1/67

Int. Ext.
4323Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AFCW - Hendrik van Oss

Clearance:

AFW - Mr. Melbourne *RM*

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Classification

FORM DS-322
11-65

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

206370

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action NNNN/VZCZCQSA040
AF RR RUDKJA RUDTCR RUEHC RUEHCR RUFNCR
DE RUTALS 9683CC 1521300
ZNY CCCCC

CONFIDENTIAL

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Info R 011246Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDKJA/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
SP RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA
SC RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
SAH RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
L RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY COTONOU
H RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
EUR RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
NEA RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY LOME
IO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
P RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MON ROVIA
USIA RUQSN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
NSC RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY NAIMEY
INR RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
CIA RUTAND/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
NSA ZEN/AMCONSUL ENUGU
DOD ZEN/AMCONSUL IBADAN
AID ZEN/AMCONSUL KADUNA
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PAGE 2-RUTALS 9683CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 9683

1. EASTERN NIGERIAN DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION CYPRION EKWENSI'S UNWISE AND EVIDENTLY UNAUTHORIZED (CAS ANE-161) PUBLICATION OF ~~ERRONEOUS~~ REPORT MAY 30 THAT SEVERAL FOREIGN GOVTS HAD RECOGNIZED BIAFRA PROBABLY HAS DAMAGED EASTERN GOVT'S EFFORTS PORTRAY ITSELF AND "BIAFRA" CAUSE IN GOOD LIGHT. QUICK DENIALS WERE MADE BY USG, USSR, AND ISRAEL, AND LATER BY GHANA, ETHIOPIA, AND GUINEA. RADIO BROADCAST FROM CONAKRY MAY 30 (FBIS N302100) INDICATIVE OF RUFFLED FEELINGS RESULTED FROM EAST'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON RECOGNITION. DENYING GUINEA HAD RECOGNIZED REBEL REGIME OF OJUKWU, RADIO GUINEA SAID OJUKWU'S NAME WILL BE SYNONYM FOR COWARDICE AND TREASON FROM NOW ON, AND EQUATED OJUKWU WITH ISHOMBE.
2. RADIO LOME TODAY SAID NO COUNTRY HAS OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED EXISTENCE SECESSIONIST REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA.

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-2- LAGOS 9683, 6/1/67

3. EDITORIAL IN TODAY'S MORNING POST REFERS TO RADIO GUINEA'S DESCRIPTION OF OJUKWU AS ISHOMBE, AND EXCORIATES EASTERN GOVERNMENT FOR "BRAZEN FALSEHOOD THAT THEIR GANG

PAGE 3 RUTALS 9683CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
OF ICONCLAST AND VANDALS HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED BY FIVE
AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES." POST ADDED, "THE CHILDREN
OF UNTRUTH AND DARKNESS MUST BE EXPOSED AND ROUTED. THE
AMBITIOUS REBELS MUST BE CRUSHED AND THE CORPORATE EXISTENCE
OF THE FATHERLAND ENSURED."

GP-3. MATHEWS.

BT

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Authority	VND959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Action

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RR RUEHC

DE RUQSDA 4292X 1520830

SS ZNR UUUUU

GPM R 010825Z JUN 67

SF FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

SC TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC

SAH INFO RUQSFE/AMCONSUL ASMARA

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EUR UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 4292

IO

P IEG MOFA ISSUED DENIAL MAY 31 QTE STATEMENTS FROM EASTERN NIGERIA

USIA ALLEGING IEG HAD RECOGNIZED SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA. UNQIE.

NSC RELEASE SAID CLAIM BASELESS, STATED THAT IEG RECOGNIZE ONLY FEDERATION

INR OF THE REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA.

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Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

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POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

POL 23-9 NIGERIA

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11. Action NNNVZCZCOT 426
TO RR RUDSC RUDSLC RUENC
DE RUEHDT 5558 1522230
ZNR UUUUU
R 012130Z JUNE 67
FM USUN NEWYORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUDSLC/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
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UNCLAS USUN 5558
NIGERIAN COMMUNICATION TO SYG

1967 JUN 1 PM 7
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6-1-67

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PAGE 2 RUEHDT 5558 UNCLAS

MESSAGE DATED MAY 30 FROM FMG HEAD GOWON TO U THANT CIRCULATED TO ALL MEMBERS AT GOWONS REQUEST. AS NOTE VERBALE TODAY. AFTER BRIEF HISTORY OF NIGERIA'S DIFFICULTIES, MESSAGE CALLS OJUKWU'S UDI "ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL...AND ACT OF REBELLION". FMG TAKING STEPS CONTAIN REBELLION. APPEALS TO SYG TO REFRAIN FROM DOING ANYTHING IMPAIR CORPORATE EXISTENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY OF FRG. CONCLUDES BY STATING "ANY ATTEMPT AT RECOGNITION OF SO-CALLED REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA AS SOVEREIGN STATE WILL AMOUNT TO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF MY COUNTRY AND WILL BE REGARDED AS UNFRIENDLY ACT".

GOLDBERG
BT

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Authority VND959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/03

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POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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P 011720Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUTAND/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
RUEPJS/DIA
RUTANU/AMCONSUL ENUGU
ZEN/AMCONSUL IBADAN
ZEN/AMCONSUL KADUNA
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 JUN 1 PM 7 10

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6-1-67

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 9722

1. OJUKWU GAVE INTERVIEW IN ENUGU YESTERDAY (MAY 31)
TO DONALD LOUCHHEIM, WASHINGTON POST CORRESPONDENT.

LOUCHHEIM DESCRIBED OJUKWU AS VERY RELAXED, THOUGH
SOMBER AND THOUGHTFUL. OJUKWU CATEGORICALLY REJECTED ANY
COMPARISON BIAFRA WITH KATANGA; SAID THAT, UNLIKE KATANGA,
EASTERN NIGERIA DID NOT WANT TO SECEDE BUT WAS
FORCED TO. HE ASSERTED HE NOT RPT NOT PUPPET LIKE TSHOMBE.

2. OJUKWU STATED AIM OF EAST IS TO HAVE A GOVT THAT WILL
STAY CLEAR OF COLD WAR ISSUES AND CONCENTRATE ON AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT AND REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT. SAID PRIVATE ENTER-
PRISE WILL BE ENCOURAGED AND HIS GOVT HAS NO INTENTION
INTERFERING WITH INVESTMENT AND MEANS OF PRODUCTION.

3. HE TOLD LOUCHHEIM HE BELIEVES KEY TO WHETHER THERE WILL
BE PROLONGED AND DISASTROUS WAR WILL BE MAJOR WESTERN
GOVERNMENTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD FMG USE OF FORCE AND TOWARD
RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA. SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE GOWON WILL
BE ABLE MOUNT COORDINATED CAMPAIGN UNLESS HE HAS BACKING
OF FMG AND USC. ON OTHER HAND, HE FEELS HE WILL BE HOME
FREE IF UK AND US RECOGNIZE BIAFRA.

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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Department of State

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1. IN EVENT EAST ATTACKED BY NORTH WE BELIEVE GREATEST DANGER EXISTS FOR EXPATS ON WESTERN AND NORTHERN BORDERS FROM ONITSHA TO OGOJA, EXCLUDING CLHDIG ENUGU. 300 AMCITS THIS AREA, PROBABLY 400 OTHERS EXPATS, ALL OF WHOM SHOULD BE MOVED OUT OF DANGER IN LIKELY EVENT TROUBLE. THIS AREA GREATEST DISTANCE FROM PORT HARCOURT AND EVAC THROUGH PH WOULD REQUIRE ROAD JOURNEY 5 TO 8 HOURS AT BEST.

2. EVAC UK CITS LEFT TO PARKER'S DISCRETION BUT HE FEELS HE MUST FOLLOW OUR LEAD. ESTIMATED 3,000 US/UK DEPENDENTS ENTIRE EAST WHO WIDELY DISPERSED. PROBABLE ADDITIONAL 1,000 OTHER NATIONALITIES. ONCE EVAC DEPENDENTS BEGUN, WE ANTICIPATE TOTAL NUMBER EXPATS SEEKING REMOVAL AT LEAST 5,010.

3. PORT HARCOURT NOT RPT NOT BELIEVED DANGER AREA IN EVENT HOSTILITIES, AND SUITABLE FOR EVAC 1,200 AMCITS? AND 2,400 OTHER EXPATS NEAR COAST. BELIEVE PH NOT RPT NOT SUITABLE EVAC THOSE 700 AMCITS (AND 1200 OTHER EXPATS) WHO LOCATED NORTH OVERRI UMUHIA LINE. LACK ORGANIZED STAGING FACILITIES AND UNPREDICTABLE ROAD CONDITIONS RAISE SERIOUS LOGISTIC AND SECURITY PROBLEMS DURING EVAC PROCESS. WE BELIEVE EVAC THOSE IN NORTHERN HALF EAST SHOULD BE BY AIR FROM ENUGU WHERE MAXIMUM COOPERATION AUTHORITIES AND PROTECTION EVACUEES MORE CERTAIN. PRELIMINARY STAGING COULD BE AT E AND E ASSEMBLY POINTS, WITH ROAD TRAVEL TO ENUGU BY ORGANISED CONVOY.

5. ALTHOUGH OJUKWU ASSENTED TO RELATIVELY SMALL EVAC DEPENDENTS BY DC-6 FROM PH, HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT SAY YES OR NO TO AFRICAN RAINBOW. HE SAID CONSPICUOUS LARGE SCALE MOVEMENT

COULD POSSIBLY INDUCE REACTION FROM PUBLIC WHICH WOULD INTERPRET AMCITS EVAC AS ANTI-EAST. SAID HE WOULD GIVE FULLEST SUPPORT IF DANGER TO EXPATS LIKELY BUT NONE AT THIS TIME. SAID HE EXPECTS ATTACK ON EAST BUT ROADS BLOCKED AT

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ENUGU 780

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By MVA Date 10/5/05

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-2- ENUGU 780, 6/1/67

BORDER (WE BELIEVE BRIDGES BEING DESTROYED) AND BUSH IMPASSIBLE.
SAID THERE NO RPT NO DANGER FROM SEA.

6. HAVE NOT RPT NOT DISCUSSED WITH OJUKWU EVACUATION ON
SCALE WE ANTICIPATE IF ONCE STARTED CANNOT THEREFORE PREDICT
THIS TIME EXTENT HIS COOPERATION ALTHOUGH HE NOT RPT NOT
LIKELY ACTIVELY OPPOSE. CANNOT PREDICT EASTERN PUBLIC REACTION
ALTHOUGH THERE LIKELY BE CONSIDERABLE PANIC AND VERY POSSIBLE
ACTIVE HOSTILITY, ESPECIALLY IF IT LEARNED EAST PRIMARILY
AFFECTED AND MOVES INTERPRETED AS ANTI "BIAFRA".

7. IF SITUATION SO GRAVE AS REQUIRE EVAC FROM EAST WE BELIEVE
SIMULTANEOUS MOVES SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ALL OTHE REGIONS IN
ORDER AVOID PROBABLE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES ACTIONS APPEARING
BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST EAST. ALSO BELIEVE ORDERLY
EVACUATION FROM EAST BEST ACCOMPLISHED BY CLOSEST POSSIBLE
ADHERENCE ENUGU E AND E PLAN.

BARNARD
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O 6/1/67 9:30 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA 6/1/67 9:30 PM

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MW NARA Date 10/5/05

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Pol 23-9 NIGERIA

Pol 16 BIAFRA

CONFIDENTIAL

R 311554Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY DOUALA
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY ENUGU
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY IBADAN
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY KADUNA
RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
RUTAND/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
STATE GRNC
BT

1967 MAY 31 PM 3 41

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 19545

NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS

QUAI'S NIGERIAN DESKOFF MAY 31 ADDED FOLLOWING DETAILS TO
VIEWS QUAI'S AFRICA DIRECTOR REPORTED REFTEL:

1. QUAI OF COURSE ALSO WATCHING BRITISH AND
COMMONWEALTH REACTION TO PROCLAMATION BIAFRA REPUBLIC, AND WILL
BE INFLUENCED BY IT.
2. THERE APPROX 400 FRENCH NATIONALS IN EASTERN REGION.
3. MAJOR FRENCH INTEREST IN EAST IS OIL (ERAP WELLS NEAR

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 19545 CONFIDENTIAL
PORT HARCLURT); THERE ALSO SMALLER "FRENCH WELLS" IN MIDWEST.
UNITED BANK OF AFRICA, SGOA, CFAO, MICHELIN, PEUGEOT AND BERLIET
AMONG OTHER FRENCH FIRMS ACTIVE IN EAST.

4. CAMEROONIAN GOVT HAS GIVEN FRENCH PRELIMINARY REPLY
TO FRENCH REQUEST FOR ASSESSMENT EFFECTS SECESSION NIGERIA'S
EASTERN REGION SENT ALL FRANCOPHONIC GOVTS ON NIGERIA'S PERIPHERY.
CAMEROONIAN GOVT (A) CONSIDERS PROCESSES SET IN MOTION BY ENUGU
REGIME IRREVERSIBLE; (B) STATES THAT ULTIMATE OUTCOME THERE
DEVELOPMENTS REMAINS OBSCURE; (C) DOES NOT FOR TIME BEING ANTICIPATE
CAMEROONIAN DOMESTIC DISORDERS AS IMMEDIATE RESULT PROCLAMATION
BIAFRA REPUBLIC; (D) EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER PROBLEMS EAST'S
SECESSION COULD WELL ENTAIL IN CONNECTION NORTHERN CAMEROON'S
FOREIGN TRADE; (E) CONSIDERS THAT PROLONGED TURBULENCE IN NIGERIA
COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SITUATION CREATED FOLLOWING 1961 REFERENDUM
WHICH PLACED WEST CAMEROON UNDER GFRC AUTHORITY, PARTICULARLY
IN SOUTH.

GP-3. BOHLEN
BT

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PARIS - 19545
5-31-67

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By MVA Date 10/5/05

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

POL 16 BIAFRA

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Action

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P 311130Z MAY 67
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUDSLC/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC
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UNCLAS ACCRA 3523

LAGOS 9601

GHANA HAS NOT RECOGNIZED BIAFRA. MINEXTAFF HAS INSTRUCTED ITS HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LAGOS TO DENY REPORT.

FOLEY

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1967 MAY 31 PM 12 4

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Salvador Llanos BY 03/10

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Authority VND950503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 16 BIAFRA

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 4274

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1. FONMIN KETEMA AT END DISCUSSION OTHER MATTERS CONFIRMED
ETHIOPIA HAS NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZED BIAFRA NOR ANY INTENTION
TO DO SO.

NSA

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AID

EC

2. MALCOLM MACDONALD WHO HERE FOR THREE DAY VISIT WAYS KETEMA
FURIOUS WITH BEC FOR BROADCASTING DENIALS OF TOGO AND ISRAEL
RE RECOGNITION WHILE IGNORING ETHIOPIA. ADDED THAT IEG VERY
CONCERNED ABOUT BREAKAWAY PRECEDENT OF EAST AND WILL SUPPORT
ALL FMG EFFORTS TO RE-UNITE.

ESR

KORRY

BT

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1967 MAY 31 AM 9 37

*Cable Alaska 4274
5-31-67*

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Authority <i>VND 954/503</i>
By <i>MM</i> NARA Date <i>10/5/05</i>

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

POL 16 BIAFRA

NR POL BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Kaduna 736

3

UNCLASSIFIED

Action
AF

P 311020Z MAY 67
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUUSLC/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

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1967 MAY 31 PM 9 38

Info

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RUUSLB/AMCONSULATE IBADAN
RUUSLE/AMCONSULATE ENUGU
RUTGHB/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 19
RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 137
RUEDPSA/CINCSSTRIKE CINCEAFSA
RUEKDA/DIA
RUTGYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY COTONOU
STATE GRNC
BT
UNCLAS KADUNA 736

SUBJECT: NORTHERN NIGERIA NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF EASTERN SECESSION
ANNOUNCEMENT"

1. GOVERNMENT - OWNED NEW NIGERIAN OF KADUNA, MAY 31, FEATURES

THREE LINE BANNER HEADLINE QUOTE GOWON TO CRUSH EAST REBELLION UNQUOTE
LEAD ARTICLE REPEATS FMG STATEMENTS OF MAY 30.
BACK PAGE HEADED QUOTE MOBILIZATION UNQUOTE WITH ARTICLE COVERING
ORDER BY NORTHERN AREA COMMAND, NIGERIAN ARMY OF IMMEDIATE MOBI-
LIZATION OF ALL ABLE-BODIED RESERVISTS DISCHARGED SINCE 1939 BUT
NOT OVER 50 YEARS OF AGE.

2. NEW NIGERIAN EDITORIAL HEADED QUOTE TOMORROW WILL BE
THE JUDGE UNQUOTE.

TEXT IN FULL FOLLOWS: "THE NEWS IS BAD. IT COULD HARDLY BE
WORSE. THE INEVITABLE HAS HAPPENED. EMOTIONS HAVE
TRUMPHEED AND REASON LAYS TRAMPLED IN THE DUST.

THOSE WHO FOR MONTHS CHERISHED THE HOPE, ALBEIT A FADING HOPE,
AND THE IBOS HAVE HAD THEIR FAIR SHARE OF IT. YET WHEN
TRIBAL LOYALTIES ARE FANNED TO FEVER POINT, WHAT CHANCE HAS GOOD
SENSE OR RATIONAL THOUGHT? ONE CAN UNDERSTAND HOW ORDINARY PEO-
PLE CAN BE DELUDED INTO TAKING A STRICTLY TRIBALISTIC OR NATION-
TIC PATH.

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Authority VND 954503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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-2- KADUNA 736 311020Z MAY 67

THE NAZIS SUCCEEDED IN DELIDING THE BULK OF THE GERMANS, A SOPHISTICATED, EDUCATED AND ENLIGHTENED PEOPLE AND PLUNGING THE WORLD INTO FOUR YEARS OF HORROR AS A RESULT. SO WE SHOULD NOT BLAME THE MASS OF THE IBOS FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED. WHO SHOULD HAVE KNOWN BETTER. THEY WERE AWARE FROM THE START OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS. THEIR BRAGADOCIO DECEIVED NON-ONE. THEY WERE HELL-BENT ON TROUBLE, SPURNING THE HAND OF COMPROMISE, REJECTING CONTEMPTUOUSLY THE MANY CONCESSIONS MADE TOWARDS THEM. THEY SPAT UPON THE OFFERED HAND OF FRIENDSHIP.

WE HAVE LIVED WITH RECRIMINATION OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER FOR THE LAST 15 MONTHS AS THIS LATEST CHAPTER IN OUR SORROWFUL HISTORY UNFOLDS THEY ARE BOUND TO START AFRESH. ONLY THE CONSCIENCE OF MAN AND THE PASSING OF TIME WILL ATTRIBUTE FAIRLY THE BLAME FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED.

""SUPPORT BY ALL""

IN THE MEANTIME ALL WE CAN DO IS TO SUPPORT THOSE WHO, WITH JUSTICE IN THEIR HEARTS AND COMPASSION IN THEIR SOULS, SEEK A WAY OUT OF OUR TROUBLES. AT THIS STAGE THIS MEANS THE USE OF FORCE, BUT THIS HAS NOW BECOME INEVITABLE AND MUST BE SUPPORTED BY ALL.

WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT MORE THAN THE FUTURE OF THIS COUNTRY IS AT STAKE. FORGET THE HYPOCRISY THAT ABOUNDS. IGNORE THE DOUBLE-DEALING THAT GOES ON. INSTEAD, REMEMBER THAT THE EYES OF THE WORLD ARE ON NIGERIA. THAT WHAT HAPPENS IN THIS COUNTRY--WHAT WE ALLOW TO HAPPEN--WILL UNQUESTIONABLY SET THE PATTERN FOR THE REST OF AFRICA. OUR FAILURE WILL BE AFRICA'S FAILURE.

IF THIS STILL POTENTIALLY GREAT AND INFLUENTIAL COUNTRY IS ALLOWED TO FRAGMENT, IT WILL BE LIKE PUTTING THE CLOCK BACK A HUNDRED YEARS OR MORE. TODAY CAN ONLY PROVIDE THE EVIDENCE. TOMORROW WILL BE THE JUDGE.""
STOKES
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:39 A.M. JUNE 1.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA AT
1:39 A.M. JUNE 1.

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Authority	VND 950/503
By	MW NARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 23-9 NIGERIA
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*
XR POL 16 B IAFRA

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CORRECTION ISSUED:
6/16/67, 12:45 AM, VT

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Action

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Z 300455Z MAY 67

FM AMCONSUL ENUGU - CORRECTED PAGE 1

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH

RUDICR/AMEMBASSY LONDON

RUDSLC/AMEMBASSY LAGOS

RUTGYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

INFO RUDSLB/AMCONSUL IBADAN IMMEDIATE

RUDSLK/AMCONSUL KADUNA

RUFJC/AMEMBASSY PARIS

RUTGHB/AMEMBASSY ACCRA

RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE/CINCEAFSA

RUEPJS/DIA

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS ENUGU 769GG

YAOUNDE PASS HOST GOVERNMENT

FOLLOWING TEXT DECLARATION INDEPENDENCE REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA
(FORMERLY EASTERN NIGERIA) RECORDED 0200Z BY MIL GOV
LTC. C. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU FOR BROADCAST AT 0500Z MAY 30:

FELLOW COUNTRYMEN AND WOMEN, YOU, THE PEOPLE OF EASTERN
NIGERIA:

CONSCIOUS OF THE SUPREME AUTHORITY OF ALMIGHT GOD OVER
ALL MANKIND, OF YOUR DUTY TO YOURSELVES AND POSTERITY;
AWARE THAT YOU CAN NO LONGER BE PROTECTED IN YOUR
LIVES AND IN YOUR PROPERTY BY ANY GOVERNMENT BASED
OUTSIDE EASTERN NIGERIA;
BELIEVING THAT YOU ARE BORN FREE AND HAVE CERTAIN
INALIENABLE RIGHTS WHICH CAN BEST BE PRESERVED BY
YOURSELVES;

UNWILLING TO BE UNFREE PARTNERS IN ANY ASSOCIATION OF A
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC NATURE;

REJECTING THE AUTHORITY OF ANY PERSON OR PERSONS OTHER
THAN THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF EASTERN NIGERIA TO
MAKE ANY IMPOSITION OF WHATEVER KIND OF NATURE
UPON YOU;

DETERMINED TO DISSOLVE ALL POLITICAL AND OTHER TIES
BETWEEN YOU AND THE FORMER FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA;
PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH ASSOCIATION, TREATY OR

ALLIANCE WITH ANY SOVEREIGN STATE WITHIN THE FORMER
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA AND ELSEWHERE ON SUCH TERMS
AND CONDITIONS AS BEST TO SUBSERVE YOUR COMMON GOOD;

AFFIRMING YOUR TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN ME;
HAVING MANDATED ME TO PROCLAIM ON YOUR BEHALF, AND IN
YOUR NAME, THAT EASTERN NIGERIA BE A SOVEREIGN
INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC,

NOTE: CORRECTIONS PASSED S/S-O, WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA
& NSA AT 4:50 AM, 6/15/67.

UNCLASSIFIED

ENUGU 769

5-30-67

0563

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/03

(6)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

POL 23-9 Nigeria

204502

XR PS 7-6 US-NIGERIA

XR POL 16 BIAFRA

Origin

ACTION: CIRCULAR
TO ALL AF AND EUR DIPLOMATIC CONSULAR
POSTS --

Info

CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA PRIORITY
USUN PRIORITY

XXXX State 204937 CIRCULAR

Ref: State 204502

Nigerian Crisis

1. In early hours May 30, Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria formally proclaimed Eastern Nigeria sovereign independent Republic of Biafra. Federal Military Government (FMG) has declared state of national emergency and is reacting vigorously to Eastern action.
FYI
2. /Since FMG use of military force against East is distinct possibility, our most immediate concern is protection Amcits throughout Nigeria. / As reported reftel, we advising against unnecessary travel to any part of Nigeria or within that country. To date, Embassy Lagos has not believed that Amcits are in imminent danger or that they should consider leaving country. Further deterioration in situation would of course raise questions of additional steps.

3. It remains our basic position that ~~which~~ ^{problem of Nigeria} is a matter of primary concern to the Nigerians, to Africa and to the Commonwealth.

Drafted by AF/AFW/RPSmith:mf 5/30/67

7573

Telegraphic transcription and classification approved by

U-Mr. Katzenbach

Clearance L/AF-Mr. Runyon

AF-Mr. Palmer

S/S - Mr. Walker

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

FORM DS-322
R 65

0564

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

03
INCOMING TELEGRAM *Pol 16 BIAFRA*
Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Action RR RUEHC
DE RUQSUC 7458 1501224
ZNY CCCCC
R 301219Z MAY 67
Info FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUTALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS
STATE GRNC

BT
CONFIDENTIAL KINSHASA 7458

1. IN VIEW BAHIZI'S STATEMENT THAT GDRC WOULD NOT
RECOGNIZE EAST NIGERIA (LAGOS 9559) AND FACT QUESTION
LIKELY COME UP WITH MOBUTU OR BOMBOKO VERY SOON, WOULD
APPRECIATE AT LEAST PRELIMINARY VIEWS FROM DEPT. ON OUR
OWN RECOGNITION POLICIES AND HOW ACTIVE WE SHOULD BE WITH
GDRC AND OTHER AFRICANS ON THIS POINT.

GP-3. BLAKE
BT

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1967 MAY 30 AM 10 35
7458
5/30/67

1
CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority VND 959/503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

66 POL 23-9 NIGERIA
 POL 16 BIAFRA
 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

84-82

UNCLASSIFIED

031359

Action

MAY 30, 1967
 2:28 PM

AF VZCZCDSA971
 Info OO RUEDPSA RUEHC RUEPJS RUQSDA RUQSUC
 DE RUDSLC 9597G 1501434
 SS ZNR UUUUU
 GFM O 301432Z MAY 67
 SP FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 SC TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 I INFO/RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE/CINCEAFSA PRIORIY
 H RUEPJS/DIA
 EUR RUDKJA/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
 P RUTGHB/AMEMBASSY ACCRA
 NSC RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 INR RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY COIONOU
 AID RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
 EC RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 RUDSC/AMEMBASSY LONDON
 RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
 RUDSVC/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
 RUFJCX/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
 RUTAND/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
 ZEN/RUDSLE/AMCONSUL ENUGU
 ZEN/RUDSLB/AMCONSUL IBADAN
 ZEN/RUDSLK/AMCONSUL KADUNA
 STATE GRNC
 BT
 UNCLAS LAGOS 9597

RSR

1. AMBASSADOR CALLED TO MINEXAFF AT NOON TODAY. HE GIVEN TEXT OF MESSAGE IN FOLLOWING PARA BEING SENT ALL HEADS OF STATE.

2. YOU ARE NO DOUBT AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH NIGERIA HAS FACED SINCE THE EVENTS OF 1966. I HAVE COMMUNICATED WITH YOU IN THE PAST ON THE EFFORTS WHICH MY GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THESE PROBLEMS.

PAGE TWO RUDSLC 9597G UNCLAS
 UNFORTUNATELY OUR EFFORTS HAVE NOT RESULTED IN THE SUCCEESS THAT WE ALL HOPED FOR AS A RESULT OF THE INTRANSIGENCE OF HE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF EASTERN NIGERIA LT.COL. ODUMEGWU OJUKWU. ALL THE CONCESSIONS I HAVE MADE HAVE BEEN REBUFFED. THE FINAL EFFORT WAS THAT OF THE

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND 959503
 By MNA Date 10/5/05

POL 23-9 NIGERIA
 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State POL 16 BIAFRA

SECRET

53
 Action
 AF

CZCMA733
 00 RUDLAR RUEHC
 DE RUTALFA9607: 1501500
 ZNY SSSSS
 O P 301450Z MAY 67 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 TO RUEHC/ SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 INFO RUDTICR/ AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
 STATE GRNC
 BT
 S E C R E T LAGOS 9600

1967 MAY 30 PM 12 04

031293
 9600
 5-30-67

ENR
 P
 NSC
 INR
 AID
 EC

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM ENUGU DATED 30 MAY REPEATED YOU ACTION:

QTE ENUGU 773

REF: LAGOS 9572, 9591

RSR

1. OJUKWU DID NOTIKASE SUBJECT OF RECOGNITION, NOR, FROM TELECON WITH ONYEGDULA A FEW MINUTES AGO, HAS GOEN REQUESTED RECOGNITION FROM ANY GOVERNMENT AS YET. MY STATEMENT TO OJUKWU WAS THAT HE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE DECISIONS FROM ANY GOVT ON THIS QUESTION IF EAST DECLARED INDEPENDENCE.

2. PARKER, NKWO AND I SUMMONED TO PREMIER'S LODGE AT 0300 MAY 30 WITHOUT ADVANCE EXPLANATION. OJUKWU MADE LONG STATEMENT WHICH RECORDED AND FILMED, TERMINATING IN DECLARATION INDEPENDENCE. DURING CHAPAGNE TOASTS WHICH FOLLOWED, INVOLVING MOST SENIOR GOEN OFFICIALS, PARKER, NKWO AND I EMPHASIZED TO ALL, INCLUDING OJUKWU, THAT WE NOW IN POSITION WHERE WE COULD DO OR SAY NOTHING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. THIS ACCEPTED BY ALL WITHOUT ARGUMENT. WE DID NOT RPT NOT TOAST TO BIAFRA, AND REFUSED BE PHOTOGRAPHED OR MAKE STATEMENTS.

3. WHEN PRESSED, CONSULATES'S LINE ON RECOGNITION HAS BEEN THAT DECISION WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON WHEN APPROPRIATE TIME COMES, AND THAT IN MEANTIME CONSULATE'S FUNCTION WILL BE REPORT DEVELOPMENTS, LOOK AFTER WELFAG AMCITS IN EAST, AND AVOID ALL ACTIONS WHICH WOULD ANTICIPATE WHAT WASHINGTON MAY DECIDE.

4. HAVE COORDINATED WITH NKWO AND PARKER RE SWEARING IN CEREMONY. ONYEBGULA ACCEPTED OUR REGRETS AS IF THEY FULLY EXPECTED AND UNDERSTOOD. BARNARD.

Note: Advance copy S/S-O, White House, USIA, CIA, NSA, DOD, AT
 12:30PM 5/30/67

SECRET

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND959503
 By M/MNARA Date 10/5/03

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *POL 23-9 NIGERIA*
Department of State *TR POL 16 BIAFRA*

52

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

VZCZCEID329TAA002
AF 00 RUEHC RUFNCR
Info DE RUTALS 9601CC 1501340
ZNY CCCCC
SS 0 P 301335Z MAY 67 ZFF4
GIN FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
ST TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SC INFO RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE CINCEAFSA PRIORITY
SAD RUEPJS/DIA
RUEDXDJ/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
RUENCR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA
RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADDISABABA
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY FILAMY
RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUTANA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
P RUQSN/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
NSC RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY NIANEY
ENR RUTAND/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AED ZEN/AMCONSUL ENUGU
PC ZEN/AMCONSUL IBADAN
OIR ZEN/AMCONSUL KADUNA
STATE GRNC
BT

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1967 MAY 30 PM 1 08

*9601
5-30-67*

RSR-

PAGE 2 RUTALS 9601CC C O N F I D E N T I A L
C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 9601

REF: LAGOS 9597

1. WHEN AMBASSADOR WAS GIVEN TEXT OF GOWON'S MESSAGE TO ALL HEADS OF STATE, DEPUTY PERMSEC ADEGOROYE RAISED QUESTION RECOGNITION REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA. HE SAID EASTERN RADIO BROADCAST TODAY STATED SEVERAL COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY RECOGNIZED BIAFRA, INCLUDING U.S. (COMMENT: EMBASSY HAS PICKED UP SEVERAL REPORTS OUT OF ENUGU TODAY THAT BIAFRA HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY ISRAEL, ZAMBIA, TANZANIA, GHANA, GUINEA, CHINA AND TOGO AS WELL AS U.S. THIS ENUGU PROPAGANDA HAS NO REPEAT NO BASIS IN FACT SO FAR AS WE CAN ASCERTAIN. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TOLD US THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT REPEAT NOT RECOGNIZED BIAFRA.)

2. BECAUSE OF ENUGU RADIO BROADCAST ADEGOROYE URGED AMBASSADOR TO ISSUE DENIAL THAT U.S. HAD RECOGNIZED BIAFRA. AMBASSADOR SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO DIGNIFY ENUGU'S PROPAGANDA BY GIVING A FORMAL DENIAL. HOWEVER HE AGREED WITH ADEGOROYE THAT IF A

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Authority VND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03